

**ART AND POLITICS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
SIX PERSPECTIVES**

Southeast Asia Paper

Number 32

Center for Southeast Asian Studies
School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies
University of Hawaii at Manoa

**ART AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY:
SIX PERSPECTIVES**

Papers from the Distinguished Scholars Series
1984-1985

edited by
Robert Van Niel

Southeast Asia Paper Number 32
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INTRODUCTION

In the years 1984 and 1985, the Southeast Asian Studies Program of the University of Hawai'i arranged to bring a number of speakers to its campus in what was called its Distinguished Scholars Lecture Series. I was asked to take charge of this program. The endeavor was extremely successful, bringing some ten scholars to the campus, each of whom gave at least two lectures or demonstrations. These events were well attended and were enthusiastically received by students, faculty, and town folk. It was the intention at the time to publish at least one of each scholar's papers in a volume in the series of Southeast Asia Papers. That intention suffered many delays from many causes, not the least of which was the reorganization of the Southeast Asian Studies Program into the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, which became one of the units within the new School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies. The publication of these papers was literally lost in the shuffle. By the time the project was revived in early 1989, some of the scholars had used their papers for other purposes and others could not be reached, but six of the original participants agreed to submit their revised papers for publication in a single volume that would commemorate the Distinguished Scholars Lectures and also make available to a wider audience the views and concerns expressed by these scholars. This volume is now in hand.

It was never the intention of the Distinguished Scholars Lecture Series to select speakers on the basis of a single theme. Rather, we hoped to bring to the University of Hawai'i campus scholars whose ideas and research were on the frontiers of their particular disciplines and who were thus laying down themes and patterns for future scholars to take into consideration. It is this fact that gives the papers in this volume a freshness that helps to overcome the delay in publication. But it is also this fact that results in the papers having little commonalty other than that they deal with Southeast Asia. It is well known that collections of diverse papers bound together in a volume such as this tend to become fugitive unless they strike a strong chord of scholarly interest and concern. While I am not versed in each of the disciplines represented by these papers, I feel certain that several of the papers in this volume will strike such a chord among readers. For my part, I shall attempt to provide pithy synopses of each author's contribution so that the reader will be moved to explore the contents of each paper more fully.

In his paper on "The Art of Sitep (Sri Deva) in Thailand," which was accompanied by a slide show, Prince Subhadradis, Rector of Silpakorn University and an art historian, describes an early site on the Pasak River in north-central Thailand. The earliest influences were Indian from Gupta times and Dvaravati. Later, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the site became a Khmer town. Excavations by the Thai Fine Arts Department have found indications of both Buddhist and Hindu influences. The town seems to have been abandoned in the early thirteenth century and was not again a settled site. Consequently the archaeological finds in the area help to reconstruct the early history of Thai and Khmer society.

Professor Kenneth R. Hall of North Adams State College in Massachusetts has written a paper on "The Politics of Plunder in the Cham Realm of Early Vietnam." The organizational structure of the Cham "state" [Champa] which controlled the southern portion of present-day Vietnam from the second

through the fifteenth centuries is explicated. The nature of this "state" was extremely segmentary, but the Cham peoples were held together through a shared value system that allowed a central authority to emerge. Cham kingship was closely related to the economic system: raiding and plundering were an essential part of Cham statecraft, supporting the royal position through redistribution of booty and captured slaves. A cultural relationship developed with Java that brought art styles and marriage partners to Champa, but this could not save the Cham realm from succumbing under the retributions of its neighbor to the north.

Professor Shelly Errington, an anthropologist from the University of California, Santa Cruz, has provided "Two Lectures on Political Process in an 'Indic State'." These two lectures are closely interrelated and actually form a single recounting of the essential conclusions of her field work in Luwu, which is (or was) a "state" on the island of Sulawesi (formerly Celebes) in Indonesia. The social relationships of the people of Luwu, both vertical and horizontal, and the system and symbols that guide these, are central in these two lectures. Persons familiar with the archipelago world of Southeast Asia will recognize the description of a hierarchical social structure as extant in former times in Luwu, but will also have experienced the changes that have been occurring since Indonesian independence. The deeply penetrating analysis of both the personal and the public aspects of living in a society that is always on the alert for aggressive penetration is so engagingly presented in these two lectures that everyone with an interest in Southeast Asia will gain something in the reading.

Professor John Emigh of Brown University takes the reader into "The Domains of Topeng," which is a solo masked dance-drama indigenous to the island of Bali, Indonesia. In this paper, the reader is not only enveloped in the intricacies of this form of popular dance-drama, but is also brought into touch with the broader practice and theory of dramatic performance on a world-wide basis. The result is a robust and penetrating analysis of the Balinese topeng, as it is seen by the Balinese and as it has been viewed by outsiders. When he visited the University of Hawai'i campus, Professor Emigh performed a topeng dance-drama, "Little Red Riding Shawl," which served to bring home many of the points made in his paper as well as providing splendid entertainment for those in attendance.

As a historian at Rutgers University, Professor Michael Adas analyzes a slice of modern Southeast Asian history in his paper, "The Annex of the Raj: The Anglo-Indian Interlude in Burmese History, c. 1826-1941." Asking the question why post-independence Burma has isolated itself from the rest of the world, he finds the answer not in a simple response to British colonialism (which did not produce similar effects elsewhere), but rather in the unique situation of Burma being "twice-colonized." This refers to the flood of Indians who were brought in or came in with the British, who treated Burma as an adjunct to their Indian Empire [Raj]. First Indian precedents in governance and law, then Indian entrepreneurs, and finally Indian migrant laborers led to a situation in which Burmese felt themselves being displaced in their own country. It was this circumstance, argues Adas, that may underlie Burma's withdrawal from the world.

What is imperialism? This question is at the heart of Professor Stephen Rosskamm Shalom's paper on "The United States and the Philippines: 'Sentimental' Imperialism or Standard Imperialism?" Professor Shalom is a political scientist on the faculty of William Patterson College in New Jersey. Applying political and economic arguments and interpretations, he argues strongly for regarding American policy, past and present, as imperialist in the standard, unadorned meaning of that word. He sees the economic forces in American society as determinant of America's involvement in other societies, especially those of the third world. His thesis is advanced through a dialectic with those scholars who have advanced contrary views about America's role in the Philippines.

This collection of papers presents a wide diversity of disciplines and interests as did the talks of the other scholars whose papers are not included in this volume. For the audience, the talks were interesting and elicited many questions and often lengthy discussion. Though readers will not have the pleasure of discussing these papers with the authors, it is my hope that they will find them pleasurable and stimulating.

The Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa is pleased to make these papers available to an extended audience.

Robert Van Niel
Professor of History

Honolulu, Hawai'i
October 1989

The Art of Sitep (Sri Deva) in Thailand

M.C. Subhadradis Diskul

The town of Sitep is a deserted ancient town in the Province of Petchabun in northern central Thailand. It is situated about five miles (8km) from the left bank of the Pasak River and is marked on the maps of Thailand as being approximately at latitude 15° 27' North and longitude 101° 612' East. It was discovered in 1904 by H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, then Minister of Interior and also the founder of the study of Thai archaeology and art history. The town can be divided into two sections: the original or inner one in an oval form about a mile square on the west surrounded with moats and earthen ramparts, and the outer or subsidiary larger one on the east in a more or less rectangular form, also surrounded with moats and earthen ramparts. They are adjoining and the western rampart and moat of the latter are also the eastern ones of the former. This is typical of an ancient oval or round town in Thailand--when there was more population, an adjacent town would be created by sharing the same moat and rampart in one direction.

The inner town of Sitep, from an archaeological point of view, can be dated back to about the 5th century A.D. from a stone inscription in Sanskrit in the form of a bell or an inverted lotus bud which might originally have been the top part of a town pillar. Though it cannot be deciphered properly, the palaeography of the script points to the 5th century A.D. The upper part of the body of a stone Krishna statue has also been discovered. It still retains strong Indian Gupta influence so the statue might belong to the same date. Also, another stone inscription has been found about 10km north of Sitep. It is also in Sanskrit and might date back to the 7th century A.D., mentioning the erection of images of Siva by the king when he ascended the throne. This king's name is Bhavavarman and Professor George Coedes, an eminent French epigraphist, surmised that he was probably King Bhavavarman I of Chenla who was a half-brother of King Mahendravarman by a different father. If this surmise is correct, it means that the kingdom of Chenla in Laos and Cambodia spread its influence at a very early stage into the present-day northern central Thailand. This supposition has now, however, been contested by other epigraphists whose theory is that the text mentions only a comparison to King Bhavavarman, and was not issued by King Bhavavarman I himself. Therefore, the inscription might be later than his reign.

The history of the town of Sitep can be divided into two epochs. The first one might be termed the Indian period. Apart from the stone inscriptions and a statue mentioned above, a number of stone Hindu god images have been found. Most of them represent Vishnu, wearing an octagonal hat with receding stages on top and fringes of hair falling on the back part of the neck. Two of them, at least, are standing in triple flexion. The dress is a short one with the end of the robe tucked behind the body (*sampot*). Most of them are sculptures in the round but different from the early Khmer sculptures in that they have no *reserve de pierre* to connect their upper hands to the head or the hat so all the upper arms have been broken. Apart from Vishnu, there are also Sivalinga, standing Siva with his bull, Nandin, and Surya (the sun-god). One of the latter can be dated back to the first half of the 7th century because of the necklace which resembles strongly the belt of the

image of Uma from Koh Krieng in Cambodia dated by French scholars to the Khmer Sambor Prei Kuk style.

At the end of this Indian period, about the 8th-9th century, the Dvaravati artistic influence from central Thailand crept in as the town of Sitep in the old days was probably on the route linking the Dvaravati kingdom in central Thailand to the Khmer empire. This influence was Buddhist, as some stone Wheel of the Law, bases and pillars have been found. Unfortunately, most of them were clandestinely dug up and fell into private collections both in Thailand and abroad. A phonolith (stone bell) which was popular during the Dvaravati period was also discovered. All of these objects have been found in the inner town of Sitep.

It can be said that the stone Hindu images at Sitep lasted for a long time as one can notice their evolution in style. At first, the ears of early images are carved naturally and the back part of a hat ends in a horizontal line. Later, the upper rim of the ears has become rectangular instead of oval and the back part of a hat curves down on the neck, sometimes even divided into two flaps or layers instead of only one. The triple flexion has also become hardened.

In 1976, students of the Faculty of Archaeology, Silapakorn University, excavated at a site near the town of Sitep. A Buddhist monk who resided in the town came to watch the excavation and informed the excavators that he had found a stone Chinese head inside the town. This head turned out to be Vishnu wearing a cylindrical hat, so the Faculty of Archaeology acquired it and later donated it to the Thai Fine Arts Department, as it fits very well on a stone torso wearing a short dress that had been discovered a long time ago at Sitep. The image, with the head, is now being displayed in the Bangkok National Museum and can be regarded as a mixture of the early Vishnu image of southern Thailand style, wearing a cylindrical hat with a torso of the northern central school, wearing a short dress.

The second epoch of the town of Sitep can be called the Khmer period from the 11th to the 13th century. In the inner town there exist three Khmer brick towers which the Thai Fine Arts Department has excavated. The main one is more or less at the center of the town on a laterite base and facing west. H.G. Quaritch Wales, an English scholar who surveyed the site in 1935-36, thought that it might date back to the 6th century because of the three *niches lumineaires* inside imitating the window of a wooden structure. This supposition has been contested by Professor Jean Boisselier, a French scholar who is an expert on Khmer art. The latter expounded that the *niches lumineaires* existed for a long time in Khmer art and he thought that this main central shrine should date only to the 11th century because of its many outer redented corners. Quite near this tower on the south lies a terraced structure of laterite in a rectangular shape, probably facing east. On top have been found some pieces of brick. Since this terrace has not yet been excavated by the Thai Fine Arts Department, one has to wait to learn about its real function. Many stucco decorations have recently been discovered.

Two more Khmer temples stand in front of this main shrine on the west and also face the same direction. Originally there was only one shrine above the ground on the north and an earthen mound on the south. The Thai Fine Arts Department excavated this site in 1984 with Bovornvet Rungruchi as supervisor. They found that the northern one which is in brick on a laterite base has a long porch on the west. It also contains three *niches lumineaires* in the chamber and in

front on the floor lies a large semicircular limestone pedestal decorated with designs of lotus petals which might have originally been a base of a Dvaravati Buddha image. From the excavation, there appears on the south another smaller *prang*, also of brick, situated on the same laterite base and also facing west. The top part of this *prang* has crumbled down leaving only half of the false back door on the east to be seen. The result of the excavation here is fruitful as many stone decorations have been brought to light. The most important item is probably a complete stone lintel representing in the middle Siva and Uma riding on the bull, Nandin, over a Kala face (a monster without a lower jaw) which is holding in each hand a three-faced *naga* whose body turns into a garland with a number of floral motifs on top and underneath. The style of the dress and of the lintel point to the Khmer Baphuon style of the 11th century, therefore supporting Boisselier's opinion about the date of the Khmer temples at Sitep.

Apart from the two stone lintels, the other one being unfinished, many stone architectural fragments have been brought to light such as door-columns carved with small figures of seated hermits at the bottom, window balustrades, a foundation stone with small holes for containing semi-precious stones, etc. These Khmer temples were probably built for Hinduism, as Sivalinga (a phallic emblem representing Siva), Yoni (a stone base for Sivalinga), and a broken figure of Nandin (a bull) have been unearthed. Also fragments of pottery, some semi-precious stone, beads and terracotta coins have been discovered.

On the north, outside the inner town of Sitep, stands a large mound. It has not yet been excavated but one can surmise from its form that there is a central brick *prang* surrounded by a smaller one at each corner. Such architecture would be constructed at the center of a Khmer town, but here it is, surprisingly, outside the town.

The town of Sitep was probably abandoned after the Khmer had lost their power following the reign of King Jayavarman VII, the last great monarch of the Khmer empire (1181-c. 1220). A large stone statue of a *dvarapala* [door guardian] dating back to the Khmer Bayon style of that period was found in the town. It is now preserved in the Bangkok National Museum. After this period, no Thai Buddha images or Sawankhalok ware of the Sukhothai period have ever been found in Sitep. Sitep was probably replaced by the town of Petchabun during the Thai period from the 13th century onward.

Khmer monuments in the town of Sitep face west, which might be because of the Pasak River that flows down from the north to the south on that side or because of an important natural hill, Khao Thamorat, which is on the west of the town. On that hill there exists an important cave containing high-relief figures probably of Mahayana Buddhism: images of the Buddha and Bodhisattva. Unfortunately, the heads of these high-relief figures had been cut; the Fine Arts Department could retrieve five of them, which are now displayed in the Bangkok National Museum. Two belong to Buddha images and one portrays Maitreya Bodhisattva because of a *stupa* on top of his chignon. They belong probably to the early Dvaravati style (7th-8th century A.D.). Outside the cave one can still perceive a large standing Buddha image in the attitude of argumentation with both hands and, inside, a seated Buddha in the attitude of meditation flanked by a *stupa* on the left and a Wheel of the Law on a pillar on the right, typical of

Dvaravati style, and two figures of Bodhisattva with four arms, the lower right one in the attitude of giving benediction. One is standing in *tribhanga* [triple flexion].

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The Politics of Plunder in the Cham Realm of Early Vietnam

Kenneth R. Hall

Among historians who study Southeast Asia's pre-1500 history, there is substantial disagreement on what constituted a "state." Is the standard a unified bureaucratized polity that is consistent with traditional Western understanding of what an advanced state should be—a view that is reinforced by the accounts of Chinese historians, whose dynastic histories contain highly flattering views of their southern neighbors' accomplishments (and consider several of the early Southeast Asian civilizations to have possessed state systems that were similar to their own)? Or could an institutionally weak yet integrated society still be considered a major civilization?

One standard by which early Southeast Asian states are measured is the number of stone temple complexes they have left—the more impressive the archaeological remains the more prosperous and accomplished was the state, or so the reasoning goes. Thus, the massive temple complexes of central and eastern Java, as well as Pagan (Burma) and Angkor (Kampuchea) on the mainland, suggest that accomplished political systems were responsible for their construction, via a central administration that mobilized a realm's wealth and manpower to create these architectural wonders. But historians now are coming to find that broad levels of social, economic, and political integration were not necessary for such construction, nor did the building of impressive religious edifices necessarily demonstrate the political and economic accomplishments of a society.

The Cham state that ruled over the southern region of Vietnam from the second through the fifteenth centuries exemplifies the accomplishments of a culturally integrated yet decentralized polity. Like its contemporary Southeast Asian civilizations, Champa, the name by which the realm of the Cham people was known in its epigraphic records as well as in external sources, left impressive temple complexes and numerous inscriptions (composed in both Sanskrit and in the Cham language), which are the main source for early Cham history. On the basis of its archaeological remains, Champa would have to be classified as a major early Southeast Asian state. Yet Cham epigraphic records reflect a weakly institutionalized state system that depended upon personal alliance networks to integrate a fragmented population.

The Cham realm consisted of scattered communities in river valleys and coastal plains between the South China Sea and the mountains. Chams lived in an environment conducive to multi-faceted subsistence from agriculture, horticulture, fishing, trade, and piracy; their capitals were widely separated settlements on different parts of the coast, which took turns assuming hegemony over others; each hegemony was known to the Chinese by a different name. Weakly integrated politically, Cham culture still was highly cosmopolitan and was in constant communication with its neighbors by land and sea to the south and west.¹ A network of lagoons and navigable rivers between Hue and Quang Tri provided protected waterways for internal communication. Cham archaeological remains dot the upriver and highland regions. Cham ruins upriver from Binh-dinh

(Vijaya) at Cheo Reo, Yang Prong, and other highland locations especially document Cham presence throughout the Song Ba river network that bends around the Binh-dinh mountains, with mountain pass access beyond the highlands into Laos and Kampuchea.²

Lowland landholding rights were often shared by several villages, whose leaders cooperated in control over activities therein. Inter-village economic coordination included the maintenance of shared water management systems and the provisioning of communal granaries. Cham farmers cultivated paddy fields using relatively sophisticated iron plowshares and large water wheels for irrigation. Each village had a "water chief" who organized villagers in the clearance of land and the preparation and maintenance of water channels and dikes. Village chiefs met to coordinate overall system maintenance. The Cham realm was especially noted for its "floating rice," which was quick growing ("hundred day") and could be grown even under water cover of up to five meters. Cham agricultural settlements were scattered up river valleys and on terraced hillsides and entered an ecological frontier between the highlands and lowlands where wet-rice cultivation was practiced in Cham areas, but where swidden shifting (slash and burn) cultivation and hunting and gathering predominated among adjacent hill tribesmen.

The Vocabulary of Cham Kingship

Rather than representing shifts from one dynasty's rule to that of another, the periodic movement of the Cham royal center ("capital") among several river mouth urban centers bearing Indic titles—Indrapura (Tra-kieu), Vijaya (Binh-dinh), and Kauthara (Nha-trang)—corresponded to transfer of hegemony from the elite of one Cham river valley system to that of another, as one river system's elite became dominant over the other river mouth urban centers of the Cham coast. As such, the Cham polity was more like the Malay riverine states to the south than its mainland wet-rice plain neighbors to the west and north.³ Like the rulers of the archipelago riverine-based political economies, the authority of a Cham monarch was concentrated within his own river mouth plain; beyond his river mouth urban center base, a Cham monarch's sovereignty depended on his ability to construct alliance networks both with the leaders of the populations in his upriver hinterland and with those of the Cham coast's other riverine systems.

Despite the periodic spatial transfers of authority from one river mouth urban center to another, there was one constant. The Cham sacred center at Mi-so'n, located on the edge of the highlands and upriver from the early Cham political center at Indrapura (Tra-kieu) on the coast, served as the locus of Cham royal ceremony that promoted a sense of cultural homogeneity among the disparate populations of the Cham realm. Thus, although Cham society was weakly linked institutionally, the common values expressed in Champa's widely distributed inscriptions demonstrate a high level of societal integration that provided the foundation for a functional Cham polity.

The vocabulary of Cham statecraft as it is portrayed in the inscriptions places stress on the personal achievements of the Cham monarch. Early local belief supported the idea that some individuals (especially the Cham society's leaders) could be superior to others. It was held that there was an uneven distribution of

both secular and spiritual prowess. An individual's heroic secular accomplishments confirmed his spiritual superiority. Personal achievements in one's lifetime earned an individual ancestor status.

There were strong traditional concerns for the dead. Just as one allied oneself with those of superior prowess in life, so too one desired a personal bond to "ancestors of prowess" whom it was believed could bestow material and spiritual substance on their devotees.⁴ Those who achieved greatness in life were considered to have contact with the ancestors that was greater than that among others of their generation. By establishing a relationship with a successful leader, the follower confirmed his own bond with the ancestors; homage to one's overlord was thus a gesture of obedience to the ancestors.

Subject populations validated their own potential for ancestor status by sharing in their overlord's continuous achievement. The successful overlord projected himself as influencing his supporter's stature in life as well as their hopes for recognition after death. Successful patrons carefully recognized their clients' achievements and meritorious deeds by bestowing material (*i.e.*, titles and wealth) and spiritual (*e.g.*, ritual and death status) "gifts" on those whose secular performances on their patron's behalf were noteworthy.⁵

Early Cham society thus rallied behind spiritually endowed leaders who were supported by a blend of local and Indian cultural symbols and values that allowed their leaders to mobilize local populations and their resources for various inter-regional adventures. Specifically, early Cham rulers patronized Siva, noting his patronage of asceticism and his identification as the lord of the universe and the abode of the dead; they also had affinity for Indra, the Vedic god of war and, in various later times equally identified with Visnu and Buddhist deities.⁶ Cham rulers were little concerned with developing state institutions, but instead initiated syncretic religious cults that allowed their followers to draw from the leader's spiritual relationship with the ancestors as well as Indian universal divinity.

Among the remaining Cham records, two inscriptions from the late eighth century reign of the Cham monarch Indravarman I (c. 787-801) are especially comprehensive in their display of the vocabulary of Cham polity. Indravarman assumed authority over the Cham realm during a period of political turmoil. Prior to and during Indravarman's early reign, Champa's old political centers were ravaged by maritime raids that were attributed to seamen who are described in Cham inscriptions as "ferocious, pitiless, dark-skinned people from other countries...."⁷ In 774 the first of two raids by sea pirates destroyed the Po Nagar temple at the Cham political center of Kauthara (Nha-trang). King Satyavarman (c. 774-784) claims to have repulsed the invaders in a 784 inscription that reports the dedication of the restored temple complex.⁸ Indravarman, Satyavarman's younger brother, faced a second raid in 787 that desecrated the Siva temple of Bhadradhipatisvara west of his new capital at Virapura (Phan-rang).⁹ Indravarman had to stabilize the Cham political order, and his inscriptions provide a summary of early Cham traditions that he drew upon to substantiate his legitimate assumption of Cham sovereignty.

In 799, Indravarman dedicated the reconstructed temple at his capital, and the inscription that records this restoration provides the following commentary:

King Indravarman, who is honored by good men; who is foremost among those who regard sacrifice as their principal treasure; who is celebrated in this world on account of the efficacy of these sacrifices.... Glory to him, who like Visnu raised the world, as it were, by his two hands; who is like Indra, fallen to the earth ruling over the whole of Champa; who like Dhananjya is of irrepressible valor, and yet, like Hari [Siva], prospered after having conquered many groups of enemies, and placed his feet in a large number of countries...; who is like Indra in this world, by virtue of perfect austerities, and constant sacrifices performed in previous births; who is like Chananda [god of gifts] by his liberality; and whose charming body is embraced with pleasure by the Goddess of sovereignty.

The King, who, on account of his capacity to govern better and better a country...celebrated for its urban centers...had a capital city [built] like the city of the gods. This fortunate king is always victorious over his enemies in the world in all directions. In the height of his strength he combines in himself the prowess of Candra, Indra, Yama, and Kubera [the gods of the four sacred quarters, i.e., he was the master of all regions]; originating partly from Brahman, the master of immense wealth, possessed of fortune and prowess, crushing, like Visnu, his enemies by means of his prowess, he established the proper law [in his kingdom]....¹⁰

This prolonged eulogy celebrates Indravarman's association with various Indic divinity that provided the foundation for Indravarman's achievements. Looking backward to the initial institution of the sacred linga at Virapura, Indravarman's inscription proceeds with the purposeful linkage of the reigning monarch to the legendary Cham king Bhadravarman. Bhadravarman ruled the Cham realm around 400 C.E. and was said to have founded the sacred Mi-so'n temple complex, where he instituted the original Bhadresvara Siva linga that became the symbolic source of Cham sovereign power. Indravarman's inscription eulogized Bhadravarman, and implies that one intent of the inscription was to proclaim that the legendary Bhadravarman's spiritual powers were drawn upon by his legitimate successor Indravarman:

[He] is called Bhadhipatisvara because he is the master of welfare, and maintains, by his splendor, the welfare, the health, and the goods of the worlds. Now, for a long time...he, the dust of whose lotus-feet is worshipped by the three worlds, became, by his own [spiritual] prowess the cause of prosperity of the world. [But] then, owing to the excess of faults in the [world] the temple called Bhadradhipatisvara was burned by an army...coming by ships, and [the temple] became empty [i.e., it was plundered in 787]....

[The king] Indravarman reinstalled it [the Bhadradhipatisvara linga in 799], and out of the goodness of his heart gave it treasures:... Indravarman also installed an earthen linga of the God, which [after his death] came to be known as Indrabhadresvara [in his honor]. When this king protects the earth, his subjects are delighted at his

prowess. Renowned in the world for his zeal in protecting Dharma [order], he always triumphed over his enemies by his own [spiritual] prowess. Endowed with virtue, and born in a noble family, charitable, surrounded by heroes, and defeating the enemies by his prowess, he protects the world on all sides....

The vocabulary of Cham statecraft is well summarized in the last line of this inscription; Cham monarchs were 1) virtuous, 2) associated with ancestors of prowess, 3) able to bestow gifts and prosperity upon their subject population, and 4) were substantially supported by a warrior elite who 5) allowed their conquests of surrounding and potentially threatening populations.

A second and somewhat later inscription of Indravarman from another temple at his political core also emphasized the prowess of Indravarman's immediate dynastic predecessors. But this second inscription focused on each monarch's personal accomplishments that brought his subjects prosperity rather than more abstract spiritual aspects of royal prowess:

[King Prathivindravarman, (c. 758)] famous in the world for his family and prowess, enjoyed the lands by conquest of all his enemies by his [own power]:.... Having enjoyed the whole of Champa [by conquest], he flourished as a great king. There were abundant means of subsistence and various things in his kingdom. The king destroyed all the thieves, as the sun dispels the darkness. He shone in his family as the moon does in the sky.

[He] was succeeded by Satyavarman, who was very heroic, and renowned in the world by his actions...the world was subject to his great power.... In combat, enemies could not stand their ground in his presence, but turned their face on seeing him [i.e., they ran away from him in battle]. By his victories, he was comparable to Indra; by his [physical] prowess, he was like Siva; among those who desire glory, he was very strong, like the son of Indra; in the assembly of men, he was respected by honest persons...he, the master of all creatures, is victorious by having churned all his enemies [i.e., he, like Visnu, churned the creative ambrosia of the universe to sustain the "golden age," and thus exterminated his enemies].

[His younger brother Indravarman became king]. He was fortunate, dutiful, powerful, and renowned in the world for his strength. Although a king and protector of men, he was a destroyer of enemies and accompanied by his army ("heroes in combat"); he attacked his enemies as soon as he saw them, as a lion attacks an elephant...he destroyed the army of his enemies. The king, who was very wise, and surrounded by heroes [i.e., his military subordinates]...[his realm thus] flourished...[and]...his noble actions fostered good fortune. Indravarman, of the house of Satyavarman, [is] the cause of the prosperity of the [Cham] world....¹¹

As opposed to the normal focus on hypothetical sacred spiritual prowess in earlier Cham inscriptions, a topic that received ample discussion in the first noted inscription from Indravarman's early reign (when he was establishing his

sovereignty), Indravarman's second inscription (which was a product of an established, legitimated reigning monarch) placed its focus on the demonstrated physical prowess of Indravarman and past monarchs and highlighted their illustrious military victories against assorted rivals of the Cham state. The second inscription's theme was that when Cham monarchs had successfully destroyed various armies of their enemies, only then could the state reach its full potential.

Thus, in early Cham epigraphy greater stress was placed on the moral purity and ritual aestheticism of past and present monarchs that made conquest and economic prosperity possible. Indravarman's late eighth century inscription still acknowledged the sanctity of past and present monarchs. But in this and the inscriptions of Cham monarchs who follow, greatness was measured by the monarch's physical capacity, as demonstrated by his successful leadership of military expeditions (which provided consequent material reward), with increasingly limited reference to a monarch's spiritual powers. Conquest, according to these later inscriptions, resulted in Champa's prosperity more so than the dutiful performance of sacrificial ritual.

Ultimately, the ruler "bestowed with superior prowess" had to generate income to his direct subordinates and secure for his subjects the material well-being that Cham monarchs were expected to provide. With the loss of economic prosperity, serious questions undoubtedly arose regarding the successful magical qualities of the ruler's cults, and the autonomy of regional units soon would be reasserted.

The Cham Political Economy

Throughout Champa's history there was periodic regional autonomy and resistance to the centralizing ambitions of would-be Cham monarchs that was coincident with an inability to provide expected economic returns. While Southeast Asia's early major wet-rice state rulers based their sovereignty on income derived from a relatively stable agricultural base, the various records of Cham civilization indicate that Cham rulers could not expect a sufficient flow of agricultural surpluses to finance their political ambitions.

There is disagreement among historians relative to the agricultural productivity of the Cham realm. Chinese sources substantiate that the Cham were wet-rice cultivators, and that the Cham territory was especially known to the Chinese as the source of quick growing "floating rice," which the Chinese adopted in southern China. But the remaining evidence of Cham civilization, including Chinese sources, does not demonstrate the extensive hinterland agrarian development that is found in the evolving major wet-rice states that were Champa's contemporaries in Cambodia, Burma, Java, and the Red River Delta of Vietnam. The comprehensive problem faced by Cham monarchs was that the region between the Mekong Delta and Hue where Cham authority was concentrated did not have a broad plain that could have served as a rice bowl to support an elaborate polity.

The king's place, according to Cham inscriptions, was not in managing the day-to-day affairs of his state, but in the battlefield where the Cham monarch protected his subject communities and thereby secured their prosperity. Cham monarchs are never referenced in records of local water management. Nor did

Cham monarchs assume a role as supervisors of communal granaries, which, along with the local water management networks, were the source of unity among local peasant communities. However, Cham monarchs did periodically assign the responsibility for the supervision of new or existing public granaries to newly established temples.

Inscriptions report that in return for securing his subjects' prosperity, the Cham monarch was entitled to receive one-sixth of local agricultural production. But it is repeatedly proclaimed that due to the ruler's "benevolence," the state expected to collect only one-tenth. Since such references appear in inscriptions reporting transfers of the ruler's remaining income rights on property to temples (which assume an increasingly significant role as centers for the concentration of economic resources), it can be inferred that the state was either unwilling or incapable of collecting a share of local production even in its own river system base, and thus assigned its token one-tenth share in the hope that a temple, an institution with local roots, might have better luck making such collections. What was normally assigned were income rights to uncultivated and unpopulated lands, further indication that the state had only limited rights over cultivated lands.

Manpower (war captives or other bondsmen) was frequently assigned as well to support the extension of agriculture under the direction of a temple and its temple staff. Such consolidation of control over land and existing granaries and their assignment to temples, which in turn promoted the king's sovereignty in their religious cults, might have provided the Cham king with indirect access to local production that was otherwise inaccessible to the state.

The inherent instability of Cham sovereignty is especially revealed in the inconsistency of the epigraphic stress on the ruler's spiritual and physical prowess, yet the inscriptions indicate that this prowess was insufficient to guarantee the future security of endowed temples. Inscriptions invoke curses to protect temples rather than threatening physical retribution to offenders. Cham inscriptions glorify the physical capacity and personal heroism of Cham rulers, but normally end with the proclamation that those who plunder temples, which, based on consistent reference would seem to have been a common occurrence, were subject to divine retribution--normally a shortened and unprosperous life and the promise of hell as one's destiny in life. For example, the first eighth-century endowment inscription of the assertive Indravarman I, noted above, ends with the following warning:

*Those who protect all these goods of Indrabhadesvara in the world
will enjoy the delights of heaven along with the gods. Those who carry
them away will fall into hell together with their family and will suffer
the sorrows of hell as long as the sun and moon endure....*

One may conclude from the epigraphic evidence that, during a king's reign, but especially after his death, his territory and notably his richly endowed temples were subject to pillage by his various political rivals. Thus, inscriptions of Cham monarchs report their restoration of the temples of previous Cham rulers; these temples had been destroyed by demonic "foreigners," but also by various Cham chiefs who had attempted to acquire the material resources and manpower necessary to proclaim their own sovereignty. The act of restoration was a

statement of legitimacy, and was a proclamation that the new monarch had sufficient resources to guarantee his subjects' future livelihood.

Since Champa possessed an extensive coastline, one alternative source of income for Cham monarchs was the sea. But here, too, there is little evidence that Cham monarchs depended on trade revenues—port cesses or the returns on royal monopolies on the sale of local commodities to international traders—to finance their sovereignty.

Trade on the Cham coast depended upon the summer monsoon winds, which propelled sea traffic north to China. Prevailing fall to spring winds from the north made the Cham coast a natural landfall for South China sea merchants, known collectively to the Chinese as Yueh, who were headed for the archipelago and beyond. Despite the Cham coast's favorable position relative to the prevailing seasonal winds, Chinese sources always considered Cham ports to be secondary rather than primary centers of international commercial exchange. Yet Cham ports did have important products the Chinese and other international traders desired—notably luxury items such as ivory, rhinoceros horns, tortoise shells, pearls, peacock and kingfisher feathers, spices, and aromatic woods.¹²

Chinese and Vietnamese sources enumerate the commodities available at Cham coastal ports and demonstrate the importance of the highlands as the source of Cham trade goods. Elephants and their tusks, for example, were desirable and were included among the tribute gifts the Cham monarch sent to the Chinese court on fourteen separate occasions between 414 and 1050 C.E. These elephants came from the highland regions upriver from Vijaya (Binh-dinh) and Panduranga (Phan-rang). Rhinoceros horns (ground rhinoceros horn was prized as an aphrodisiac by the Chinese), cardamom, bee wax, lacquer, resins, and scented woods (sandalwood, camphor wood, and eagle/aloeswood) were also products of the same upriver region.¹³ Areca nuts and betel leaves, the chewing of which gave teeth a distinct red color, were products of the highlands upriver from Indrapura (Tra-kieu); cinnamon was a product of the region upriver from Vijaya, and gold was said to be mined at a mountain of gold some 30 li from modern Hue.¹⁴

Highland oral histories provide valuable insight into the nature of Cham realm commercial exchange, which is ignored in all the remaining written sources. In local legend among the highlanders in the Darlac Plateau region near Cheo Reo, the prime source of the highland products enumerated, Cham are reported to have made attempts to better integrate highlanders into the Cham political economy via negotiation rather than by force. Highlanders were offered the protection of the Cham armies, as well as the privilege of becoming trade partners of the Cham.¹⁵ Apparently, the most valuable among the trade commodities the Cham offered was salt, which was critical to the highland diet as well as in local animal husbandry. In addition to substantiating that the highlands were the source of the trade items enumerated in external sources, highland oral histories report that Cham monarchs were entitled to receive locally woven cloth as tribute.¹⁶

Among the highland populations in the region north of the Mekong Delta—the source of eaglewood that was valued for its fragrance when burned in Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese ritual—the Cham were said to have come and, with local headmen, organized bands of men to assist in the search for the

aromatic wood. Local tribesmen became Cham vassals and received a Cham saber, seal, and a title which roughly translated "lord/master," thereby confirming their leadership status.¹⁷

An especially close Champa-Java network of cultural dialogue that included a special trade partnership emerged by the eighth century. From the seventh through the tenth centuries, there developed what art historians call "Indo-Javanese architecture" in Champa, which expressed tantric Mahayana Buddhist themes that are similarly depicted in contemporary Javanese art. The reliefs of the temples at the Cham sacred center at Mi-s'on are said to resemble those of the Borobudur.¹⁸ There was a unique Siva-Buddhist syncretism at temples downriver from Mi-s'on at Don-duong (Indrapura); here there is an inscription dated 911 C.E. that records the adventures of the tenth century Cham courtier Rajadvara. Rajadvara twice traveled to Java to study Buddhist magic science; the word used in the inscription is *siddhayatra*, the same tantric term used to describe the magical powers of supernatural prowess contained within Buddhism that were pursued by late seventh century Sumatra-based Srivijaya monarchs.¹⁹

The Italian adventurer Nicolo de Conti visited Champa in 1435 on his way from Java to China. During the fourteenth century, the Cham monarch Jaya Simhavaraman II married a Javanese princess, Tapasi. A short time later Che Nang, the Cham puppet ruler set up by the Vietnamese conqueror An Huang asserted his independence by fleeing to Java—perhaps he was the son of the Java princess.²⁰ There is also the Javanese legend of Dvaravati, sister of a Cham king, who married the ruler of Majapahit and then promoted the spread of Islam in Java during the late fourteenth century. Cham sources that document an Islamic commercial community resident at Panduranga in the late tenth century,²¹ support Javanese belief that the spread of Islam to Java was attributable to Champa.

Despite this evidence which indicates that international trade on the Cham coast could be an important source of income, dependency on sales of local products to an external marketplace was not an adequate economic base upon which to build a state polity. Periodic fluctuations of the sea trade due to disorders at the route's ends in China and the Middle East meant that, like the leaders of the Malay states to the south, Cham monarchs could not depend upon international commerce as a stable and continuous source of royal redistributions. That Cham rulers did not directly control external trade can be concluded from records of Cham coast commerce. These report that the major center of international trade was at Panduranga, at the extreme southern edge of the Cham political domain. The maritime populations of Panduranga must have maintained a good deal of autonomy from Cham political control, judging from a description of the community that appears in an eleventh century inscription which characterized the Panduranga population as "demonic, unrespectful, and always in revolt" against the state's authority.

Based on the total omission of reference to merchants in remaining inscriptions from the Cham heartland, it appears that international trade was confined to Panduranga. Here at the extreme southern edge of the Cham realm, the "ferocious" threatening foreigners could be isolated (not unlike China to the north, where seagoing trade with the West was similarly isolated at Canton on the extreme southern edge of the Chinese state). Foreign merchants based at

Panduranga would have received the enumerated products of the Cham hinterland via active coastal and upriver trade networks that were dominated by a permanently resident Cham coast seagoing population.

When they could not depend on the normal flow of commerce to supply them with their needed livelihood, this Cham coast seagoing population was likely to turn to piracy. During such periods of ebb rather than flow, these seamen were likely to pillage neighboring river mouth urban centers and their temples. Thus, the eighth century sack of the Po Nagar temple near modern Nha-trang by "ferocious, pitiless, dark-skinned sea raiders" may be attributed to Cham seagoing populations rather than "foreigners." It is noteworthy that shortly after this 774 raid, in 787 Indravarman I established his new capital at Virapura, adjacent to the Panduranga commercial enclave. Immediately thereafter he had to repulse a second attack from the sea before he could fully proclaim his sovereignty. Indravarman's "prowess by conquest" that is referenced in his inscriptions must thus have included subjecting the various Cham coast seagoing communities to his authority.

The Chinese court was always trying in vain to compel Cham monarchs to assume responsibility for the behavior of their coastal populations; judging from the frequency of Chinese demands, it would seem that this coastal population was only marginally under any Cham monarch's control. Cham coast piracy was widely known among the international trade community. Voyagers were often warned to avoid the Cham coast when traveling from the Malacca Strait region to China. This weakened the appeal of Cham ports to international traders and further increased the likelihood that Cham monarchs could not regularly depend on trade revenues to finance their political ambitions.

Being thus unable to secure sufficient revenue from their subordinate river valley agricultural communities or consistent return from internal or external trade, Cham monarchs had to seek alternative sources to finance the alliance networks that were so critical to their sovereignty. Therefore, it was necessary for Cham rulers to seek wealth beyond their own population centers by leading their allies on periodic military expeditions outside the Cham realm. Plunder raids were thus waged on a regular basis against Champa's neighbors—initially rival river mouth population centers and later Khmer territories to the west and Vietnamese territories to the north.

This plunder dynamic explains why Cham history is dominated by seemingly consecutive military expeditions. Periodic Cham raids are not only reported in Cham epigraphy but also in Vietnamese chronicles and, from the tenth century on in, inscriptions from the Khmer realm to the west. Cham military expeditions acquired plunder and manpower—Cham ports were widely known as a major source of slaves, *i.e.*, war captives, who were traded at Cham ports to various international buyers. The proceeds from successful expeditions were subsequently divided among expedition participants—the various "heroes in combat" who figure so prominently in Cham epigraphy as the monarch's principal political allies—and/or the coastal populations, whose navigational skills made them useful participants on raids against Vietnamese coastal settlements to the north as well as against Khmer settlements up the Mekong River in the south—who in return acknowledged the Cham monarch's sovereignty.

Successful plunder expeditions were also a means by which the Cham monarch's needed cultural image as the source of his subjects' well-being was validated. Warriors and other key participants in a successful plunder expedition were often assigned jurisdiction over land that was either undeveloped or needed redevelopment. Inscriptions record that one of the first acts of these royal supporters was the lavish endowment of temples, whose staffs subsequently assumed supervision of land development projects. Seemingly, these warrior elite were donating, or redistributing, a portion of their share of the successful royal plunder expeditions via their reassignment of various objects, money,²² and manpower that made local development possible.

Royal subordinates also sanctified the development projects by instituting *linga* and establishing beyond the royal core new temples that honored the temple's benefactor but that especially proclaimed the glory of past and present Cham monarchs, for whom the temple *linga* were named. Such recognition of the monarch through the endowment and consecration of temples promoted local appreciation of the monarch's accomplishments and encouraged the locals' subordination, in the absence of a direct royal administrative presence, to the sovereignty of the Cham state.

The Cham state may thus be understood as a loose and periodically interdependent polity that encompassed a series of river mouth urban centers and their upriver hinterlands. In the absence of a sufficient resource base to support their political aspirations, Cham kings by necessity depended on frequent military expeditions to acquire plunder that could be redistributed directly (sharing booty with their warrior allies) or indirectly (via temple endowments) to maintain the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Cham riverine networks. Cham monarchs maintained the subordination of their direct military allies by keeping them "in the field" on various plunder expeditions. In the absence of a royal bureaucracy that could directly administer the regions of the Cham realm, Cham monarchs instead depended on the willingness of local elite to recognize the monarch's sovereignty via their participation in his expeditions of conquest and/or by their support of religious cults that proclaimed the ruler's superior prowess. There was an inherent instability in this political economy that ultimately depended upon redistributions from plunder raids. The fate of the Cham state was inevitable; following several centuries of reciprocal raiding, Vietnamese retaliatory expeditions finally dismembered the Cham realm in the fifteenth century.²³

Notes

1. See Paul Mus, *India Seen From the East: Indian and Indigenous Cults of Champa*, I.W. Mabbett and D.P. Chandler, trans., Clayton, Victoria, 1975
2. Gerald C. Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains*, New Haven, 1982, p. 460
3. See Kenneth R. Hall, *Maritime Trade and State Development: Early Southeast Asia*, Honolulu, 1985

4. For extended discussion of "men of prowess," see O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, Singapore, 1982
5. On symbolic gifting, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, 1977
6. I.W. Mabbett, "Buddhism in Champa," In David G. Marr and A.C. Milner, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, Singapore, 1986, pp. 289-313
7. Auguste Barth and Abel Bergaigne, "Inscriptions Sanscrites du Cambodge et Campa" (henceforth ISCC). In *Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Notices et extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque du roi et autres bibliotheques*, 27, Paris, 1885, 1893, p. 242
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-256
9. *Ibid.*, p. 217. In 793, he sent an embassy to China to demonstrate his control. George Maspero, *Le Royaume de Champa*, Paris, 1928, p. 104
10. Barth and Bergaigne, "ISCC", pp. 226ff
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 218ff
12. Paul Wheatley, "Geographical Notes on Some Commodities involved in Sung Maritime Trade," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 32:2 (1959), 5-140
13. Maspero, 57, 67, 87-88, 99, 120, 123, 133, 138
14. The Italian adventurer Nicolo de Conti went to Champa via Java in 1435 and reported that Champa was a major dealer in aloes, camphor, and gold. Nicolo Conti, *The Travels of Nicolo Conti in the East in the Early Part of the Fifteenth Century*, London, 1857, pp. 8-9
15. Hickey, p. 116
16. Cloth woven from a variety of local fibers by village women, and generally in rich shades of red, blue, and yellow contrasted with black, white, and grey worked into stripes or geometric patterns, is still a valuable product of highland groups. Hickey, 446
17. *Ibid.*, p. 117
18. B.P. Groslier, *Indochina*. Geneva, 1966, pp. 39, 54, 77
19. E. Huber, "La Stele de Dong-duong," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient* 4 (1904), pp. 85ff, verse BXI; Hall, pp. 79ff
20. Maspero, p. 189
21. Hall, p. 183
22. e.g., Barth and Bergaigne, "ISCC", pp. 218, 275
23. Maspero, 237-239. For comparison, see George W. Spencer, "The Politics of Plunder: The Cholas in Eleventh Century Ceylon," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 35:3 (1976), pp. 405-419

Two Lectures on Political Process in an "Indic State"¹

"Opposition and Solidarity" and "The 'State' as a System of Signs"

Shelly Errington

Introduction

Clifford Geertz has remarked that in Bali "status and the compulsions surrounding it animated most of the emotions and nearly all of the acts which, when we find their like in our own society, we call political. To understand the *negara* [Balinese polity] is to locate those emotions and construe those acts; to elaborate a poetics of power, not a mechanics" (1980:123). In the following two papers, "Opposition and Solidarity" and "The 'State' as a System of Signs," I turn to the political life of Luwu, the name of a former "Indic State" of South Sulawesi, Indonesia, whose political and social life, like that of historical Balinese and Javanese Indic States, was animated by "status and the compulsions surrounding it." In these papers I have ignored what could be called the mechanics of economic power: land tenure and rents, and the devices by which the rich maintained themselves as such. I have concentrated instead on the poetics of power, which, in societies such as these, implicates the emotions and acts and the institutional arrangements and devices by which people constitute themselves as social persons within a hierarchy and try to maintain their places within it.

Sulawesi and the Circumstances of Fieldwork

Sulawesi is the name given to the orchid shaped island that lies to the east of Borneo and to the west of the Moluccas (Spice Islands). The Gulf of Bone is formed by the extension of two southern peninsulas, the western and eastern; "South Sulawesi" refers to the southwestern peninsula. For fifteen months, primarily in 1976, I did fieldwork in the former "kingdom" of Luwu, which, with Goa (centered at Makassar, which is now called Ujung Pandang and is the capital of South Sulawesi) and Bone (centered at Bone on the east coast, now the capital of the sub-district of Bone), was one of the three major polities of the pre-independence era. Like other Indic States, Luwu was organized around a high central point defined by the ruler or Datu, the state regalia, and the palace. The polity was called an *akkarungeng*, from the root *arung* or "lord." (A glossary appears at the end of the second paper. Readers who are speakers of Indonesian will recognize that the *a-eng* construction parallels Indonesian's *ke-an* construction.) In Luwu I stayed with the family of the former Opu Pa'Bicara (it would be *pembicara* in Indonesian), the Lord Spokesman or Lord Orator, one of the four main ministers of the *akkarungeng*; I shuffled between his residence in Palopo, currently the capital of the sub-district of Luwu, formerly the center-city of Akkarungeng Luwu, and the residence of his unmarried older sister in Senga, a small village to the south of Palopo. She was known as Opu Senga, Lord of Senga; Andi "Anthon" Pangerang, one of the Opu Pa'Bicara's sons, was an important guide and informant, and appears in my fieldnotes (some of which are quoted in the following two papers) as "AA."

Buginese and Makassarese economy was historically based on long distance trade and wet-rice agriculture, and to a large extent it continues to be, although an important nickel mine now exists in northern Luwu and tourism is increasingly important for Ujung Pandang and Toraja-land of the mountainous interior. Buginese and Makassarese can be found throughout the Malay archipelago, and are best known as fearless sailors and fierce fighters, and for their touchiness in defense of their honor. Their word for honor and shame is *siri'* (analogous to Indonesian *malu*), and it looms large in their accounts of themselves. Their other great preoccupation, at least among nobles, is to make good marriages—marriages with people of "white blood"—which those who claim nobility claim to have. Like other Indic States of island Southeast Asia, Akkarungeng Luwu conceived of itself as consisting of three major types of people: the nobility, with white blood; the commoners or free people; and the slaves. Although none of these has legal status in the Republic of Indonesia, people's origins and status claims are still very much a matter of interest to South Sulawesians.

Luwu's linguistic/ethnic situation is mixed. The high nobility there speak and write Buginese, but the middle nobility and villagers for the most part speak Tae, the same language group as the Toraja. They do not consider themselves to be Toraja, for the Toraja are Christians and live in the hills; on the other hand, they do not think of themselves as Buginese (ToUgi). If pressed, they will say that they are ToLuwu, "people of Luwu," and I will refer to them that way. Because of the linguistic diversity and the many cognate words with Indonesian, I have indicated throughout the text which language a word belongs to with the indications "Tae," "Bug.," or "Ind."

I chose Luwu as a place for fieldwork in part because, coming to field work with historical interests in the literature, politics, epistemology, and sensibilities fostered in the Indicized states of Southeast Asia, I sought an area in which I could see lived some of what I imagined that earlier life to be. Luwu, I was assured, was a region outside the main currents of "development." Luwu's Datu had died in the mid-1960s and the Opu Pa'Bicara still maintained a very strong *kapolo* or family-following, but he had accepted no position in the Indonesian government. Luwu seemed to be caught in a time warp. As it turned out, the time warp proved to be as much substance as illusion—not, however, because the main currents of history had passed over Luwu but because Luwu had been ravaged by them, and ToLuwu were trying to reconstitute their society on the model of the old regime, the Datu-centered polity that existed prior to World War II and Indonesian independence. Luwu had been very active in resistance against the Dutch, and the Datu and the Opu Pa'Bicara had been captured by the Dutch and banished for a year. Soon after their return and the establishment of the new Republic, the Kahar Muzakar rebellion began, which plunged all of South Sulawesi into anarchical civil war (see Harvey 1974). Kahar was from Luwu, and the devastation and destruction of all society were especially complete in that area. Nearly everyone fled from the countryside to the cities, either Palopo or Makassar. Kahar was captured and executed in the mid-1960s, and by the mid-1970s, when I arrived for fieldwork, the scene seemed peaceable and prosperous. People were, however, in the process of reconstituting society as they knew it, and they knew it largely as they had known it before the start of World War II,

combined with the obvious bureaucratic changes that their membership in the Republic of Indonesia brought about. The Opu Pa'Bicara had no legal or bureaucratic authority, but he had a great deal of religious and familial authority and inspired enormous loyalty. He was engaged in arranging marriages, settling siri' disputes, and other sorts of activities that he performed prior to independence. Moreover, ToLuwu, like all Buginese and Makassarese, continue to be very preoccupied with their siri', and the nobles continue to be concerned with preserving their children's degree of "white blood" by having them marry people of the same or higher amounts of it than they themselves have.

Opposition and Hierarchy

The nation-state, such as the Republic of Indonesia, imagines itself to be a community of equal citizens bound by abstract horizontal ties, Benedict Anderson has argued, where "state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory" (Anderson 1983:26). Anderson contrasts the nation-state with the "empire" or "kingdom," a community bound by personalistic ties, imagining itself as oriented spatially around and toward a high center. Indic States, such as Akkarungeng Luwu, were of the latter sort.

In Indic States, the polity's central city was the polity itself, as many commentators have pointed out.² The conduct of the ruler and the safety of the state regalia, whose presence located the realm's most central and socially highest point, were considered crucial to the prosperity and peace of the entire realm. The ruler in these polities was the fount of social and political status, the high and concentrated location of the spiritual potency on which the fertility and prosperity of the realm and the individual person alike were thought to depend. Deeply centrist, Southeast Asian polities represented themselves to themselves as perfect, undivided, centered unities. Like other Indic States, the court of Akkarungeng Luwu represented itself to itself with centrist and centered images: the banyan tree, whose branches shade and protect those below, and whose fertile abundant growth comes from the top; the umbrella, another shading object with a high center; the mountain, which has a high central peak and is immovable. For such societies that aspired to attain a hegemonic center, dualities of any sort implied challenge, instability, and the possibility of de-centering. Needless to say, the political center's goal was to remain central—to remain unchallenged, immobile, and eternally stable. Just as obvious as the ideal of stability was the difficulty of attaining it. Before colonial powers fixed their boundaries and stabilized their centers, Southeast Asian political centers were sometimes de-centered. Not just polities but persons were (and continue to be) conceptualized there as centered entities that embody and locate cosmic energy, which, in Luwu, is attached at the navel. The centering and de-centering of realms, whether the realms we term "Indic States" or those we call merely "persons," is the process that can be called "political" in these societies, historical and contemporary.

In a hierarchical society like Akkarungeng Luwu, people were, in theory, arranged with respect to each other in a continuum of social places, falling away from the Ruler in degrees of diminishing purity. Inevitably, some people were very close to each other in status: each was approximately the same distance away

from the Ruler. Although the Datu was gone when I was in Luwu in the mid-1970s, many people were oriented towards the Opu Pa'Bicara as their local political/social center. I observed and heard about many incidents of status competition involving *siri'* [honor/shame]. I call people who are close in status "status-peers" rather than "status-equals" because, following Dumont, it seems clear that such a society provides no ideological space for "equals." This point is basic to my analysis and is therefore worth expanding.

Dumont (1965, 1970, 1971) suggests that hierarchical societies do not tend to have well-developed notions of persons as separate, autonomous, and equal. (He distinguishes, of course between "hierarchical" societies and those that are merely "stratified," that is, class societies, legal bureaucracies and the like.) "Equals" are people who are separate, and who, therefore, can interact as autonomous beings. Equals can interact peaceably without having to choose between deferring or dominating. Relations between "equals" need not be structured as a contest, since it is not necessary for either to absorb the other into his or her social body.

In Luwu, people do not imagine that they are autonomous or that their identities are self-referential, as the ideology of egalitarianism and utilitarianism suggests. In Luwu and in other societies that exhibit sacred hierarchy in Dumont's sense (in which the higher ritually encompass the lower), the most prominent political characteristic of social relations is that they are cast in terms of high and low. In such societies, each person stands socially between people who are higher than themselves and people who are lower than themselves. These are the relations that I term "vertical": between people who are elder and younger, superior and inferior (measured by white blood in South Sulawesi, by different attributes in other Southeast Asian societies), protector and dependent, commanding and deferring, more powerful and weaker. Central and peripheral "vertical" relations are among the most stable in these societies, and they are in a sense the paradigmatic model for all social relations. Everyone is enmeshed in "vertical" relations.³ Stable social groupings can be formed between those who are juniors and seniors to each other, for each person in such a relation can "know his place." A basic part of my account, then, is the local concept of the "person"—how the person's motives and consciousness are locally construed.

The logic of a hierarchical system does not admit the possibility of exact peers in status. Yet people who are close in status are effectively status-peers. Neither is willing to admit the superiority of the other. As a result, their relation is unstable and inconclusive, characterized by competition and opposition rather than by unity and solidarity. It approaches a contest in its structure and meaning. A major preoccupation of near-peers is to try to determine and assert which of them is higher. It can be no accident that the contest between closely matched opponents is one of the most pervasive structures of narrative, symbolic, and expressive forms in the hierarchical societies of island Southeast Asia. The contest between near-peers, told as narrative (in rituals, in shadow-puppet theater, in retold adventures, in cautionary tales, in recounted conversations) is itself a self-representation, a way that these societies have of telling themselves what life is like. These contest-narratives are the obverse side of the same societies' self-representations as mountains and immovable centers. The wishfully immovable center, challenged by a near-peer, becomes embroiled in a contest; the contest, lived or recounted, employs lived action or forms the structures of the

narrative; the old center or the new one, newly triumphant, becomes the new immovable center—immovable, at least, until another peer challenges.

The geometry of ideal social order in which there is one center surrounded by tiers of obedient and loyal followers could be displayed only if people stayed in their places. Most of the time people did not stay peacefully in their social places. Places in Luwu are not legal-bureaucratic places in which people can rest, as though appointed to a sinecure. They must continually assert and embody their places in order to retain them. The constitution in Luwu of a mountain-shaped society requires, as it were, of its members, to run at full speed merely in order not to lose ground.

In these two papers I analyze the competition between status-peers, a competition whose centrifugal consequences continually disturbed the geometry of social order in Akkarungeng Luwu and by analogy in other Indic States. The first, called "Opposition and Solidarity," concerns political microprocesses, the ethos of personal interaction and the analogue of psychology in a world dominated by the need to exhibit *siri'*, status/honor. Given that exhibiting *siri'* is the most important attitudinal stance humans can exhibit, the subject of the second, "The 'State' as a System of Signs," examines some of the consequences for the shape and meaning of the polity, and suggests that the "state" was a system of signs of differential status enforced by power at the top.

Notes to the Introduction

1. Early versions of these two papers were delivered in 1983 at the University of Hawai'i as part of the Southeast Asia Program's Distinguished Scholar Series. The two papers developed into Part II of my book, *Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm* (Princeton University Press, 1989), where they appear as chapters four and five under the names "Vulnerable Places" and "The Contest for Place," respectively. They are reprinted here, in slightly modified form, by permission of Princeton University Press.
2. The literature on the topic of what Geertz calls "the exemplary center" is more or less co-extensive with the topic of Southeast Asian Indic States. Some of the most useful and concise statements can be found in Anderson 1972, Geertz 1973 (Chapter Three) and 1980, Moertono 1968, Schrieke 1957, and Tambiah 1976 (Chapter Seven).
3. The only exceptions consisted of the Ruler, who had no one above him, and the lowest slave of a slave who had no dependents. For an explication of slavery in Southeast Asia as dependence, see Reid (1983).

Opposition and Solidarity

When I first arrived in South Sulawesi, I stayed in Ujung Pandang, in the household of very high nobles from a Bugis former kingdom to the south of Luwu. The following excerpt from my fieldnotes describes my initial puzzlement:

I thought I should practice doing fieldwork as well as doing language so I decided to find out who lives around us. To get the lay of the land, I asked one of the noble cousins of the household to come with me. We got to the first house and I said, "Who lives there?" "Kapolo," she said, pleased. At the next one I said, "And who lives here?" "Kapolo," she said again. And again for the third house. I was beginning to feel that this was not specific enough. No names, no relationships—what happened to kinship, anyway? At the fourth house and my fourth question she stopped, lowered her voice, and all but whispered, as though it were a scandal, "ToLaing."

Eventually, I came to the conviction that if ordinary Buginese were to write an indigenous social science—an effort to describe accurately what the world is like—they would begin with the great divide between kapolo and ToLaing, relatives and strangers, "us" and "them." Only those at the very top of a Southeast Asian hierarchy stand outside and above the contest for place. (Those were the circumstances of the Opu Pa'Bicara and his immediate high core of relatives at the time I did fieldwork; hence he, and I looking over his shoulder, could speak about the former akkarungeng as a whole and from the top, for it was in the past, and his social place was unchallenged and unchallengeable partly because it was past.) Historically, of course, even rulers lived in a *habitus*, as Bourdieu would put it, of opposition; there were always other rulers in other kingdoms who could challenge them. But rulers were in a better position than most to eradicate opposition, and throughout Southeast Asia they imagined themselves as unchallenged and unchallengeable. Not so for ordinary humans, who lived in a dualistic world of allies and enemies rather than in the center of a wishfully and sometimes actually hegemonic center. Historically, the social place that any given person held was constantly threatened by status-peers. Status-peers vie with each other for a superior social place.

At the time I did fieldwork, society in Luwu was no longer officially and legally a hierarchy, not only because everyone was officially a citizen equal to all others, but also because it lacked a ruler and regalia, a peak to act as the ceiling of competition and the guarantor of the stability of a hierarchy of places. Nonetheless, people acted as though there were a social hierarchy whose local summit was the high core of which the Opu Pa'Bicara was the most prominent member. In a hierarchy of the Southeast Asian sort, people's social places were and are constantly threatened by status-peers, who vie with each other for a superior place. In the lived social hierarchy I witnessed during fieldwork, status-peers in the presumed hierarchy continued to compete with each other for "place." (High place in the current era can lead to no honors from a non-existent ruler in a non-existent polity, of course, but it can lead to respectable or better marriages with people of similar or higher white blood than one's own. But to

look at the competition as though it has a specific goal or utility is a little irrelevant: *siri'*, defense of "place," honor, is where people "live" attitudinally and emotionally.) Awareness of the threatening existence of ToLaing continues to inform all social life. In no trivial sense, even conversations are contests. No less so is the analogue of etiquette, which is better understood as status negotiation than as *politesse*.

As I remarked before, the contest is an exceedingly common way of casting experience in hierarchical Southeast Asia, whether the medium is a ritual drama, a cockfight, a shadow-puppet play, or the retelling of an encounter that happened yesterday; all are usually plotted as a struggle between two closely matched opponents. It is, simply, a rhetorical form that was and is widely experienced as compelling. Everyone in Akkarungeng Luwu had status-peers. Even the ruler, looking across to peers in other polities, saw other rulers, whose expansionist tendencies were a continual threat to his own. Currently, a high noble with a *kapolo* sees other high nobles with *kapolo*. Any and all centers have expansionist tendencies, which continually pose a threat to their peers. A person involved in a contest looks up or down for allies. Looking up, he hopes to find a powerful protector who will view the challenge to the lower person as a challenge to himself and will bring to bear all his prestige and influence (and warrior-followers, if necessary) to move toward a satisfactory settlement. That higher person is the navel-center to whom the lower one is oriented as a peripheral server. Looking down, a person hopes to find many inferiors who offer up loyalty, support, and obedience. Those inferiors are the loyal followers who are oriented to this person as their navel-center.

When peers are in opposition, then, the contest is not between individuals. When rulers contested each other, when there were *akkarungeng*, we would term the contest "war." When high nobles contested their peers when there were *akkarungeng*, we might label the contest anything from "vying for prestige" to "internal turmoil" or "civil war," depending on the level of violence and its success in de-centering the centers in the level above it. Now, when a low noble jostles for position with his peers, the social body of followers whom he involves may be quite small. In that case, the contest might be labeled "a tense conversation," "a boasting challenge," or "a village dispute involving a *siri'* killing," again depending on the violence level and the number of people involved.

The point, the logic, and the dynamics of lateral opposition were and are similar, regardless of level. One continues to be judged by one's rivals, whom one challenges oneself, and by whom one is challenged. At a deep level, there is no other way to know who one is.

This lived social theory, like more bookish ones, implies a psychology: an ethos, a social stance, and a way of thinking about the constitution and worth of persons. In Luwu and in South Sulawesi generally, the stance that underlies both opposition to peers and the ability to fuse into a hierarchical unity is called *siri'*. There are people who share one's *siri'*; they protect and guard it. Those who do not share one's *siri'* attack it. And so the world is divided into two sorts of people: "us" and "them", those who protect one's *siri'* and those who attack it, *kapolo* and ToLaing.

Siri' and Ripakasiri'

Perhaps the main criterion of who counts as kapolo rather than as ToLaing is the bond of siri' within a kapolo:

I was talking to Andi M. about siri'. He said that you are one siri' with your family, against ToLaing." I asked him for some examples. He said, "Suppose I owe some money to a ToLaing and I have to repay it, and the date for repaying it is approaching but I don't have it, then I go to my rich uncle and I tell him about it. My uncle will give me the money (or lend it). That is because we are one siri', and he would be embarrassed just like me if I didn't repay it." I said, "Suppose your uncle refused you the money once you asked for it?" He said in that case, he would feel ripakasiri' by his uncle.

(The term he used, *mamesa siri'* [in Tae] or *maseddi' siri'* [in Bugis] means "in a state of one siri'." [*Mesa* and *seddi'* mean "one."] The term *ripakasiri'* means "to be caused siri'," to be offended.)

The term siri' is, so far as I know, unique to South Sulawesi, but variations on the themes of shame, embarrassment, performance, solidarity, and respect that the term points to appear throughout the island Southeast Asian world. To have siri' (to be *malu* in Indonesian, or to have *isin* in Central Java, or *lek* in Bali, or *hiya'* in Tagalog-speaking Luzon) is a good thing; it marks a person as a social being. Perhaps like all words, but especially like words that stand at the juncture of emotions, processes, reactions, contexts, and understandings, siri' cannot be satisfactorily translated. Conventionally rendered, it would be something like "dignity" or "honor" or "shame"—not that the meaning of any of those words is entirely transparent even in English. The Javanese term *isin* is also often rendered "shame." But the most illuminating translation of *isin* I have encountered is Ward Keeler's (1987:66) "vulnerability to interaction." Part of the meaning of siri' could also be given as "vulnerability to interaction," because a person who has siri' is sensitive to, hence vulnerable to, other people.

When you apply it to yourself, the word indicates that you felt embarrassed or inadequate to the situation. For instance, if you tell a joke and nobody laughs, you feel siri'. Or you might feel siri' if you find yourself in a situation in which you do not know how to behave, as in the presence of a high-status person when you can't handle speech levels; or, as we might say, when you are at a dinner party and you don't know which fork to use, but everyone is judging you on your suave performance. So, when a small child, meeting a gigantic pale stranger from far away for the first time, clings and hides behind his mother's sarong, the mother says, "*Masiri-i*"—"He's (in a state of feeling) siri'"—with some pride that the child is not so brazen as to approach an important stranger without hesitation.

I think that this capacity to feel embarrassment, respect, and social humbleness is precisely what Keeler meant in translating *isin* as "vulnerable to interaction." It marks a person as social, as human, in part because it means that that person is responsive to social expectations and cues, rather than wild, controllable only by force:

AA observed that Westerners don't have siri', and for that reason they don't understand anything but policing and brute force. Shocked, I

said that, quite the contrary, we have inner controls, our hati kecil [an Indonesian term that means, more or less, "conscience"]. It is true, I admitted, that when our hati kecil does not jadi [Ind. "to happen," "to jell," "to operate"], we have a problem. That's when we have to use police and armies and such, because our cosmos doesn't take care of itself, unlike theirs. I pointed out that when they do something salah ["mistake," "out of place"], they suffer mabusung or kasalla'. But our cosmos doesn't do anything, so we have to have police.

Siri' is not an inner control in the same way we imagine conscience to be, but it does represent the capacity and sensibility required to adjust one's behavior to a situation without force or the threat of force.

Children are not born with siri'; they have to be instilled with it. In Luwu, as in many parts of Indonesia, people are horrified at the thought of hitting their children and seldom do. When asked why they consider it bad, they explain that if a child is continually hit, especially near the face, the child will grow up lacking in siri'. When pressed further about what connection those things have, they explicate what to them appears obvious. For one thing, the child becomes used to obeying only in response to force. A person with siri', by contrast, knows when and whom to obey without being forced. For another, a habitually abused child will grow up into the sort of person who expects abuse, and will not react appropriately if insulted or threatened. Such a person will be a coward and will not insist on the respect that is due him or her.

And so it is not surprising that various inadequacies and deficiencies in the siri' of other ethnic groups is both explained and emblemized by their (alleged) habit of striking their children. In actual fact, from the bands of hunting-gathering Semai of the Malay interior to the hyper-refined Javanese of the court in Yogyakarta, parents of this archipelago are appalled by the notion of using force to discipline their children. What precisely horrifies them about it differs from society to society, along with the views that each has about how proper social beings are constituted. Nonetheless, explaining alien people's inadequacies by their alleged child abuse is as widespread in the Malay world as the practice of not hitting one's own.

Again, throughout the archipelago, to be said to be deficient in siri' (or whatever: *de'gaga siri'na* [Bug.], *kurang perasaan malu* [Ind.], *ora nduwe isin* [Jav.], *sing nawang lek* [Bal.], *walang hiya'* [Tag.]) is to be found inadequately human. And so in Luwu they say:

*Siri'-é mitu tariase tau
Narekko de'na sirita, tanianik tau
Rupa tau mani asenna*

Only with siri' are we called human
If we have no siri', we are not human
That's called human in form only

and

*Naia tau de é siri'na
de na rilainna olokolo-é*

The person who is without siri'
is no different from an animal

Siri', in short, is a quality that all humans should have. But to be made siri' by someone else (ripakasiri') is something else again.

The word's construction reveals that it is siri' turned back on oneself: ripakasiri', "to be caused to have siri'." Again, this construction is found elsewhere in the archipelago: *dipermalukan* in Malay, *di gau-é isin* in Javanese, *napahiya'* in Tagalog. ToLaing differ from kapolo precisely because they do not have one's siri' as their own. As a consequence, one must be suspicious of them, for they wish to be insulting and denigrating if they find the slightest opportunity to do so with impunity. "*Makaretutuko aké deng ToLaing!*" ("Be on your guard if there are ToLaing!" [Tae])

Ripakasiri'

All social relations are conceptualized in terms of shared siri'. There is a presumption that people from the same "source"—siblings, their juniors, and lower-status kin who trace relations to the same forebear—should be of one siri'. In this way, "kinship" can be, to some degree, mapped onto and meshed with siri'. But kinspeople can become ToLaing to each other by offending one another. Conversely, people who are initially ToLaing to each other can, through association and habit, become joined in siri'. People in Luwu are very clear that it is intense and prolonged association, *assiwolongpolongeng*, that joins people in siri'. One farmer in Senga said:

You feel maseddi' siri' ("in a state of one siri'") with your kapolo, but it's also because of association (assiwolongpolongeng). For instance, the wood merchant who lives with Daeng P's brother has to behave well, for his deeds are the deeds of Daeng P's brother.

When people are thrown together into association, they either develop a single siri' or else they become enemies. Consider my discussion of siri' with a sailor on a trip he made back to Luwu:

You really feel siri' when you are away. If you are in Luwu, you may know of someone, but you do not go around together. But when you meet in a distant country, you feel that as ToLuwu you are mamesa' siri'. I asked what it meant to "feel siri'" when he was far away. What did it mean for his behavior? He said that you are surrounded by ToLaing, they are looking at you, and they will judge Luwu and your ToMatoa by your behavior.

I asked what it meant to be one siri' with other men from Luwu, whom he had not known before. He said the guys from South Sulawesi always stick together in fights, so people from other suku-bangsa (ethnic groups) are afraid of them. Many suku-bangsa don't

have siri', so each person is alone. They don't have a chance against the guys from South Sulawesi.

It is my strong impression that being "one siri" is a constant potential rather than a constant state. The feeling is activated, sometimes in a very *ad hoc* manner, by a challenge from the Other. Far away from home, always surrounded by ToLaing, the sailor has a heightened awareness of the oneness of his siri' with his ToMatoa and with people of Luwu.

The Other that prompts people to join together in siri' is not fixed; it is whomever challenges. The people with whom one unites in siri' are also not fixed; they can be whomever joins one against the offending Other. The following incident from fieldnotes illustrates these observations:

This morning about 10AM there was a noise of strong voices. Opu D and Tante P and I went to the front porch to see what was happening, and AA drifted in from the neighbor's to the scene of action, which was right in front of our house on the main road. There was a bemo (a small passenger van) and D's younger sibling N. N was shouting. I saw him gesticulate at the driver and say something about mud and water, and he made more gestures. I saw AA come up, take his hand, and turn him away, and then AA spoke a few words to the driver. The driver immediately went over to N, right hand extended and left hand on right elbow (a deferential gesture). The driver grasped N's hand and touched his forehead with it. He minta maaf (asked forgiveness) and N accepted it. Then the driver got into his bemo and drove off, and AA and N discussed it some more, and then N laughed. Then N came over to me and said in Indonesian, "Minta maaf, kena air," (Ind., "I apologize, I was struck by water."), and then he left and the crowd dispersed.

[The] report of AA a few minutes later was that N was going along on his motorcycle with his child in front and his wife in back. Seeing an oncoming bemo, he flashed his lights to show that there were puddles and the bemo should slow down; but the bemo just barrelled on through, splashing the child. N put his child and wife over to the side and halted the bemo and began yelling at the driver. A small group assembled. He hit the driver through the window and then, because the guy was sort of leaning down, put his foot in or near the driver's face, and said "Kau tidak melawan?" (Ind., "You're not going to fight?") and the driver said no. And so, N said later, he couldn't fight him because it would be like fighting a woman. N was still very hot when AA came up, whereupon the driver started making excuses, like he didn't see him and didn't know there was water and so on. AA immediately saw the danger and said, "Kau tidak merasa salah?" (Ind., "You don't feel at fault?"). "Saya merasa salah" (Ind., "I feel at fault"), answered the driver. "Kalau begitu, minta maaf" (Ind., "If it's like that, ask forgiveness"). So that's what the driver immediately did. Then the driver asked whether he could be considered free to go and was given permission by AA and N. Then N had to ask forgiveness from AA (really from Opu) because he had caused a commotion right

in front of the house, and from me, because I am AA's and AM's sibling.

AA says that the siri' that N felt was for everyone--the whole populace was ripakasiri' by the driver's behavior. If the driver had been local, people would have considered it a matter between N and his immediate rapu; but since the driver was a Bugis from the south everyone got together because they were all in it together. The paradox was that N was guarding Opu's siri' (because Opu guards theirs), but he did it by making a fuss in front of the house, which is strictly an offense to Opu's siri', so he had to ask forgiveness from the house's high residents.

AA said that of course if the driver had been foolish enough to fight, he would have been killed easily, because everyone would have entered the fray to strike him. I asked if that wasn't unfair, a mob attacking one person. He said no, not at all, quite the contrary, everyone would feel siri' not to enter in, because when one person is guarding our siri', how shameful not to help. Just like Kahar (the rebellion against Java, the civil war of the 1950s), when Kahar was ripakasiri' by the government; he was fighting to defend the siri' of all people of South Sulawesi, many felt, and so lots of people felt it would be shameful not to join him.

The boundaries between those fused in siri' and those opposed in siri' also shift with the actions of individuals. As mentioned, a person who begins as a complete stranger, by definition a ToLaing, can become, through *assiwolongpolongeng*, of one's siri' with a group of people who are of one siri'. In this process, people of distinct siri' become one (*si-temmak-temmak*). I myself experienced this process of losing my status as a ToLaing and becoming maseddi siri' with the people I stayed with. This process is not equivalent to "establishing rapport" or "being accepted" in any sense immediately comprehensible to Occidental humanism. A person cannot live in a household and remain a ToLaing because it would be intolerable for the household.

How would one act as a ToLaing in someone else's household? One would behave as though one's actions reflected only on oneself, not on the household members. When Americans living temporarily in Javanese households do this, they often feel quite righteous, because they conceptualize the worth of the "self" (theirs specifically) as located in its autonomy and exercise of individual freedom. But people in Java and South Sulawesi do not care much for individual freedom (they translate it into Indonesian as *kebebasan*, being untied and unconnected), and they have only a slight conception of equality and democracy. They have a strong notion, however, of what neighbors will say. And they have a strong notion of how people with siri'—that is, people who properly speaking are humans rather than just wild animals—behave. Autonomy characterizes the way animals act—they do not think about how their actions reflect on their ancestors, and they apparently have no siri', for they are not vulnerable to the feelings and wishes of others. As one lady remarked to me while feeding her chickens, chickens are just the opposite of humans; when they are young, they follow their elder, but when

they are adults, each goes its own way. "Not so for us humans! The more you are an adult, the more you stick with your kapolo!" she said.

People who are not bound by siri' are opposed in siri'. There is no neutral ground, and there are no alternatives. At the same time, the boundaries between "us" and "them," between people fused and people opposed in siri', constantly shift with context and with individuals' behavior. So, for instance, two followers of the same ToMatoa are joined in siri' when the ToMatoa holds a ceremony and the followers work in it. (Even that is an optical illusion, of course. They are joined in support of the ToMatoa's siri', not of each others'. If in certain contexts they work together, it is because they both follow the same high-noble core.) But if the followers are in the village and the ToMatoa is not present, they regard each other as ToLaing. They say to their children, "*Makaretutuko aké deng ToLaing!*" "Watch yourself if there are ToLaing!" And they mean, precisely, fellow villagers and fellow members of the same high noble's kapolo.

The reverse process, in which people who should be of one siri' offend each other and become ToLaing to each other, is also a constant potential and common event. In those instances, for example when two brothers *pakasiri'* each other (cause each other to have siri'), they become ToLaing to each other until and unless someone higher than both and trusted by both (a ToMatoa, whether the elder of a kapolo or a respected older relative) is able to settle the matter in a way that saves face for both. Of course, sometimes a reconciliation is impossible. To put it another way, a person is as likely to be *ripakasiri'* by someone with whom he or she is acquainted as by a stranger—perhaps more likely.

In such circumstances, the ToMatoa is critical in preventing bloodshed, because it is an offense for his followers to fight in his presence. Here is a story, retold from my fieldnotes, illustrating the function of the high-status ToMatoa, the Opu Pa'Bicara. I retell the story in its entirety, changing the name of the murdered man and leaving out the name of the killer, so as not to *pakasiri'* their kin. Those who are named and alive acted honorably. The story was told to me by Andi Anthon and the Pak Yusof, who is in the kapolo of the Opu Pa'Bicara and whose house is right next door to the Opu Pa'Bicara's. We were discussing madness and people's reactions to it.

There was a second cousin of Opu's (a follower) about three years back. He was making a nuisance of himself, taking people's cars and demanding money and such. People said he was sinting-sinting (Ind., "mildly crazy," "highly eccentric"). One night he appeared at Pak Yusof's in a chauffeured car, carrying all his weapons with him. "That uncle showed lack of respect, for sure," AA interjected.

The man entered Pak Yusof's house and said, "I don't regret it—only, for my wife and children," and he gave all his weapons to Pak Yusof. Meanwhile Pak Yusof had gotten out his own weapons, because the man looked dangerous and was known to be slightly crazy. When the weapons were surrendered, Pak Yusof put them in a room and locked the door.

The man opened his shirt and said repeatedly, "Hot, hot, fan, fan," and Pak Yusof fanned him. The man was weeping and burning with heat and said, "Call Opu." AA, from the adjacent house, had seen the

man approaching, and had gone to report it to his father, the Opu. He had then taken off his sarong and shirt, and wearing only shorts (for maximum mobility) had returned to the scene prepared to fight. Yusof said to him, "Quick, go get Opu." And the man called to AA, "Come here, my child, go call Opu." AA saw that the man no longer had weapons, so he went back to get Opu.

Opu arrived and very slowly (so as not to make any sudden movements) approached the man and Pak Yusof. Like an unruly monster (*Ind.*, *raksasa*) the man jumped onto Opu, weeping and embracing him, and kept saying "Lieutenant Ismail, Lieutenant Ismail." Opu said that they would fix it, or something like that, not recognizing that the man had already killed Lieutenant Ismail.

They went out to the car, and the driver revealed that the Lieutenant was already dead, something of a rude shock, his head blown off with a gun.

Pak Yusof loaded the man in the car and took him to the jail or the police station or something. The armed soldiers there all ran away from this man who had no weapons, because they thought he was invulnerable (*Ind.* *kebal*). So Pak Yusof said to the man, "You will stay here, won't you," and the man said yes.

Then Pak Yusof went back to the house to ask AA to go with him to Bua, where the man's wife and children were. (AA interjected that only later did he realize what his function was to be.) As they approached Bua, there was a lot of shouting, because that is where Ismail had been killed. All of Ismail's family were there, and they yelled "Halt!" to the car, because this was a matter of *siri*. The madman was a closer relative of Opu's than of the others, but Ismail was in Opu's *kapolo* too. So the car was stopped and Ismail's relatives said, "Who goes there?"

"Yusof."

"Who else?"

"Andi Anthon."

"Get out." So they got out and the car was searched. The dead man's relatives thought the killer might be in the car, protected by his relatives. The two had to stand in front of the headlight beams and it was scary, but Pak Yusof was calm and AA followed. (He interjected.) "If the talk was just a little off, it would have been fatal," Pak Yusof commented.

"Listen," Pak Yusof said when the car had been searched. "This is my family too, and if the government doesn't take care of it, then we will all together fight to the death! Because this is *siri*!" These words calmed them a bit, but they were weeping with frustration because they wanted an enemy, and Pak Yusof was not one. They wanted to go to the madman's house, about two kilometers away, and pull it down, probably killing his wife and children who were in it.

"If you want to get the wife and children," Pak Yusof told them, "that will enter the *siri* of the *kapolo* of Andi Anthon. And if you want to get his *kapolo*, you might as well start with him, as he is right here.

*And if you want to attack him, I will fight right now by his side."
Helpless again, they wept in frustration.*

So Pak Yusof remained there as a sort of hostage and AA took the car and went to the house of the man. The wife and children had shut it up and barricaded it as much as they could. They said, "Who is there?" He answered, "Andi Anthon." So they opened a window. He got them out and into the car, and they went back and picked up Pak Yusof, and then they sped off into town.

In this story Pak Yusof presents himself, with Andi Anthon's collaboration, as a powerful and calm man who is used to dealing with siri' and violence and who can command even madmen, who will obey. Pak Yusof was the main narrator, with Andi Anthon, whose status was higher but whose generation was junior, interjecting and nodding "yes" at crucial points. It was told for my benefit in order to illustrate several points about siri'. Pak Yusof and Andi Anthon present Yusof as powerful, experienced, and commanding, but also as wise enough not to try to handle this tense and potentially explosive situation by himself. He makes a point of showing Andi Anthon, the son of the ToMatoa whom all parties acknowledged, whose presence effectively guaranteed Pak Yusof's own safety and that of the madman's immediate family. To fight in their ToMatoa's presence (or in the presence of his son, the same thing) would have offended the ToMatoa. In the days of the akkarungeng, when there was fighting, the Datu sent a delegate with a red umbrella, symbol of the Datu. At its appearance all fighting had to stop. I was told a number of stories about fighting and about the sudden appearance of a high noble or a red umbrella, obliging the warring parties to cease and desist. In such cases, the narrative continues, "They wept! They had no place for their siri'!" Grown men are not supposed to cry, except in one circumstance—when their siri' is offended but the situation prevents showing themselves ready to die in its defense.

A person who dies because of his siri' *maté rigollai, maté risantangé*, "dies a death of palm sugar and coconut cream." Dying for siri' is the sweetest death, the only death worth dying. To be killed or to die for any other reason is foolish and a waste.

There is a sense in which the whole system of etiquette, or better, manners and mores, is about submission (politeness), attack (rudeness), and defense against attack. It is a side of social life for which a cockfight can provide an image and teach a moral.

The Cockfight as a Moral Tale

Cockfighting, an activity popular throughout the Malay archipelago for many centuries, is now banned in South Sulawesi. Knowing, though, that cockfighting is a cultural system, I inquired, though not too vigorously, about it. My fieldnotes include this discussion of cockfighting with the Opu Pa'Bicara and his son Andi Anthon:

I told Andi Anthon something about cockfights in Bali, what I had garnered from CG's article, and he was amazed to hear that the Balinese have cockfights but then don't themselves break into fights.

*He said that cockfights were allowed only in front of the palace, because people could be controlled there. Other places, they were likely to get into fights. AA said that he thought that one thing you learn in a cockfight is to control yourself, and that is a very important lesson. He gave me the "refined" word for it, the stative verb *maperreng* and the noun form *aperre-perreng*, and provided this saying: "Nareka nacau perrekik padata urane, nacau waranitokik." This means, "If we are defeated in our steadiness as males, our bravery is defeated too." But he said that the main point of cockfighting is a training in manhood. Cocks cannot live together without determining who is best! Further, if one is defeated it says "kraak!" and doesn't complain again, doesn't hit the opponent in the back or anything.*

*[On another occasion] the Opu Pa'Bicara said that a man who was a real stud in the old days was called a *pakkawacampa*, a man who cockfights. What you did in cockfights epitomized how you dealt with *siri'*—how you treated your opponent, how you dealt with nobles, how you reacted to winning and losing. People can forget themselves if their cock is defeated.*

Cockfights apparently taught several moral lessons. Most striking, perhaps, is that cocks, like men, cannot live together without settling who is best. Equally striking a lesson is that the defeated cock defers to its superior, accepts its fate, and does not fight back, the implication being that human beings ought to do likewise.¹ Most people who live outside South Sulawesi, and many Buginese and Makassarese themselves, tend to identify *siri'* (especially in the modern age in cities, where people are not certain who, if anyone, deserves their deference) only as readiness to fight at the slightest opportunity. A middle-aged middle-ranking noble remarked:

*Nowadays everything is chaotic because there are so few respected ToMatoa. So the young people in the cities think *siri'* is all about being brave and ready to fight. In the old days, you had to have *siri'*. If you did, you were sure to be brave. Now people think you have to be brave, and call that "siri".*

This man's view is that *siri'* is coming to signify merely a willingness to fight and the impulse to demand deference, not the willingness to defer to a superior. But the two are aspects of the same thing, and old-style nobles take as much pride in one as in the other.

*When Andi K (a noble son of the Opu Pa'Bicara) was here and we were talking about *siri'*, he told this story about himself. It was quite a few years ago, when Andi K lived in Jakarta. He and his friends were high bureaucrats and hob-nobbed with ministers often. They were at the airport. Word suddenly came that the ruler of Bone (an important South Sulawesi former kingdom) was at the airport. Andi K said to his friends, who were Javanese, "Hey, don't laugh at me." And he went to the ruler and made a *sembahyang* (a deferential gesture) that showed great respect. The ruler allowed him to carry his bags. He had zillions*

of them, and they were really heavy! We all laughed heartily at the incident. (What we found so funny was the double incongruity of a high noble weighed down with bags like a porter; and a modern educated bureaucrat dropping everything to defer to an embodiment of the old regime.) Then they all explained, with great pride, that if Andi K had not acted like that, he would have felt that he had no siri'. He would have felt that his feeling of being human had disappeared, because siri' is what differentiates humans from animals.

Siri' is about attack and defense, but it is also about holding steady (*apperrengeng*). The conversation about the cockfight highlights the importance of steadiness, of holding one's own in the skirmishes for status that compose everyday life. I turn now to the strategies and tactics used in etiquette, but will return at the article's end to siri' as the capacity to hold steady due to the fact that one is aware of one's place.

Siri' and the Contest for Place

What counts as attack and as injury or (as ToLuwu put it) penetration? Let us take the point of view of the attacker, and speak as though the attacker intended to penetrate and injure. Obviously, piercing soft body flesh with bullets or knives counts as penetration and attack, a type of injury that is far from uncommon in South Sulawesi. The newspaper in Ujung Pandang, its capital city, reports a killing due to siri' almost weekly. (Although no killing due to siri' occurred in the villages I frequented during fieldwork, I did observe a number of very tense incidents involving siri' whose natural end, if uninterrupted, would have been the death of one or both parties.) Even to expose a weapon in another's presence counts as an attack. And so it is, as they say, "not polite" to expose a weapon in the presence of a superior. "Not polite" means "not deferential"; "not deferential" means "attacking."

Words can also be weapons. The clearest form of words used as attacking missiles is the insult. The clearest form of insult is to cast aspersions on another person's ancestry, to state or imply that the person's origins were low. Even to hint such an insult raises the level of tension in an interaction to a very marked degree. It puts everyone on guard.

To pronounce the personal name of a person can count as a hostile act, for it places him as inferior to oneself. To speak the name of someone clearly inferior—a child whose status is similar to one's own, or an adult whose status is decidedly inferior to one's own—is acceptable and, in many circumstances, appropriate; but to utter the name of a peer or a senior (by either status or generation) constitutes a challenge.

Body stance is another potential weapon. The "polite" parts of the body, used for deferential interaction, are the head, the right hand, and the front. And so one can insult by turning one's back, or by exposing the sole of one's foot, or by using one's left hand in dealing with another person. Or an attacker could approach another's head too closely, stand tall directly in front of someone who is sitting, or step directly in front of the person without bending. Those are very extreme forms of insult, however, and are seldom used. A more subtle and more common

way of indicating lack of deference, a testing form of attack, is for the attacker simply to spread out casually, stretching or spreading his knees (when sitting in a chair), looking straight at the opponent with chin tilted up and shoulders thrown back and open or getting up abruptly without asking permission. From this description it can be inferred that the most deferential body stance, the one used by inferiors with very high-status people on formal occasions, requires that the elbows and knees be kept close to the body, the head slightly bowed, the eyes lowered, the shoulders stooped, the soles of the feet hidden.

If the body speaks a language in Luwu, it is public and social not private and idiosyncratic. The meaning of body language in Luwu is very different from the sort described in books on the subject that are available in the United States on supermarket bookracks. Those volumes instruct the reader that a person's fear and self-doubts will be discernible from the position of the knees, the hunch of the back, and so on. To "read" the body in America is to read an interior psyche with a unique history expressing itself in the medium of the body.

Body language in Luwu, by contrast, is entirely public in its code, a code instilled in children as etiquette and displayed in ceremony as social form. It is also public in its interpretation. Because one is trained from childhood to read the body stances of other people and to control and minutely adjust one's own, "reading" body language is far from a subversive or shrewdly insightful act. Finally and most profoundly, it is public in the sense that one's body stance does not express one's interiority, whether unconscious or intentional. Rather, it registers the status of the person to whom it is oriented. And so it is that one can aggress against another person by adjusting one's body, in major or minor ways, so as to register degrees of attitude ranging from deference to contempt.

Another weapon available to an attacker is penetration by insight. A person can be "read," as ToLuwu put it; that is, personal inclinations, desires, impulses, and reactions can be revealed unintentionally to an observer, who pays careful attention to the person's face and body stance. The fact that the body is a public system of signs that can be read locks the observer and the observed into an intensely reciprocal system of communication. The attentive observer is hyper-aware of minute inflections of facial expression, voice, and body stance, which may reveal reactions the observed wishes to conceal. The observed tries to maintain self-control over every gesture and to remain completely impassive and without affect, especially in situations of duress.

Needless to say, the higher one's status, the higher the stakes. A high ToMatoa is studied carefully by his followers, who take their cues for their own reactions from the reactions of their leader. The ToMatoa must not allow himself to reveal even slight annoyance at something that he does not want his followers to be furious about, for the ToMatoa's slightest reaction will be many times magnified by his faithful bodyguard. Thus if a high leader allows himself impulsively to express an emotion, the result may be bloodshed. The public expression by leaders of personal emotion attains, in this system of signs, the status of an irresponsible self-indulgence. A person who habitually indulged himself in that way would not be able to become a ToMatoa in the first place. He would be (correctly) viewed as impulsive and erratic, and therefore as a danger to his followers rather than their protector.

A corollary assumption holds that the need to make wishes verbally explicit reveals a leader to be ineffective and impotent. It shows that other people are paying the leader so little attention that he or she must resort to overt commands and rebukes, which are analogous to force and therefore bear an inverse relation to the exercise of authority. Incidentally, this is one thing that makes it very difficult for women, who are the primary caretakers of children, to attain much spiritual potency. For example, Opu Senga, the Opu Pa'Bicara's older sister, was known for her "clean soul" and calm demeanor. Once I was discussing Opu Senga's faultless reputation with the wife of a high administrative official posted to Luwu, a lady who, being *moderen* and *maju* (modern and progressive), was far from awed by the alleged virtues of the *ancien regime*. She expressed the very reasonable opinion, one that was in fact shared by ToLuwu, that few women could achieve the Opu Senga's calm state, because most of them have children. Children, as yet not fully trained in "reading," are impossible to control without being given explicit directions. Whatever *moso* (sting of authority) that a woman might have developed dissolves as she fusses about and instructs a recalcitrant child. It is not accidental that women of the very highest status do not take care of little children. The Opu Pa'Bicara's wife, for instance, had many administrative duties concerning the kapolo: she settled disputes among the women, administered the cooking activities for ceremonies, and so on. Members of the household (lower relatives) had cared for her five children's physical needs when they were younger.

Since it is clear that people in Luwu recognize that they are shedders of signs that will be interpreted by others, and that they therefore must control the signs they shed, it is worth comparing briefly the sorts of "selves" that ToLuwu constitute for themselves with the sort of "self" that Erving Goffman postulates in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) and other works. Like ToLuwu, Goffman's postulated persons are aware that they are shedding signs—"presenting the self" for public scrutiny and appraisal. But Goffman's characters are inhabited by a sort of homunculus that manipulates their exteriors. The consciousness of an interior identity that is different from an exterior presented self pervades Goffman's work. Thus his postulated social actors appear always somewhat schizoid (their manipulating inner self seems different from the manipulated visible shell), and always somewhat fraudulent. ToLuwu are somewhat aware of an analogous possibility, but only marginally. In general, their view is that outward visible behavior is a direct, albeit diluted, expression of the interior state; because they imagine a continuity between inner and outer rather than a gap, the schizoid break between interior experience and outward behavior does not usually arise. They are aware that utter fraud can take place—a lower person going to another district and passing himself off as higher—but in general they think that it would be too difficult to act as though one had a clean soul—showing patience, refraining from anger, and the like—if one did not.

Regardless of status, everyone is subject to penetration/attack within the set of understandings I have just outlined, though the stakes are higher for higher people and they work more at keeping themselves steady. (Indeed, the mark or sign of lower people is their alleged inability to control themselves.) The purpose of an "attack" on another's siri, the injury sought, is to challenge the other person to defend his social place, in the hope of dislodging him from it and putting him in

a lower place, thus elevating the attacker's place with respect to the attacked. To stay steadily in one's place in spite of continual attacks is considered both moral and brave. It is no coincidence that one of the very highest-status names that can be given to a high noble translates as something like "cannot be dislodged." The understandings within which contests for place happen are shared by all; but the appropriate response to a challenge differs, depending on a person's place.

ToMatoa have the reputation of being impassive, slow to anger, judicious, and calmer than their followers. When I asked how I could recognize a person of high status, I was continually told things like "they never become angry," "a full stem of rice bows over low," and "they walk with eyes cast down, looking neither right nor left." A person with a truly "clean soul" does not go around looking for a fight. High nobles with large followings strike both ToLuwu and visiting anthropologists as calm and controlled, and this is, in their view, the way it should be.

One old village gentleman, discoursing on siri', commented on the even-tempered steadiness of his ToMatoa, contrasting it with the hot-tempered adamanche he himself shared with other lower nobles. "It's like this," he said. "It's as if I have one rupiah, and Opu has a thousand rupiahs. I have to be very careful how I spend mine, because it's all I have. That's why I have to be on guard if I think someone else wants it. But Opu! He has so much, he doesn't have to worry!"

The implication here is that Opu has siri' to spare, and can afford to be generous. Though a striking metaphor, it is nonetheless not the way high nobles see it. They feel that they are more rather than less vulnerable to insult relative to lower people. Since their places are so high, very slight and minor lacks of deference directed toward them constitute insult. The same behavior directed toward a person of lower place would be appropriate and acceptable. As a consequence, very high nobles must be extremely aware of everything that happens or is about to happen, reacting immediately to disrespect so as to quell it before it escalates. Better still, their high status and the potency of their presence should be so overwhelming that no one dares or wishes to do anything that would constitute disrespect.

Most of what can be interpreted as insult is not a legal matter in any sense. Whether or not a bit of behavior is to count as an insult depends on whether one of the affected parties chooses to see it as such. Whether a party sees it as such in turn depends on the status he or she in effect claims by insisting on a particular interpretation of that behavior. The less obvious the difference in status between two people, the more obscure to both of them which is higher, and consequently the more like a contest their interaction will be. When the difference in status between two people is greater, the difference and the direction of the difference is clearer to both of them, and consequently there will be less tendency for their interaction to take on the character of a contest.

A consequence of all this is that, viewed sociologically, competition exists between status-peers, while alliances form between high and low. But no status is immune to attack: people of every status have status-peers, as well as inferiors who may well challenge and test them. Since everyone has peers, everyone is, on some occasions, engaged in defending his place against those peers. No one has siri' to waste, contrary to what the old gentleman told me.

People of different statuses and followings do, however, exhibit different habitual attitudinal stances, as the same man noted. One of the several reasons for this observed difference is, I think, quite simply that high nobles with many followers are literally better shielded from attack. A high noble with followers has bodyguards who accompany their leader on occasions when the high noble is a guest at the ceremonies of rivals. These bodyguards shield their leader not only from physical attack, which is unlikely, but also from slights to the high noble's status communicated through insufficient deference shown in seating or service. The point of having a bodyguard is to demonstrate potency and a large following such that the host does not dare to treat one with anything but appropriate deference. Members of a bodyguard defend their leader's *siri*, their leader's place. Because bodyguards are extremely adamant and quick to react at the slightest presumed slight, they must be calmed by their leader. The wise leader will show caution care and coolness rather than hot and dangerous outbursts, until a determination has been made as to whether an insult really occurred and, if so, whether the host is ready to make a public ceremonial apology. In this way leaders of large followings acquire the reputation for calm coolness, a sign of high status and potency.

High nobles who have few followers are not so fortunate. Those high nobles are relatively unshielded by others and tend to be correspondingly more anxious, more adamant, and quicker to react defensively about how they are treated. They are notorious for making nuisances of themselves by overreacting to slights. My own observation was that they "overreact" only in the sense that a high noble should not be so touchy (he or she should be calm), but not that they are imagining slights that did not happen. The host, knowing that one of his guests is of high status but has few followers, may well be careless in seating and serving him. The slighted noble, seeing his status-peer who is the ToMatoa of a large bodyguard treated better than himself, becomes miffed because the ToMatoa's deferential treatment by the host makes a visible statement that the ToMatoa is more important and higher than his slighted status-peer. The slighted noble reacts hotly, thereby depleting his *moso* and confirming everyone's view that he is unsuitable to be a ToMatoa and is not really as high as the other ToMatoa. Being a high noble without followers is a hard life.²

The women who attend a ceremony go with their associated men, separating into the women's section only when the whole group of men and women has arrived. The women do not carry weapons—that is the function of their associated men—but the group's internal organization is just like the men's; it consists of a high leader and a following who protects her and whom she keeps in calm order by mediating their disputed and cautioning them if they act incorrectly. The leader of the women's group is usually the sister or wife of the men's ToMatoa. Her follower group, too, looks out for slights; she, too, has a reputation for calm coolness. If a truly serious insult occurs, dealing with it is handed over to the men, for their function is to be, as a whole, the bodyguard of the women. The groupings form guarding peripheries to the navel-centers their leaders define.

Lower nobles may be in the groupings that shield higher nobles. Or they may go to a ceremony in groups that are loosely associated with the high noble, even if they do not actually form the high noble's immediate bodyguard. It not uncommonly happens that lower nobles, hearing that their ToMatoa is going to

be at a wedding in village X, go to the wedding in a group, announcing loudly that they are the people of Opu Such-and-Such, who has yet to show up. They may well have no idea who is getting married. When Opu Such-and-Such does show up, he will be pleased that his extended following has put in an appearance to support him. For their part, they are proud to attend the ceremonies where their ToMatoa is an honored guest, and will recount in the future the fact that they are faithful and valued followers of that esteemed and potent Opu, and that never has a ceremony gone by where they were not there to serve and protect him, for their ancestors have been allied with his ancestors since time immemorial, and so on.

Commoners, traditionally, were involved in nobles' ceremonies mainly in service capacities, not as guests. Now that commoners may have bureaucratic posts in the government or may be rather wealthy as business people, they not uncommonly attend nobles' ceremonies as guests. Since commoners almost inevitably do not have follower-kin to act as an entourage, this may lead to some embarrassment: no one wants to go unshielded as a guest to a ceremony. Bureaucrats bring their office workers with them as an entourage, but this tactic works best only for high bureaucrats. After all, the office workers may be in the entourage of some higher noble to whom they owe a more important allegiance.

Entourages, in short, shield their leaders from both weapons and slights. Everyone strives to make an appearance at potentially tense occasions either with or in an entourage. No one goes alone if there is any way to avoid it.

Bodyguards are not the only shielding periphery that can prevent penetration of a human center. The system of titles and names forms a complex shield against the insult of being addressed by one's personal name. Commoners practice teknonymy, a naming system by which a person is addressed as the father, mother or grandparent of someone. In that way, the name of the junior-generation child is uttered, but not that of the more senior-generation parent or grandparent. Childless people are given teknonyms based on their siblings' children or grandchildren. Nobles have status-titles by which they are addressed. A person who utters aloud the name of a noble of much higher status will be struck with *mabusung*. An effect of these practices is that nobles' names are densely shielded by a bodyguard of titles that prevent their names from being used as weapons by being uttered aloud.

A final shield, already mentioned, is the cultivation of flatness of affect and the appearance of no affect. Nobles council their children: "*Ajak nabacako tau!*" (Bug., "Don't let people read you!"). Reading, of course, is usually not a private activity and is never an entirely silent one. The term *baca* might therefore be translated as "utter," "pronounce," or "recite" as well as "read." The gist of this warning is: do not expose yourself such that people can gossip about you!

It may come as no surprise that, from the lowest pedicab driver to the highest noble, Bugis-Makassarese are preoccupied with being *salamat*. *Salamat* means "safe," and one of the more important ways that one stays safe is by protecting oneself from penetration. They are concerned, in other words, with invulnerability. It should also be clear by now that people of different ranks and followings are safe from penetration in differing degrees, since the protecting layers of peripheries around a given human center become thinner and thinner as we descend the scale of status.

Commoners, who have no entourage of bodyguards to protect them from weapons or insults, are shielded at least by teknonyms, but no one who says their names aloud suffers *mabusung*. Like nobles, commoners do not indulge themselves in moodiness, and they consider the expression of wrath to be dangerous. Yet they do not cultivate flatness of affect nearly to the extent that high nobles do, with the result that their feelings and views are much more "open" to inspection and assessment.

High nobles with followers are shielded from attacks. Defended by others, they are able to be steady. They also actively cultivate steadiness. Their aim is to be neither defending nor attacking—to be neither "defensive" nor "aggressive" nor a combination thereof, but to be utterly calm. They want to be the still center that holds steady against attacks and expands without effort.

Etiquette is not, as we put it, "mere"; it is a contest to the death, metaphorically and sometimes literally. The contest exemplified in etiquette is the same one exemplified in wars and ceremonies. It is a contest for place for, although place is believed to be largely inherited, it is made visible only in its demonstration.

A Wall Someone Else Builds

Protective layerings of people, title, and flatness of affect shield the sacred navel-centers defined by high nobles. The house follows a similar pattern: an elaborated series of layerings around a center post and center spirit that protects the house's inhabitants. These layerings serve to deflect the hostile missiles from the Other that might otherwise succeed in penetrating.

These layered walls are crucial to a person's safety and status. Yet their existence, as Clifford Geertz points out for Java, seems paradoxical, because they are erected by other people:

Politeness is something one directs toward others; one surrounds the other with a wall of behavioral (lahir) formality which protects the stability of his inner life feeling, but it is, paradoxically, always a wall someone else builds, at least in part. (Geertz 1960: 255)

The seeming paradox arises not from an internal contradiction in the way that ToLuwu understand the world to be but because of the way that English-speaking Occidentals tend to attribute motives. Translation from one world's "rhetoric of motives" to that of another creates the illusion of paradox. I want to discuss this problem briefly, and then return to the notions of motives and energies that form the analogue of a psychology in Luwu.

The rhetorical device I employed in explicating attacking and shielding was an attribution of intention to the attacker. I tried originally to write the section without attributing intention, but I found it very awkward, for the simple facts about etiquette that I was trying to convey were lost in circumlocutions. The attribution of intention is built into our common-sense psychology and our rhetoric for describing action. We habitually think of individuals as bounded entities, and we think of their sources of energy, their impulses and motives, as originating within themselves, whether inside their physical bodies or their psyches. And so we tend to understand their behavior as an externalized

expression of internal energies. Sometimes those energies or impulses are seen as physical/biological, sometimes as conscious and intentional, sometimes as unconscious and unintentional; but their origin is always believed to be internal. We often speak as though utterances are externalized thoughts and as though violence is externalized aggression. The notion of a private psychology locates an impulse in the interior experience of a (bounded) individual, which becomes public when it leaves the mind as speech, the body as emotion or behavior.

These common-sense understandings and the language that almost inevitably casts persons as agents, intentional or unintentional, make it difficult to describe "etiquette" in Luwu without violating its meaning. That one utters respectful titles and holds one's body respectfully is not viewed in Luwu as an expression of one's interiority, as the externalization of an inner impulse. Onlookers do not interpret one's body stance as an expression of one's psychological history of personality characteristics. Body stance and utterances (especially the forms of speech indicating politeness or familiarity) are supposed to reflect the status of the person to whom they are directed.

In a perfect world, a world in which everyone knew his social place and registered it appropriately, the crystalline geometry of high and low statuses would be visible in every interaction, and the world would be still and eventless. Bodies would be transparent registers of relative status—humble to those above, straight and dignified to those below. There would be no challenges, for people would defer to those above them. No one would be dislodged because they would be in their places, and their rights would be acknowledged by all. With no challenges, the social world would be without events.

Needless to say, humans are not transparent registers of each others' relative status. Too many things get in the way. For one, there is ignorance: people do not have their precise degrees of status stamped on their foreheads. The social system is not a legal and bureaucratic one, in which people hold social places as sinecures; people must continually negotiate and demonstrate their status. Further, there is self-interest, a tendency to give oneself the benefit of the doubt.

A person who has *siri'* will not show deference to anyone gratuitously—that is, without first satisfying himself that the other person is worthy of respect. Only those of very low status, or pitifully lacking in *siri'*, would be polite (deferential) to anyone they met, on the assumption that the unknown person is higher. And so ToLuwu do not consider an initial aggressive rudeness (as we in Euro-America interpret it) to be a fault.

Just as it is not rude to test an unknown person, by the same token it is not considered pushy to resist that testing with dignity. Quite the contrary: what is shameful—obtuse, a flaw, an exhibition of lack of consciousness—is not the initial expansion and testing of another person, but the refusal to retreat and defer in the face of evidence that the other person is worthy of respect. Such a person "has no *siri'*," no more than a person who retreats too quickly.

The impression that people continually expand into or withdraw from the space occupied by another is actually a rather accurate one. ToLuwu are habitual and sensitive readers of the signs others emit; the reading is so ingrained that it is not conscious. They continually monitor others and adjust their own behavior accordingly. When one shows weakness, the other begins to expand into the opening just revealed; this motion can be read as rudeness or aggressiveness. The

mistake would be to imagine that that stance proceeds from bad intentions, or others' bad intentions toward oneself (if one is aggressed against). Stance is impersonal, in a deep sense. One is therefore not justified in being annoyed if people continually expand into one's space. They must expand; if they are too quick to defer to someone unproven, they are exhibiting a lack of *siri'*. (Even this way of putting it makes it sound too intentional.)

Here is a real contradiction. If both persons in an interaction are adjusting to each other, there will be an endless oscillation, a continual instability. Therefore, in each social interaction, one person is more reactive, the other person is more steady. The test is: Who is the steadiest? Who causes the other to react, while herself remaining impassive and in control?

Assuming for a moment that the person addressed is of higher status, the burden of proof, as it were is on the higher one. By her³ stance and demeanor, she evokes, or rather controls, the reactions of the lower person. If the higher one is relaxed, loose, unconscious, silly, then the lower one will react with greater expansiveness and less deference, for the lower one is monitoring the other unconsciously (and sometimes consciously). If the higher one is dignified, steady, and by slight inflections of facial expression and voice shows that she is aware of everything going on and will tolerate no expansion, then the lower one will stay in her (lower) place. Defeat comes from being reactive, from giving up control to the other person, from allowing the other person's stance and demeanor to control one's own. That is part of the meaning of the saying, "If we are defeated in our steadiness as males, our bravery is also defeated." And that is why the Bugis-Makassarese and the Javanese alike constitute their social interactions in such a way that a person evokes the reactions of the people around him. "A central concept in the Javanese traditional view of life is the direct relationship between the state of a person's inner self and his capacity to control the environment," writes Soedjatmoko (quoted in Anderson 1972:13). One who has control over one's inner and therefore outer or visible self exhibits steadiness, thereby evoking respect and deference; one who has little inner control inspires rudeness and negligence on the part of others.

The impersonality of the reactive tendency to expand when another person shows weakness, thereby inviting lack of deference, remained obscure to me for some time. One reason for my confusion was that I had spoken to the Opu Pa'Bicara and to Andi Anthon about the subject in Indonesian. They had explained that wise leaders stay calm and caution their followers against rash action in the event that the leaders are treated with negligence at a ceremony. Only if the insult was *dengan sengaja* (Ind., intentional), they said, should the leader allow himself to acknowledge the discourtesy by demanding an apology. At some point I realized that this Indonesian phrase was getting in the way of my understanding, because intention has nothing to do with it. From fieldnotes:

Now everyone says, "Tidak dengan sengaja," it wasn't deliberate, when someone offends someone else. Opu seems to say this to calm his followers, and follows it by saying that we must not make a disturbance in people's houses. If we are ripakasiri', there are ways for it to be remedied (a public ceremony of apology).

But this "not deliberately" is increasingly seeming to me rather vague. Because what could "deliberately" mean? What counts for being ripakasiri' is being publicly humiliated. No one cares about anyone's deep motives for humiliating them.

The point is, even if someone did not really intentionally humiliate you at a ceremony, nonetheless if it happened then it means that the person did not think you were important enough to be extremely careful of. For instance, it is very unlikely indeed that protocol would be lax for the Datu, and be excused later because it was "unintentional." That would be outrageous and senseless. The point is not whether someone intended anything or not—who cares? In any case one suspects the worst with good reason, because his siri' is opposed to one's own. The point is, he didn't think you important enough to treat with care.

I suggested this thought to Opu and AA, who said, but of course. All this sengaja stuff is new, and is said only when speaking Indonesian. It really has nothing to do with anything except people's actions. If someone who offended you is willing to make an apology, then in retrospect it appears unintentional and all right. (Because, Opu said, we have to have pity on people and give them a chance to see that they were mistaken and make it right.) But if they won't apologize, then they wanted a fight, and it was "intentional."

The fact is, humans are fallible. They make errors of judgment all the time about the strength and adurance of the people who are "guests" (by definition ToLaing) at their ceremonies. They press whatever advantage they think they see; if the other person accepts it, the host has won the interaction and a new status quo has been established between them. If the other person resists, and is able to make good his resistance, then the host must retreat and "apologize." "Apology" is a ceremony to prevent bloodshed, when one person has miscalculated the strength of the other and has successfully been called on it. And so a constant *a posteriori* judgment goes on in everyday life. The person who wins the cockfight of status is the person who ought to have won it. He is the one whose potent presence dominated the weaker one, forcing the weak one to go "kraak" and retreat.

Not unrelated to all this is a strong tendency, in court texts throughout Southeast Asia, to assume that whoever succeeded, say, in winning a kingdom or leading a kapolo, is the one who ought to have succeeded. This stance toward the past is not simply a rationalizing or manipulative rewriting of it by the people who gain power. Even less is it the cynical stance implied in the statement "might makes right," a statement that makes sense as a "cynical" statement only in the context of a secular politics and secular theory of the state. In a sacred politics, the *a posteriori* judgment makes not a cynical statement but an epistemological one: how can anyone know who should have succeeded, except by seeing who in fact did?

These conceptions imply a psychology, but it is a psychology whose rhetoric and attribution of motives are almost entirely public. If a person was rude to someone who accepted the rudeness or was unable to do anything about it,

people attribute it to the weakness of the attacked. This harms the standing of the attacked, who is shown to have been vulnerable to attack. The possibility of being treated familiarly—of being attacked—by people who are unaware of one's status is one of the most salient reasons for high people not to go out into public without a protecting retinue, whose function is both to signal the person's high status and to defend it if necessary. In such a rhetoric and psychology, the person with a status to protect is highly vulnerable, because that person is the one who is seen as responsible for other people's reactions to him (or her).

One might well ask whether ToLuwu do not recognize that the attacker sometimes has a willful desire to disparage the higher person, a desire whose source comes from within himself rather than being evoked by the higher person's blameless presence? The answer is complex. In general, the answer is that the motives of the attacker go unmentioned. Certainly, onlookers never use a language of explanation that legitimizes the rude person on grounds of a private interiority. They do not say, "I wonder why Joe was so obnoxious to Professor Smith. Perhaps he is feeling low because his wife left him (an explanation in terms of the attacker's present psychological state)...or maybe he has an unresolved Oedipal complex (past psychological history)...or he just got up on the wrong side of the bed this morning (inexplicable psychological state)...or maybe it was something he ate (a materialist explanation)...," and let it go at that. The attacker is assumed always to be expanding, as it were, into the space created by the chink in another's armored stance. The responsibility for the attack lies with the chink, not within the attacker. Thus people's social places—their standing and ultimately their status—are deeply vulnerable. A person who lets down his or her guard, who loses alert consciousness when confronting other people, in effect invites their attack. The attacker, without forethought of the consequences or intentional malice toward the person whose presence was weak, expands into the weaker person's social space and "wins" the interaction.

It is considered cowardly always to retreat from possible confrontation. People assume that the habitual retreator is simply impotent, afraid to test his mettle. At the same time, it is a mistake to cultivate associations or put oneself into circumstances that positively invite people to be rude. From fieldnotes:

It has been my feeling that the Javanese are more defensive in caring for their status, and the Buginese more aggressive. I have been looking around for proofs. WK (an anthropologist who worked in Java) said once that when one of his friends, a young man, got married, WK asked him what was different now. The man said he thinks of his dignity now and doesn't spend time with little children. I wondered if this applied to the Buginese, who seem better at controlling people and less timorous asserting their status aggressively.

I asked X, who was amazed at my ignorance. He said of course little children cannot be controlled, because "tae pa naisseng bettuang" (Tae, "They don't yet recognize meaning," that is, behave appropriately, have siri', etc.). Suppose you spend time with little kids flying kites, he said. Then one day you are with the Camat (Mayor) and you are out on the street, and a little kid comes by and yells, "Hey, hey, X, see you later!"—well, the little child isn't condemned. Rather, it

is clear that you lack moso such that little kids feel free to come up to you even when you are with the Camat. Furthermore, since they are so hard to control, if you try to control them you will always be scolding and angry. Buginese men feel they lose their grip on things as well as their moso if they are continually angry and fussing. "It's as though our grip on things has disappeared, if we are always fussy/angry. It uses up our energies," he said.

Children are hopelessly unruly, so excessive familiarity with them must be avoided by adults to maintain their dignity. Children cannot be controlled, because "they don't yet know meaning," adults with siri' do "know meaning," which makes them vulnerable to interaction. In that interaction, one person dominates, controlling the situation and the other person, while the other one reacts. The question is, who will dominate the situation by his presence, forcing the other one to go "kraak!" and, defeated, acknowledge superiority?

Let us return to the "walls" that surround a human center. I began my investigation of etiquette with barriers. Like a house's walls, the titles and followers that surround a high noble form a sort of second skin, a barrier, a protection against invasion. The practical usefulness of these layerings is readily admitted by anyone in Luwu.

Yet this sort of thinking about humans, as for houses, seems backward to ToLuwu. The question that they have is not whether layers help protect a vital center—clearly they do—but why and how some vital centers, but not others, are able to attract protecting barriers to themselves. Those barriers are human bodyguards, but also include the deferential speech, the titles humbly uttered by those lower. Those "walls, built by someone else," are not expressions of the builders' intentions but are evoked by the centered, steady person. The higher person does not express but elicits the barriers that protect him. That person's power and influence are more analogous to a magnet than to a thrusting weapon.

The diabolical paradox is that in Luwu, the "self" must continually be demonstrated in order to exist. For the same reason, it is constituted by other people. We can take the term "constituted" in a weak sense and a strong sense. In the weak sense, other people constitute one's place, who one is, by making it visible. As a middle-noble follower said to me proudly, "Opu needs us, too. We make visible who Opu is." But there is also a strong sense of how the reactions of other people constitute who one is in Luwu: ultimately, there is no other criterion of where a place is—how close it is to the navel-center of the world—than whether it has a periphery, and how big that periphery is.

The "State" as a System of Signs

Although it is conducted at the level of etiquette and implicates the processes we might want to call "psychological," the competition between peers in Luwu is not a private matter but a public activity. It gives form to social life, and the politics of the former states were shaped by it. In this lecture I want to explore some of the consequences for the meaning and conduct of the pre-independence politics of South Sulawesi by comparing the stance of siri' among several other insular Southeast Asian societies.

Competition as the Effort to Maintain Parity

"Commoners" in Luwu and in other hierarchical polities of South Sulawesi are all peers in status, by definition. They are people who live within societies whose nobles are hierarchically ranked and organized; at the same time, they themselves are not internally ranked according to the nobles' criteria (claims of white blood, titles, or differential social places). To say that these commoners are all status-peers according to nobles' criteria is not to say that they are never competitive with each other, or do not try to differentiate themselves from each other regarding prestige, however prestige may be construed locally. Quite the contrary. In Luwu, I observed the competition between commoners only from a distance, as nobles were the focus of my study. But fortunately we have Chabot's very informative ethnographic account of Makassarese commoners entitled (in translation) *Land, Status, and Sex in South Celebes*. Makassar is the pre-independence name for the city that was the center of the hierarchical polity of Goa, whose ruler was called a Karaeng rather than a Datu. With Luwu and Bone, Goa was one of the major polities of South Sulawesi. (Makassar is now called Ujung Pandang, and it is the capital of the administrative district of South Sulawesi.) Chabot's ethnography, published in 1950, is based on fieldwork done before World War II and Indonesian independence. At the time of Chabot's observations, the polity of Goa was administered indirectly by the Dutch and still maintained a Karaeng, or ruler. Much of the internal administration of the polity remained intact, including regulation of the use of signs of status by the Karaeng and court. The right to regulate such matters was eliminated, of course, with the advent of independence and "demokrasi."

Commoners in Makassar, Chabot informs us, continually strive (using the ethnographic present for Chabot's book) to outdo each other in terms of standing. I was struck by some of the points Chabot makes about upward striving and about siri' because they resonate with what I had seen in Luwu among peers. This striving is expressed, among other things, in acquiring wealth (land, livestock, and "ornaments," Chabot's term for objects inherited from ancestors, called *arajang* and *mana'* in Luwu), in defeating others during fighting or skirmishing, in outdoing them in each personal confrontation, and in adopting outward forms of higher people (Chabot [1950] 1960:110).

In a different part of the book, Chabot suggests that such striving is prompted by challenge and counter-challenge between peers. He indicates very clearly that

challenge and counter-challenge are cast and perceived by Makassarese in terms of affronts to siri'.

Vertical mobility occurs by means of opposition relationships. Men between fifteen and forty years, especially the younger ones among them, must face each other in a perpetual relationship of challenge and outdoing. Each challenge and outdoing demands a reaction. The person who does not react (that is to say, the one who does not participate in what is regarded as important in his culture has little social standing. The feeling of someone who is outdone is indicated by siri'. Someone is siri' when his social standing is impaired and when another person knows this. As Chabot puts it:

A man is inclined to regard immediately as outdoing any accidental event at an encounter, or a lucky word on his part, by which he raises himself above the other person, at least in his own eyes. The other, when he hears this, is also siri'.

The reaction may consist of a counter-challenge, a returned insult, by which the original challenger in his turn becomes siri'. It is never possible to determine precisely who "began." The mutual opposition is sometimes explained by an event from the past that is regarded as of great importance, for instance, a murder. But with that the question concerning the origin of the mutual opposition is merely put off.

There exists the possibility that the outdone person will respond by stabbing. The consequence of outdoing can therefore never be foreseen. It remains charged with real danger. Many stabbing brawls in South Celebes are proof of that.

One of the most spectacular challenges is the theft of cattle, horses, or buffalo. Its purpose is, in the first instance, to show one's courage (kaporeanna); only in a few cases are economic motives at the bottom of this. Sometimes a warning is uttered beforehand: "I am coming" (that is to say, "to steal your buffalo"). Stealing cattle is done to find a reason for a brawl. A successful buffalo theft is considered a triumph and at the same time a challenge. ([1950] 1960: 290-91)

Chabot's account describes commoners. Yet everything in his characterization of the dynamic of striving among them seems to me equally apt for characterizing the dynamic between peers at any level, including the highest nobles, in South Sulawesi. Peers strive to outdo or best one another, using whatever medium is accessible: house structure and ornamentation, the size of ceremonies, the magnificent names they give their children, the largeness of their followings, their wealth, their bravery in the face of overwhelming odds, marriage to a person of high standing, appropriating the claim to a title such as Andi (possible only in the uncontrolled city of Ujung Pandang), or whatever.

Even slight success by a peer that excels what that peer had done or done before is perceived as a challenge to one's own dignity and standing. Each success must then be met with a similar success, in effect a counter-challenge. Who "began" is not really at issue, for the competition is so intrinsic to being peers. There never was a starting point at which the relationship was stable, without tension.

To fail to take a peer's success as a challenge to oneself, and therefore to make no effort to meet it or best it, indicates that one accepts the other person's superiority. In short, peers construe any excellence or success by another peer as an attack on their *siri*'. If they did not react to meet that attack, therefore, they would show themselves to be lacking in *siri*'. A peer of any level must continually challenge and counter-challenge in order to maintain parity, or else be left behind.

Some societies in island Southeast Asia that have no principle of institutionalized hierarchy consist exclusively of status-peers. The Ilongot tribe of Luzon (Philippines), described most fully in the work of R. Rosaldo (1980) and M.Z. Rosaldo (1980), represent such a society. In a striking argument that links local social dynamics to local ways of construing emotions, M.Z. Rosaldo has argued that the Ilongot insist that they are all "the same," all "peers." She suggests that it is the Ilongot preoccupation with maintaining parity among themselves that in fact generates competition among them. When one person does something outstanding, Ilongot say, other Ilongot become envious, and envy stirs *liget* (anger, excitement, energy). When a woman's yam crop is especially large, or when a man takes a head, or when a hunter kills a large amount of game, other Ilongot feel *liget* stirred within them. They see that someone else is excelling, standing out as better or more accomplished than themselves. They find it intolerable for someone to stand out: "Are we not all Ilongot? Are we not all the same?" they ask. The *liget* of those who have been superseded prompts them to go out and accomplish great deeds themselves, in order that they remain peers of the one who excelled. "'Without *liget* to move our hearts,' Ilongots have told me, 'there would be no human life.' It is envy, they explain, that stimulates industry and spurs people on to labor..." (M.Z. Rosaldo, 1980:47). Competition and energy are thus generated in the Ilongot effort to restore and maintain parity. Like Luwu peers, Ilongot peers compete fiercely, in order not to be left behind.

Although the dynamic of challenge and counter-challenge in order to maintain parity could be said to characterize the interaction of peers, regardless of who the peers might be (members of a hill tribe in central Luzon, commoners in Makassar, or nobles of similar status in Luwu), the social outcomes of their strivings are rather different. In those societies which have institutionalized rank in some form, the oppositional striving can be said to have a direction, and that direction is "up". The same cannot be said of the Ilongot. In Ilongot, there is virtually no social up or down. As the Ilongot put it, "We are all the same." Only one level of parity exists.

If we picture the inflationary and expansive tendencies of social striving as a sort of soufflé that rises in the oven of challenge, we could say that the pan constituted by Ilongot society is like a cookie sheet: it has no sides. The ingredients for rising are there; in the heart of challenge the soufflé rises magnificently. But with no way to consolidate, reify, or permanently mark its gains, it collapses once again to its former level flatness. Societies with institutionalized ranking systems, by contrast, provide markers of standing that give sides to the pan; a person's rise in standing in such a society attaches itself to some marker and clings to it, never again to fall to its former level.

Again, Chabot provides some very interesting observations on this matter as it pertains to the commoners of Makassar. He describes how commoners in

Makassar strive to differentiate themselves from one another. Commoners do not have white blood in differing degrees. They consequently lack claims to what Chabot calls (in Dutch) *stand*, which only the nobility have. (Chabot's *stand* is essentially what I have termed "status" or "social place," *onro*.) From the point of view of nobles looking at their own society, then, commoners in South Sulawesi are all "the same," or, as they sometimes put it in Indonesian, "level" (*rata-rata*). Nobles would regard any differences in degrees of prestige among commoners as trivial. To commoners, however, the differences in prestige among themselves are far from trivial. While commoners cannot compete for "status," they do strive to outdo each other in terms of what Chabot calls (in Dutch) *aanzien*, or "standing." The differentiation in standing among commoners is brought about through women. The social worth of a woman (which is to say the standing of her family) is measured by the bridewealth given at her marriage. A woman cannot be given less bridewealth than what was given for her mother. Moreover, a woman may not marry a man of lesser standing than herself.

This arrangement constructs a vertical direction and a means of measuring one's rise within it. Thus, Chabot writes, if we imagine Makassarese society as a ladder, women—or rather the bridewealth given for them—are the ladder's rungs. He points out that if female hypogamy were allowed, then the rungs of the ladder would no longer hold. It would be impossible to measure advancement by the offer or receipt of a brideprice of a certain amount. This set of arrangements, in short, provides the sides to the soufflé pan, the marks of advancement to which the upward-striving ingredients can cling and never again fall below. People hope that in the next generation a yet higher mark, a larger brideprice, will be reached.

A little reflection will make it clear that in such a system of measuring standing, it is in the interest of both the bride's family and the groom's family for the bridewealth to be as large as possible. Since the bride's social standing is measured by her bridewealth, her family's interest in a large bridewealth is clear. But recall that female hypogamy is not allowed. The obverse is that male hypergamy is also prohibited; a man may not marry a woman higher than himself.⁴ Since the groom is therefore assumed to be at least as high as the bride, and since the measure of the bride's standing is the bridewealth she receives, the groom's standing, too, is measured by the bridewealth.

The Polity Regulated Inflation

This set of circumstances encouraged inflation. The minimum bridewealth was fixed by what was given for the bride's mother, so there could be no falling back, no loss of the gains in standing made in the previous generation. At the same time, it was in both parties' interest to make the bridewealth larger than it was in the previous generation. "It is therefore comprehensible," Chabot writes, "that the *sunrang* (bridewealth) has a tendency to rise" ([1950] 1960:116).

This tendency to inflation could not help but pose a problem to those people who were higher in standing or status than commoners. Since the lower tended continually to become higher, the bridewealth for commoners could eventually equal that paid for the lowest rank of nobles. Lower nobles, in turn, needed to inflate the bridewealth paid among themselves in order to differentiate themselves from commoners. And so it went, on up through the system. If the top

of the system refused to inflate and remained stable, one could imagine everyone eventually reaching parity with the top. That could not be allowed to happen, and was not. As Chabot puts it:

In his kingdom, the prince is the highest. He, and with him his kinsmen of the same blood, should therefore have the highest sunrang (bridewealth) within that kingdom. As a result he is concerned that the sunrang in his region be clearly established according to rank and status, and known to everyone, so that his subjects will not pay or receive a higher sunrang than he himself. Hence, one repeatedly encounters prescriptions concerning the amount of the sunrang in lontar [palm leaf manuscripts]. Nature, however, seems to be stronger than rules. There always arises, some time after the amount has been officially established, the tendency to surpass the prescribed limits. Rules are only too gladly forgotten. As time goes on, more and more people seem to have paid and received a sunrang that was higher than they were permitted. Consequently, a new sunrang edict must be issued periodically. ([1950] 1960:116)

Scholarship on Southeast Asia has often and correctly called the ruler of the realm "the fount of status." Not only did the ruler have the most of whatever attributes and items acted as signs of status in the realm, but one of the ruler's functions was to distribute those signs, in the form of titles, favors, official positions, and to generate embodied rank by producing offspring of his own high rank. He was indeed the source and fount of status. But it will be clear from the passages quoted from Chabot that the ruler was not only the fount of status but also its guarantor. Because of the inflationary tendency to which any medium or criterion of status was subject, a tendency ultimately traceable to competition between peers, the ruler had to guarantee that signs of status throughout the system had some meaning. This he did by issuing edicts that fixed the value of signs.

The value of the system of signs as a whole was fixed by establishing signs as a range stretching from "high" to "low." Humans attached themselves to the system of signs by using and displaying signs in a way that corresponded with their alleged degree of white blood; each level of social rank was constituted precisely in the privilege to display and use a certain degree or level of the signs of status. Thus clothing colors, for instance, were ranged from high to low by edict, and only high people were allowed to wear colors designated "high"; house structures and decorations, similarly, were sorted into a hierarchy of possible attributes and elaborations so that houses could be used to signify different degrees of rank (unlike clothing colors, this range is still roughly observed). Bridewealth was measured in quantity of gold, and, as Chabot tells us, the amount and therefore the range of payments was fixed by edict. And, of course, humans not only used signs of status but embodied them, knowing full well that they were and are shedders of signs that will be interpreted by others; humans were themselves signs of status.

Almost any medium through which humans interacted, and thereby signalled their social place, entered the system, from the gross divisions visible in the color of clothing or the accoutrements of interaction at ceremonies (such as number of

serving plates and place of seating) to the delicate and fluctuating fine-tuning of status relations visible in body stance, gesture, and speech. Few media were neutral in this system of signs.

The system was a perfectly Saussurian one in which the value of a particular content depended entirely on its placement within the whole system. "Meaning" here means purely that a particular sign of status was located below some signs and above others. Because the meaning of signs depended on their placement, their placement within a range had to be fixed and guaranteed (backed by sanctions) if any individual sign were to signify, to make sense, to be meaningful. Hence this sort of system required a stabilizer in two respects. First, the range of signs had to be defined and the place of any particular sign (*e.g.*, the wearing of green clothing, the meaning of three tipe-tipe on a house front) had to be fixed within it. This could be done by edict and tradition. Second—and this required constant monitoring—the use of signs had to be regulated so that only high people wore "high" clothing colors, were served with a "high" number of plates, put a "high" number of tipe-tipe on their houses, and so forth. Maintaining the separation of signs, both in their range of values and in their use, was necessary if the system of signs was to remain vertical, culminating in the ruler. The presence of the ruler, then, stabilized the system of signs by giving it a ceiling in both theory and practice. The sign "the ruler," who fixed the value of signs and guaranteed their correct usage, gave the system the meaning it had by providing a fixed point to which all other signs referred.

Without the guarantee that the separation would be maintained, vertical ranking in the akkarungeng would have, over the course of years, ceased to exist, becoming instead a state of level peerdom. The soufflé pan would have no sides and would be indistinguishable from a cookie sheet; the kingdom would begin to look like a hill tribe. Such a collapse of hierarchy in a hierarchical polity would be the collapse of order itself; this specter of chaos that haunts this sort of hierarchy results in the sensibility I mention in Lecture One, which insists that everything should be in its place. A hierarchy without a ceiling is more or less what I encountered during fieldwork in 1976, not so much in Luwu—where the presence of the Opu Pa'Bicara and the absence of much in the way of government offices, business, or other non-agricultural and non-kinship-based sources of wealth and status made the illusion that we were living in a modified version of certain aspects of the old regime temporarily plausible—but in other areas. People all over South Sulawesi, after all, retain a hierarchical sensibility, and they continue to aspire to achieve the signs of high status from the old regime, such as marrying white blood, having high nobles as protectors, having wealth, and so on. Yet while people still aspire to exhibit and achieve such signs of status, the signs no longer form a system with a definite range and guarantee of their meaningfulness (*i.e.*, placement) because the fount and guarantor of the system of signs, the ruler (of each of the South Sulawesi polities), has been eliminated.

What is incorrectly called "feodalisme" (it was hierarchy, not feudalism) has been replaced by what is just as incorrectly called "demokrasi." The elimination of "feodalisme" has meant the elimination of ceilings on the level of signs of status which people of any given level may aspire to exhibit. In some cases, the elimination of ceilings is relatively harmless. People say that there is an "inflasi Andi" in the cities, an inflation of people who give themselves the title "Andi." Indeed, I don't believe I have ever met a Buginese or Makassarese in Jakarta or the United States who did not introduce himself as "Andi Such-and-Such"; it has

become the equivalent of "Mr." or "Mrs.," with an ethnic identity attached. "Datu," similarly, is beginning to be used (but only by very, very high nobles) in Ujung Pandang and Bone. Once I received a letter from a woman who had been the ruler of a small kingdom south of Luwu. The return address was "ex-Datu So-and-So," and I thought to myself, "The 'ex' is where it's at!" These days quite a few people can be "Datu," but only real ones can be "ex." In some cases, the elimination of ceilings results in an inflation so extreme it brings about hardship. In Tana Toraja, the mountainous northern part of South Sulawesi, prestige continues to be measured by the number of buffalo slaughtered at one's funeral. Under the old regime, the local political structure set the number permitted to each social level. Now, tens of buffalo may be slaughtered at funerals, sometimes with ruinous consequences for the children of the deceased. In other cases, the change to "demokrasi" simply indicates a change in the means by which signs of standing can be acquired, or it means the invention of new forms that demonstrate new sorts of standing. Most obviously and profoundly, it marks the beginnings of a shift to monetization. The impact of this shift can be seen in Ujung Pandang on the occasion of weddings.

A wedding used to be one of the occasions at which a noble's influence and following were exhibited to his superiors (among others), for hundreds of followers gathered to work in the ceremony. The ruler's attention was drawn to someone who was striving upward and succeeded in acquiring and maintaining a large following, a following whose extent was made visible at weddings and other ceremonies. A ruler would be politically very unwise to ignore a person with a large following when the ruler distributed appointments, titles, and honors. People who sought honors from above, then, also had to look down to their inferiors and followers, attending to their needs in order not to alienate and lose them. The fount of honors and prestige was from above, but the groundswell of influence and power on which those honors were predicated (in effect if not in theory) came from below. A following could not, and cannot, be bought. It is very common now in Ujung Pandang for persons who in former times would have been relatively low nobles and who therefore would not have had many followers, to attain position of some importance in the present government or military, and/or to be rather rich. How to exhibit one's standing at one's child's wedding without any followers to speak of becomes a problem for these people. Such persons tend to have a small wedding in their homes, announcing to visiting anthropologists that it is *maju* and *moderen* (progressive and modern) to regard weddings as *privadi* (private affairs). This private wedding is then followed by an enormous and expensive "resepsi" in a hired hall with hundreds of guests. (High nobles living in the city and separated from their rural base of followers, whom they have neglected for the last twenty years, experience a similar dilemma, and often adopt the same solution.) A hall can be hired; workers assisting in one's kitchen for a ceremony cannot.

The advent of "demokrasi," then, does not mean that everyone is now equal but rather that no one wants to acknowledge that anyone else is better than himself. In other words, people (especially in cities) tend to regard everyone they meet as an inferior whose dignity can be encroached upon or, at best, a peer with whom they are in competition. In the absence of very overwhelming evidence to the contrary, they acknowledge no superiors. "Demokrasi" is a removal of layered

ceilings. Each person above oneself acted as a ceiling, a hard object against which one could bump one's head during one's expansion "up" and "out." This fact was well understood by at least some people in Luwu, as this conversation taken from fieldnotes attests:

I told Opu of my feeling that everyone is continually expanding and going up with their siri', and the only reason it doesn't get out of bounds is that it comes up against the Datu, like bumping into a ceiling. Opu said it was ever so true, and gave this example. It seems that people are offended if someone of their own status reprimands their children: who are they to reprimand them, after all? But with people of clearly higher status who are their ToMatoa, they may instruct their child, "Iari pattette uluta iaté," "Here, finally, is the one who may rap our heads."

The Polity Regulated Encroachment

To say that the ruler regulated inflation by being the guarantor against encroachment on the privileges of each level from the level below is to take the perspective of someone above looking down. Another perspective would be to look across at peers. From this point of view, the ruler guaranteed that peers did not encroach upon each other's place. To understand this, and to understand the perspective of the person looking "across" at the deeds of peers, it is necessary to recognize that the ranking system of politics in places like Luwu or Goa prior to Indonesian independence was not merely vertical but also hierarchical, in Dumont's sense. In such a system, the rank "above" another also encompasses the one below it; to "rise" is not merely to go "up," but also to expand by incorporating as inferiors the people who are presently one's peer. Rising and expanding are the same act.

In my discussion of siri', I wrote that one's only choice when dealing with peers is to absorb them as inferiors or else be absorbed by them. A person who uses signs of status from the level above himself is trying to absorb his peers as his inferiors. Such an act poses a challenge to those peers, and they will resist it. They regard the expander as no better than themselves. To allow themselves to be absorbed by him into a relationship of inferiority, as though he could become their patron and protector, is out of the question. They will interpret his slight and temporary rise as a challenge.

From this point of view, the ruler's control of the use of the system of signs, such that each level of persons would use them appropriately according to their status, also offered an implicit guarantee that the dignity and worth of persons in each level would be maintained against the aggressive ambitions of their peers. I am certain, as was Chabot, that people of any given level who tried to use the signs of status appropriate to the level above themselves wished less to imitate their superiors than to vanquish their peers.

"Law"

The ruler (as an institution and presence) was the fount of status and its ceiling. As the ceiling of status, the ruler fixed the range and content of its signs. That part was easy, since it was effected by edict and tradition. As the ceiling of status, the ruler was also the ultimate regulator of the use of its signs. That part was more difficult, for it required constant vigilance and ultimately the threat of force. It was also entirely necessary. Without regulation of the use of signs of status, the distinct levels, whose separation constituted a vertical range, would be conflated. Verticality itself, culminating in the ruler, would be obscured. Therefore, controlling the use of signs of status was necessarily one of the primary concerns of the polity's top-center. In a well-run polity, retribution against those trying to use signs of status inappropriate to their level—wearing clothes of an inappropriate color, or giving one's child a name too grand—would have been swift.

How was this system of law constituted? Edicts set the rules specifying the signs that each level of rank was privileged to use. In Luwu, for instance, the ruler was to be served with twelve plates; nobles of the highest rank were to be served with eight plates; those of the next with four; next, two; and finally, one. Such edicts, clearly, can delineate only the most gross differences in rank.

Leaders at each level administered the edicts by checking people at the lower levels over whom the leader, as social center, had authority. The leaders of a following could "reprimand" a follower who seized some privilege beyond his station. When I was in Luwu, I saw several instances that demonstrated how this would have happened in the old regime but now does not.

One incident involved the naming of an infant. One of the Opu Pa'Bicara's followers was a middle-level noble who had married a woman who, many whispered, was hardly a noble at all. His first wife had been lower than himself, but higher (by general consensus) than the present one. The second wife apparently felt herself to be in competition with the first one, and wanted her children not to be viewed as lower than their half-siblings by the first wife. She gave her new baby a name that everyone considered scandalously inappropriate, since it implied a very high status.

It would have been an enormous triumph, a vindication of her assertion of her claims, had her acknowledged high-status elders (the central-core leaders of the kapolo) smiled approvingly when informed of this name, in effect accepting it. Instead, they remained completely impassive, neither approving nor reprimanding. This left the matter in a sort of limbo. One can be sure that, as the child grows up, its peers and its mother's peers will not call it by the name she gave it, for people would choke on uttering an exalted name for a peer. It will probably be called by a nickname, and its exalted name will be ignored by all but its mother, who will always rankle and complain that people don't address her child properly.

I suspect that she would not have dared to test her status in such a way in the old regime. But if she had done so, a messenger would have been sent from the kapolo's high core bearing another name direct from the Opu to replace the one its parents gave it. If the name sent by the Opu were a good one, acknowledging low nobility, it would have been a gesture of both reprimand and incorporation.

The woman and her husband would have felt both humbled (for they would know that they were wrong) and grateful (for they could have been dealt with more severely but were not). If the Opu wanted to reprimand them severely, he would have sent the name of a commoner. That would have been humiliating and humbling, for it would have denied the father's status.

The authority and the force that backed the right of the high core of a grouping to reprimand its followers emanated ultimately from the ruler. So, for instance, in the old polity, having a title and post appointed by the ruler was a clear confirmation to his followers and peers of a leader's claimed status. Within the kapolo, the same effect occurred with more minor posts. A leader could (and still does) send title and names to newly married followers (names change upon marriage) that would indicate and confirm their status. As one woman said to me, "I know I am truly a Daeng [because] Opu sent me my name." Or the leader could (and still does) entrust a follower with an important function, allow the follower to accompany him on an important trip, and so on. These acts by the higher person continue to validate the status of a person on a lower level, especially with respect to his peers. Within that person's own circle of peers and immediate inferiors (such as junior kinspeople), he could and can speak with authority, for his elder's validation of the follower's status makes visible to his peers who he is.

At the same time, the charters and titles sent from above would be of little use if the person who tried to exert influence, especially in matters like settling disputes or reprimanding, did not have a loyal following of people who would guard fervently his privileges and siri' and right to reprimand people like themselves. Although authority was given from above, the force that backed the reprimand was exerted from below; it consisted of the adamant bodyguard of loyal followers who obeyed their navel-center and executed his orders. These people were precisely the ones who were subject to their navel-center's authority.

In the course of things, not all polities were always well run. Retribution was not always swift. There could not help but be, in systems such as this, many failures of administration. The high center of a political grouping, whether kapolo or akkarungeng, sometimes failed to act quickly enough, with the result that an inflationary encroachment became a *fait accompli*, more dangerous politically to correct late than to allow to stand. Perhaps a high center wavered uncertainly, or had neglected to bind its followers to it strongly, or lacked the strong backing from the authority in the level above itself that it had presumed. The result could be that a lower leader became strong enough to challenge the higher one. Southeast Asian history is filled with such incidents; indeed, the bulk of political history of indigenous hierarchical Southeast Asia consists of just such events. The status and standing of everyone in the polity was constantly subject to retrospective assessment, depending on how much a person was able to get away with claiming without being reprimanded.

In the large schemes of social regulation, which embraced not only offenses against the use of signs of status but also hundreds of other crimes, status specificity was part and parcel of the codification. The magnitude of a fine depended on the rank of both offender and offended. The fine for a person of the fifth rank (if we say the ruler was of the first rank) offending a peer by stealing his cattle, for instance, was considerably less than if that same person stole cattle

from a person of the second rank. Offending a person of higher status was, in short, a greater offense than offending a person of lower status.

In this, as in several other respects, the law of the polities of South Sulawesi strongly resembled the indigenous law of the Ifugao, a hill people of Northern Luzon (Philippines) studied by R.F. Barton ([1919] 1969). The injured party in a large number of offenses, including insult, adultery, and other less touchy matters, could demand compensation or fines from the offenders. The fines were graded by social level. At the time Barton studied them, Ifugao had only two levels: *kadangyan*, a type of wealthy Big Man who obtained the right to be called a *kadangyan* by performing a series of public feasts; and free persons or commoners. A *kadangyan* obtaining compensation from another *kadangyan* demanded, by custom, a greater fine than a free person would from another free person. When a *kadangyan* injured a free person or vice versa, the fine often was negotiated to be halfway between the fines appropriate to each category.

Ifugao had no hegemonic legal or political authority, but people did keep track of their myriad kin, who acted as a mutual-aid society in times of difficulty. In order to obtain satisfaction for an injury, people gathered together their kin and threatened, through a mediating negotiator, the offender and his or her kin. (Incidentally, the negotiating strength of a poor free person against a rich *kadangyan* with many kinspeople was his simple desperation, a lack of investment in his own life. Because he cared naught for life, he could threaten to kill, and be believed, even if he knew he would incur a retributive death from his victim's surviving kin.)

The negotiation can be subtle and nearly endless; Barton's book is instructive and vivid in conveying what matters are subject to debate in a case that appears on the surface to be straightforward. Offenses between groupings of kin, who are always mutually suspicious, had to be settled with either fines or violence. The threat of violent retribution by overwhelming numbers of adamant supporters/kin greatly aided the injured party in its quest to obtain satisfaction. But if the feuders preferred blood revenge to compensation, little could be done to prevent it, for no one had hegemonic power—or even pretensions to it.

Like Ifugao "law," the law of Luwu largely consisted of the codification of fines. Like Ifugao law, those fines took status into account. And like Ifugao law, the threat of violence by myriad supporters/kin was a potent argument in obtaining satisfaction, especially between near-peers. But unlike Ifugao *kadangyan*, Luwu's ruler, like those of other polities we designate as "states" or "chiefdoms," had pretensions, at least, to hegemonic power. The reason that Luwu's system of fines appears at first glance to be analogous to a system of law rather than a guide to controlled feuding was that Luwu's codification and its enforcement had a single point of view, that of the ruler. It was as though one of the feuding parties in Ifugao became larger than the others, commanding more loyal force. The ruler had a modicum of hegemony, always somewhat unstable and subject to erosion and it is as though this nearly hegemonic force adopted for itself the function of setting the range of fines as well as enforcing them, and made offenses against itself the most serious ones.

In Luwu, a powerful center was one that could mobilize the support and ultimately the force necessary to regulate and control signs of status. Power effected peace, a state in which the ruler was relatively unchallenged in his

authority to give value to the system of signs and to regulate their use. Peace meant hegemony over the system of signs.

Morality

The dynamic that impelled expansion at each level of status was the competition between peers, which automatically resulted in, among other things, an inflationary tendency. Controlling that tendency was, of course, a considerable concern for the people of the upper levels. As I have mentioned, I share Chabot's opinion that people of a given level who tried to use signs of status appropriate to levels above themselves wished less to imitate their superiors than to vanquish their peers; but appropriating signs of status from above was only one of many alternatives used by peers to challenge each other.

One of the most direct challenges, and therefore one most fraught with danger, concerns relations between the sexes. Chabot points out that "the male striving to rise in social standing is touched at the core through impairment of a female relative" ([1950] 1960: 293). He explains the great importance of maintaining a female relative's honor in this way:

A woman may not lose any standing. Her position is a fixed point for the men who are constantly outdoing each other. An impairment of her standing immediately calls for the most violent reaction, namely, the death of the challenger. Whoever does not react is "matésiri" (literally, dead in siri'), that is to say, "socially dead." This is expressed by saying that such a person is no longer "of use," or that he is generally despised. Killing is used because what has happened is felt to be so bad that no other reaction is considered possible.

Although some were more clearly damaging than others, almost any medium of challenge would do. As Chabot points out in a passage I quoted before, anything may be construed as a challenge, from "a lucky word (on the challenger's part), by which he raises himself above the other person, at least in his own eyes," to the theft of a buffalo, which is "considered a triumph and at the same time a challenge" ([1950] 1960: 290-91). The content of a challenge is, in fact, a matter of indifference. The content and occasion of insults constantly shifts. As I pointed out in "Opposition and Solidarity," the insult of being offended lies in being offended, not so much in the particular means by which the offense was accomplished.

I was at first puzzled in Luwu by the shifting content of what people considered offensive. My original perception—that almost anything, given the correct context, could make someone feel *ripakasiri*—proved correct. My puzzlement at the multiplicity of the content of offensive acts was due to several unconscious assumptions I had made about practices or acts that I categorized as analogues of law and morality as I knew them. My assumptions about legality, morality, and etiquette, of course, are derived ultimately, if vaguely, from the scripturalist religious traditions of the Middle East: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In these religions, morality is closely associated with a notion of explicit rules, abstracted from particular contexts and universally applicable within the community of believers—a form of "everyone equal before the Law." Moreover, in

these religions, a person follows the rules in order to avoid trouble. And so I initially assumed that people in Luwu, too, wished to avoid provoking each other's siri', and that they followed rules as one observes the traffic regulations on Interstate 80—if one wants to avoid collision, one sticks to the right side of the road. I was doubly mistaken in all this.

First, there are few explicit rules in Luwu's status system, and virtually none that apply to everyone regardless of status. Context is everything; offenses are person-specific, not universal. The point of attacking and defending siri' is that people are unequal. Siri' offenses are specific to person, which is to say, specific to their claimed standings or ranks. After all, challenges are directed at a person's dignity, which in South Sulawesi cannot be disjoined from standing. Since offenses are graded by the relative rank of the people involved, what is an offense to one is not an offense to another. What would be perfectly acceptable between peers in the fifth rank would be a mortal insult if a third rank person did it to someone of the second rank. Similarly, the same act done by the person of the second rank to the one in the fifth rank would be acceptable, even kindly (for instance, to utter the other person's name out loud). All this means that whether or not an action is offensive depends almost purely upon the two parties' assessments of whether or not they have a chance, when confronting the other person, of obtaining satisfaction. (In this, siri' offenses are parallel in structure to their codification in law, but, of course, what I have described here takes place on a much finer scale than the gross divisions demarcated by law.) The characteristic antagonism between peers comes about because of the obscurity of the difference (in titles, number of followers, etc.) between them. The nearer two people are in standing and status (the more nearly they approach being peers), the less visible are the differences between them, the more likely that each considers himself to be marginally higher than the other, the closer the show of force that either party can mobilize to threaten the other, and the more good reason each has to be suspicious that the other wishes to vanquish him.

The second way in which I was mistaken was in assuming that people want to avoid trouble. On the contrary, the demonstration of masculinity and siri' (as it pertains to men) requires and promotes a relish in aggressive testing, a constant impulse to challenge and risk offending to the furthest extent to which they are capable, without being crushed by the other person's retribution. The question is not whether to challenge, but how much offense one can get away with. Interactions, then, especially between peers, are a constant dance of expansion and retraction. A person begins with a slight challenge—a slightly disrespectful gesture, say, that tests the reaction of the other person. If the other person accepts it, offering no resistance, the first one expands further, escalating the disrespect in increments until it is checked. If, however, the other person's reaction is immediate and firm, showing that not even a slight presumption will be tolerated, the testing gesture disappears. The tester retreats, until another opportunity to strike presents itself. All this challenge and counter-challenge happens so automatically and so subtly that most of it occurs below the level of explicit awareness; it lies in the realm of sensibilities.

Delicate Sensibilities

When a person is being attacked, no rules are being broken. It is not one's legal rights that are under attack, but one's self or social dignity. Any attack, however slight, implicates the self. What is at stake in interaction is one's dignity, one's place, one's social worth—to put it concisely, one's *siri*'.

As I have pointed out before in a variety of ways and contexts, there are no alternatives when confronting peers other than defending oneself from encroachment or expanding aggressively into them. One could say that there are no equals; one person must be superior, one inferior. One could also say that there is little notion of a private psychology as we conceptualize it; since a direct reading of invisible interior worth can be made by observers of outward visible behavior, there can be no withdrawal when one is engaged in social interaction. There is no island of interior "privacy" onto which one can step to rest, out of the swirling stream of social life. There is no dark interior grotto where one can stand sheltered from the burning light of the social day. A person who tries to retreat from competition and challenge is merely a coward, impotent; people do not excuse it by saying things like "still waters run deep." To fail to participate is not to opt for privacy but to announce to the world that one has no *siri*', that one is socially dead.

In some of the more "level" (as contrasted with "hierarchical") societies of island Southeast Asia, virtually everyone is a peer in status.⁵ In such societies, encroachment is a constant theme and feuding a pervasive fact of life, for among peers, authority is hardly granted. When it is—say, in negotiations conducted in order to settle a dispute—it is only by the temporary willingness of the involved parties to submit to a go-between, who will try to arrange fines and compensation as an alternative to killing when a deep offense has been committed. A judgment made without the agreement of both parties could not be enforced.

If encroachment (or its threat) by peers implicates the self-worth and social dignity of each, as it patently does, then local ways of construing the emotions and the "self" cannot be irrelevant to accounts of law and morality. In Luwu, reciprocal encroachment is cast in terms of *siri*'. Other societies in island Southeast Asia cast experience in other terms, use varying expressions and connotations to describe the nature of social relations, and construe the emotions in locally particular ways. Yet local ways of understanding "feeling" figure prominently in a number of ethnographies whose main subjects are social structure or law. It is striking how many of these societies construe fine feeling, a delicate sensibility, to be an exquisite sensitivity to the feelings of the other person regarding that other person's dignity and standing. Schlegel, for instance, begins *Tiruray Justice* (1970), a book about hill people of Mindanao, with an explication of *fedew*. *Fedew* is something like interior feeling, and it can be "hurt" if it is offended. It is offended by another person's disregard of its "standing," *tindig*. Tiruray "justice" is a matter of feuding and fines, retribution for offended *fedew*. Crucial to Dentan's (1968) description of the negrito Semai, whom he calls "a nonviolent people of Malaya," is an account of the state of *punan*. A person is *punan* when his or her request is refused; in short, it is a state of (more or less) frustrated desire. The *punan* person may ask for compensation, or may endure the *punan* with an "unhappy heart" and avoid the offender. Obversely, it is tabu to

persusah another, which is to say, to persist in making requests that the other person does not want to grant. The Tausug, an aggressive coastal people of the southern Philippines, have been studied by Thomas Kiefer (1972). Their sensibilities are remarkably like those of the Buginese, but they call their dignity *sipug* rather than *siri*. An important feature of their social organization consists of men who form bands of shifting size and personnel whose main function is to feud, defending their *sipug* or attacking that of others. Hildred Geertz (1961:Ch III, part 3) traces the Javanese child's development of "emotions," which turn out to be names for states of more and more refined sensibilities concerning other people's status.

Notes

1. I am told by someone who has seen many cockfights that this last is untrue; a defeated cock is likely to rise up from a state of near death to get in its last peck. The assertion that defeated cocks remain so is apparently a bit of wishful thinking concerning ToLaing, whom one wishes to be so utterly defeated that they cannot make a comeback.
2. Another type of high noble with no following of his own may nonetheless be accompanied and protected in ceremonies. A hypothetical case would be a high noble named Opu T, brought from another district in order to marry a high-noble woman, part of the high-noble core of a large kapolo. Opu T is sufficiently high to marry the woman, but having no independent following, is no threat to his wife's brothers. Such a man would go to ceremonies as an honored member of the navel-core of the kapolo, protected by its bodyguard.
3. In this passage I use the feminine pronoun in order to emphasize that the sorts of interactions I describe here characterize the social relations of both sexes.
4. In fact, the obscurity of people's status and standing was such that social mobility in the form of a man marrying a higher woman was not uncommon. When both families acknowledged the discrepancy, the brideprice was supposed to be twice or triple (depending upon the discrepancy in status) what it would usually be. This form of marriage in Luwu is called *ngalli dara*, "to buy blood."
5. "Level" societies, like the hierarchical ones of this area, actually have people who are junior or senior to each other as well as peers. In the most level of these societies, the incipient structure of "vertical" difference is the distinction between senior and junior generational layers, which are demarcated in the type of kinship terminology most prevalent in the area. In such societies, elders usually have the privilege of giving advice to their juniors without causing offense to the latter. Their advice need not be followed, and they have no means except public opinion to persuade. The authority of such seniors is weak and unelaborated, when compared with the authority of people in hierarchical societies who are senior in rank (not just by generation).

Glossary

akkarungeng	Polity or "kingdom," from the root arung lord or noble
almarhum	(Arabic) "the respected deceased"
baca	To read, to interpret, to interpret and then gossip about what one has seen, to utter aloud. <i>Baca-baca</i> is to say spells.
bemo	A small passenger van that runs between villages or towns
datu	Ruler. This word (or its cognate <i>ratu</i>) is used throughout the Austronesian-speaking world to mean a ruler or leader. In Luwu, only the ruler was known as the datu; in Buginese polities to the south, the children of the ruler could also be addressed and known as "Datu Such-and-Such."
kapolo	Often translated as <i>pamili</i> (family) in contrast to ToLaing (which see). A kapolo may be a few people or an enormous collection of followers. The core of a kapolo consists of the most prominent member's siblings and other close relatives, especially of lower status than him- or herself.
lontara'	(Indonesian and used in many local languages) A palm leaf manuscript. For many years Buginese lontara' have been written on paper.
ma-	(prefix) This is the stative prefix to a predicate, meaning "in a state of" such and such, e.g., a ToMatoa is a person (to) in a state of being (ma) old (toa); or "masiri'i!"--"he or she (final i) is in a state of being (ma) embarrassed or ashamed (siri)". Its use is often parallel with that of the Indonesian prefix <i>ber-</i> .
mabusung	The state of being afflicted on account of getting out of place, that is, offending the order of the cosmos, particularly by offending a person or thing whose social place is higher or more potent than one's own (see Lecture One).
moso	The sting of a snake; the potent "bite" of authority of a noble leader
onro	Place, whether spatial or social, e.g., <i>naisseng onrona</i> , "He or she knows his place," or <i>Iga monro</i> ? "where does he or she dwell?"
pa-	(prefix to "verb" root) This usually forms a causative, as in <i>pakasiri'</i> (to cause someone to be shamed) and <i>pakurusumange'</i> (to cause someone's <i>siri'</i> to return). Its use in Tae and Buginese often parallels the Indonesian prefix <i>memper-</i> .
pakasiri'	See <i>siri'</i> .

pusaka	A Javanese word now part of Indonesian as well, meaning royal regalia and objects inherited from the ancestors; overlaps with both <i>arajang</i> and <i>mana</i> in South Sulawesi languages.
raja	(Indonesian) ruler. See <i>datu</i> .
raksasa	(Indonesian) monster
rapu	A "clump" or "stand" of stems growing from a common root or source, said of coconut trees, banana trees, and human siblings. A kapolo is composed of numerous rapu.
ripakasiri'	See <i>siri</i> '.
salama'	
or salamat	Safe, secure, healthy, well
siri'	Honor, shame, <i>amour propre</i> , human dignity, which distinguishes humans from animals. Ripakasiri' is to be shamed; pakasiri' is to shame.
tau	Person. When combined with a modifier, it is pronounced "toh," as in ToLuwu, ToLaing, etc.
ToLaing	Stranger, non-kinsperson, other person or people. See <i>tau</i> .
ToLuwu	Person or people of Luwu. See <i>tau</i> .
ToMatoa	Respected elder(s). See <i>tau</i> .

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The Domains of Topeng

John Emigh


Some years ago, with I Made Bandem, I published a translation of a *topeng pajegan* (solo masked dance-drama) performed by I Nyoman Kakul at the village of Tusan, Bali on February 6th, 1975 (Kakul 1979). Juxtaposed to that translation was a detailed description of Kakul's performance and a consideration of some of the underlying aesthetics of topeng (Emigh 1979). I was Kakul's student at the time I taped his performance, on leave from my position as a director and teacher of Western theatre. In the years that followed, I have performed Balinese and Western texts using *topeng* techniques and have continued to teach and direct for the Western stage (see Snow 1986, Reeder 1979). What follows is an attempt to look at Kakul's performance once again, from other vantage points these activities have provided. As a performer, director, and teacher of acting and dramatic theory, I am concerned not only with understanding what is involved in Kakul's performance—though that task has difficulties enough—but also with ways in which his practice of topeng relates to and is distinct from modern and post-modern experimentation within Western theatre. Ultimately, I want to know what topeng has to teach me as a Western performer, teacher and scholar, and what I am positioned (and not positioned) to learn. This approach to these questions is written in the hope that my concerns are not unique. It is expanded from notes used at the University of Hawai'i in 1985. There, I was able to make certain points through demonstration; here, I shall have to refer the interested reader back to the earlier, more descriptive essay on Kakul's performance and to the transcription and translation of that performance already mentioned.¹

To make a dent in the agenda proposed, I shall need to take a somewhat lengthy detour into theatrical theory. Just before I started to study with Kakul, Richard Schechner published an article, "Drama-Script-Theatre-Performance," in which he tried to isolate the various "domains" of activity involved in generating and sustaining theatrical performance. Schechner suggests a "taxonomical model" to be used as a tool in describing the interactions among "domains" that characterize specific theatrical forms and, in the process, makes some interesting observations about the ways in which contemporary productions in the West seem to delight in exposing "creases" between the "domains" indicated in his model (1988 [1977, 1973]:68-105). Such structural models have their dangers. They may provide complex ways of saying simple things. Worse, the models themselves may become reified, the map treated as though it were the territory itself. Still, I have found Schechner's model useful in trying to understand how Balinese topeng works as a theatrical genre and, more particularly, how Kakul's performance at Tusan acquires its force and form. Schechner's essay has just been republished; it seems timely to take it up again in order to point out some important aspects of the processes involved in Kakul's performance that might otherwise go unnoticed. As a structural model designed to indicate "domains" operative in all theatrical performance, it may also provide a useful starting place for discussing ways in which topeng performances are both similar to, and significantly different from, avant-garde Western theatre since Brecht and

Artaud. Artaud's own well known enthusiasm for Balinese performance and the recent renewal of interest in Asian theatre in general and Balinese theatre in particular add appeal to this task.

Drama-Script-Theatre-Performance

Schechner's model consists of a series of concentric spheres, with "drama" depicted as "the smallest, most intense circle" and "performance" as "the broadest, most ill-defined disk." In general terms, a "drama" might take the form of "a written text, score, scenario, instruction, plan or map" which may be transported "from time to time and place to place" and incorporated within the "script" for a particular presentation. This "script" may then be manifested in "concrete and immediate" terms within the larger sphere of "theatre," and that which is shown and enacted there be encompassed within the domain of "performance"—"the whole constellation of events, most of them passing unnoticed, that takes place in/among both performers and audience from the time the first spectator enters...the precinct where the theatre takes place to the time the last spectator leaves" (1988 [1977,1973]:72).



(After Schechner: 1977 [1973]:39)

Schechner summarizes the identities of his domains as they apply to the most familiar Western procedures: "Drama is what the writer writes; the script is the interior map of a particular production; the theatre is the specific set of gestures performed by the performers in any given performance; the performance is the whole event, including audience and performers." He further notes that, outside these spheres of activity, embracing the circumscribed "domain" of performance, is "the domain of everyday life" (1988:85).

In applying Schechner's model, some theatrical forms may be understood to define and protect the "boundaries" that demarcate these domains more than others. The integrity of any given "domain" may be reinforced and movement to the next "domain" consequently made more difficult. Thus, the "dramatic works" of, say, Shakespeare, Ibsen, or Shepard, may be bound, sold, read, and taught in "dramatic literature" classes with varying degrees of success, almost as though they were novels in dialogue form (supplemented by brief descriptions of settings and actions). Then again, at the next "boundary," a director such as Max Reinhardt might work out an elaborate *mise-en-scene*, complete with inflections

and nuances of gesture, prior to even meeting his actors. The theatrical "domain" may be sealed off by "closing" rehearsals to the public while working out the details of theatrical presentation prior to "opening" the work to an audience. The "boundary" between the "domains" of performance and everyday life is also subject to relative degrees of openness or closure. The proscenium arch, the darkened theatre and illuminated stage, the use of elaborate costumes and makeup, or of "extra-daily" movement, are all ways of reinforcing the sense of a separate domain for theatre in order to then communicate across its "boundaries"—of establishing and controlling "aesthetic distance." In common usage, many performance genres are even referred to as "pure entertainment," indicating a supposed disjunction between the events performed and the life that surrounds the performance.

Recently, there has been a tendency to play with all of these "boundaries," opening them up or exposing them as artificial. The works of such "dramatists" as Robert Wilson, Richard Foreman, or Lee Breuer demand innovative strategies from their editors due to the elaborate interplay between the domains of "script" and "theatre," while the recycling and "deconstruction" of Arthur Miller's *The Crucible* in The Wooster Group's LSD plays with the "boundary" between "drama" and "script," creating legal as well as aesthetic dilemmas (Savran 1985). Indeed, the role of the director in interpreting or confronting the dramatic text is probably the most hotly debated theoretical issue in theatre of recent decades (see Pavis 1982, Hornby 1977, Grotowski 1969, Blau 1982). These issues are now echoed in questions concerning the reader or viewer's role being asked by semioticians and critics attracted to hermeneutic circlings; every reader and spectator becomes a director before the circles are exhausted. Ensemble rehearsal procedures, the phenomenon of "open rehearsals," the use of "environmental" stagings by, for example, Schechner, Grotowski and Harold Prince, and the radical re-examination of the physical and mental relationship of the spectator to the performed action involved in the work of John Cage, Allan Kaprow and various performance artists all act to subvert the integrity of these "boundaries," as do the night club comic's banter with his audience, or Spalding Gray's use of intensely personal experience as recyclable dramatic material.

Schechner's "boundaries" then, are less formidable and static than they may appear. Still, they serve to isolate "areas" for the different sets of procedures used to generate and sustain performances and, perhaps more importantly, indicate the "potential spaces" in which crucial strategic choices as to what game we are playing may occur and "post-modern" innovations become possible. Schechner's "domains" are most usefully conceived of as expanding and contracting "homes" for certain kinds of procedures. Experienced diachronically, their limits are positioned at strategic spots where ambiguities arise; the need for each new circle and category in the model comes from the sense that "something else" is now happening—that another bundle of procedures is being used.

The model acquires its usefulness as a theoretical tool in helping to point out what is involved in traveling—as performer, as audience member, or as critic—from the home of one set of procedures to the home of another. In this regard, Balinese topeng shares many of the techniques and formal concerns of "post-modernism," for it is in the nature of topeng to keep the "boundaries" between the various "domains" of performance relatively open. It is closer to the

practice of Brecht, Meyerhold, Foreman, or Monty Python's Flying Circus than to the seamless model of playwriting and production based on the "laws" of the necessary and probable espoused by Aristotle, elaborated by Corneille, re-invented by Ibsen, and systematized for actors by Stanislavsky. Indeed a fluidity of movement from "domain" to "domain" is quintessential to topeng's strategies and aesthetic life. It is the nature and the consequences of this dynamic movement across the "domains" of performance that I wish to examine in Kakul's topeng pajegan performance at Tusan, tracing the audience's perception of Kakul's performance across the various domains involved.

Before charting a path through the experience of performance though, it will be useful to apply Schechner's model to the generative process that culminated in Kakul's performance of the story of Jelantik at Blambangan as enacted at Tusan on February 6, 1975.² Schechner's use of familiar terms leaves room for ambiguity, and I shall have to make adjustments in the definitions of some of these terms in order to apply his model to topeng. However, as Kenneth Burke noted in explaining the usefulness of his schematic "pentad": "What we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise...it is in the area of ambiguity that transformations take place" (1962 [1945]:xx-xxi).

At first glance, Schechner's summary definitions of "drama" and "script" may seem arbitrary to the point of perversity. Drama, after all, refers etymologically to action, and script to that which is written. Why, then should "what the writer writes" be called the "drama," and "script" be used to designate "the interior map of a particular production?" Schechner's concern in this ordering of familiar and acknowledgedly loaded terms is to place "drama" at the center of the set of procedures that generate and sustain theatrical performance using "scripting" to refer to the process of elaborating the dramatic nucleus to the point where it might be given theatrical life. This choice is related to (and perhaps determined by) Aristotle's observation that *praxis*, the ordering of the incidents, constitutes the "soul" of a tragedy; it is also consistent with the Sanskritic concept of a dramatic incident providing the "kernel" [*biji*] from which the play must grow (Byrski 1984:144). "Drama," then, might be redefined as being not so much "what the writer writes" as the sequence of actions, or fable, that is at the core of what he has chosen to write about. In common usage, the terms "drama" and "script" become synonymous in the West (inviting etymological confusion), since we credit the playwright with both conceptualizing the dramatic core and providing the dialogue and stage directions that begin to flesh out that core.

In Schechner's terms, of course, further "scripting" is permissible by the director, and, to a lesser degree, by the actors themselves. In topeng pajegan, however, there is no playwright to provide a script, no director to devise a *mise-en-scene*. There is only the performer, preparing to perform. He begins with the *babads*; one of the stories that these Balinese chronicles contain must form the dramatic core from which he proceeds. This dramatic core is anterior to "plot" as well as to dialogue—just as, in Greek practice, *mythos* was anterior even to *praxis*. Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides could all reshape the dramatic core of the Oresteia—Euripides several times—and so could Sartre, O'Neill, and Suzuki many centuries later.³ For my purposes, then, "drama" can be roughly equated with the fable or story embedded in one of the *babads*' flexible texts, while "script"

refers to the patterning of words and actions that will be used to convey and give specific form to this story in the context of a hypothetical performance. "Theatre" continues to describe the "script" as manifest within performance—its "immediate and concrete" expression by the performers. In using this set of definitions (just as in common usage), not all performative actions will be equally "dramatic." Happenings, musical revues, and religious rituals, for example, are all "scripted" and performed, but contain varying amounts of "dramatic" content, and some parts of a theatricalized "script" may be less "dramatic" than others—they deal less directly with an "intense, heated up center" provided by the story matter.

From Drama to Script

On the day before leaving for Tusan, Kakul sat on his porch, a well-worn notebook in his hand. The notebook contained selected babad stories [*cariteras*] transcribed from palm leaf manuscripts [*lontars*] along with genealogical charts, useful passages from the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*, favorite songs in Middle Javanese from the *gambuh* theatre (in which Kakul also excelled), and mantras in Javanized Sanskrit that would be useful for the ritual blessings conferred at the end of the performance—all written in Balinese characters. Kakul would peruse the notebook, lean back and close his eyes, glance at the book again, frown, turn a few pages, hum a bit, smile, nod his head, and stare fixedly into space as though lost in an unknown world. Sometimes, he would seem to be napping, and then his hands would begin to move slowly and gracefully, following the rhythms of unheard music. Hours passed in this manner.

Many potential "dramas" were inscribed in Kakul's notebook. He was concentrating on one of these—the story of Jelantik's mission to Blambangan and of his death while saving his King's honor and his father's soul. This story had been fixed as the dramatic core of the performance to be held in Tusan. The village had historical associations with Jelantik's descendants. Moreover, the origins of topeng in Bali have been traced by Balinese scholars to the celebrating of Jelantik's deeds by one of his descendants (named Tusan), using masks brought from Java as booty from this same expedition (Bandem and Rembang 1976). Kakul already knew the story and had performed it before on several occasions. Indeed, he already knew a great deal of the notebook's contents by heart. His concentration was not on learning the story, but rather on the story's transformation from "drama" to "script." This transformation was taking place through a process that combines procedures of selection and embellishment. In the version of the babad abridged in DeZoete and Spies's *Dance and Drama in Bali* (1973 [1938]:303), the "kingdoms" of Pasuruhan and Blambangan are equally involved in the insult to Dalem Waturenggong, and both are punished. The decisive battle is fought after Jelantik's death by another minister, Patih Ularan, who brings the head of the Dalem of Pasuruhan back to his own King. Dalem Waturenggong is so upset by his minister's over-zealous pursuit of his mission that he banishes Ularan and his heirs from Gelgel. The version Kakul performs condenses these actions eliminating many of the complications and concentrating on Jelantik; his role is made far more decisive and the restoration of his King's honor less equivocal.

Some of Kakul's choices may have been determined by his own sources for the caritera, others by aesthetic concerns, and still others by factors peculiar to the occasion for which he was preparing. For example, many *brahmans* would be in the audience, some of whom were well known and greatly respected by Kakul. Apart from its associations with Tusan and with the history of topeng itself, the story of Jelantik's martyrdom would be particularly appropriate for such an audience because of its ethical and metaphysical implications; he would have to make sure to bring these out. At the same time, it would be fun to tease these high priests a bit, and appropriate moments would have to be found for this sort of mischief.

While crystallizing the "drama" of Jelantik's martyrdom, Kakul also embellishes and supplements this dramatic core. This "script-building" is well described by Levi-Strauss' suggestive term: it is an act of *bricolage* (1966:16-33). Bits and pieces from many sources are available to Kakul in embellishing the story. Perusing his notebook, he might consider words and sentiments from the Javanized Hindu epics, or songs of praise and grandeur from the Middle Javanese *kidung* literature, to be spoken in their appropriate historical and literary languages.⁴ Various topics of current interest and vernacular modes of speech would also be considered, including idiosyncratic speech patterns specific to the Klungkung area where Tusan is located. Familiar bits of comic business would be mentally run through and assigned a place or rejected as inappropriate. Gradually, a tentative "map" for the performance is arrived at, and the sequence of masks to be used is set in mind, along with the appropriate dances. Kakul does not have to rehearse these theatricalizing elements. He can count on his knowledge of topeng conventions, his kinesthetic training, and the personal precedents he has established in his own practice of topeng to do much of the work of rehearsals. He does not know how skilled the *gamelan* musicians at Tusan will be, nor how extensive their repertory beyond the most customary pieces required for a topeng performance. He will have to be flexible. For now, his preparation consists of deciding how the material might be parceled out among his masks, what particular emphases might be given to the story on this occasion, what supplementary material might be appropriate, what special dance movements he might introduce, and what opportunities might be present for jokes and topical comments. The "script" arrived at in this manner is always incomplete.

Roland Barthes' distinctions between a "work" and a "Text" are apposite here:

The work is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the space of books (in a library for example), the Text is a methodological field. ...The work can be held in the hand, the Text is held in language. ...The Text is experienced only in an activity of production. ...The work closes on a signified.... The Text, on the contrary, practices the infinite deferment of the signified, is dilatory. ...Like language, it is structured but off-centered, without closure. The Text...decants the work...from its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice. ...The Text is bound to jouissance, that is, to a pleasure without separation. ...The Text is that space where no language has a hold over any other, where languages circulate (1977:156-164).

The topeng "script" that Kakul creates is, on every count, singularly Text-like and work-resistant. It will remain flexible and never be written down, and Kakul might alter it substantially if the audience reception is right or the weather wrong—adding or subtracting or redistributing material. Still, "scripting" his dramatic material in this manner will allow Kakul to perform with confidence and a clear sense of direction.

From Script to Theatre

The "script" becomes animate in the immediate and concrete "domain" of the "theatre." The suspended ordering of all the considered possibilities and chosen intentions that constitute the "script" must find its life in the movement of muscle and bone, the clanging of wooden hammers against metal bars, the sounding of archaic and contemporary speech, and the display of painted wood and gilded cloth that, for the audience, is topeng. A Balinese spectator does not go to see this or that drama performed; the caritera chosen is rarely announced and may not be determined until the arrival of the performers (see DeZoete and Spies 1973 [1938]:937-40). Schechner rightly points out that, while in the West—at least since the Renaissance—the tendency has been to throw emphasis onto the drama and script, in the East the tendency has been to emphasize theatre and performance: Aristotle's despised "spectacle" (1988 [1977,1973]:73).

Balinese theatre is a good case in point. Topeng is not lacking in verbal complexity or dramatic content, and the various stories have their separate appeals; but I have never heard a Balinese say that he is off to see a particular story. Rather, he will say he is off to see a particular form of theatre, or perhaps a well known performer or group, or even, simply, "the dancing." Topeng is distinguished from the many other forms of Balinese dance and theatre by the entire constellation of the masks worn, the instruments, tunings and melodies used, the costumes displayed, the movements executed, and the modes of story telling deployed. Audience expectations and criteria for excellence are targeted first and last to this theatrical domain.

In my earlier essay and translation, I have already tried to give a sense of the theatrical life of Kakul's performance (1979). Such an attempt is doomed to be reductive and illustrates the difference between "script" and "theatre" as "domains" of activity. Leaving aside the thorny problems of translating Balinese into English, the process of moving from performance to taped recording, to transcription, to translation is a movement away from theatre and back toward script—now reconstituted as a performance text—a sort of pseudo-work.⁵ In this process, no matter how many notes and directions are appended, or how many typefaces and photographs are used, the theatrical elements of the production are the first elements to be glossed over or altogether lost.

In performance, it is possible to obscure the process of theatricalization—to attempt to make the theatrical domain transparent, so that the audience perceives activities given shape there as directly representative of happenings in the everyday world.⁶ The "fourth wall" of the naturalistic stage is one such theatrical device that works to de-emphasize its own theatrical presence by first isolating the theatrical space and then recreating within that space a vision of the world as experienced outside the domains of theatre and performance—throwing

attention back onto the scripted drama or forward onto social concerns that may be thematically represented. In topeng, however, the "otherness" of the theatrical domain is boldly and flamboyantly declared. The gamelan melodies, the "unnatural" postures and movements of the dance (kinesthetically implanted through an arduous process of direct manipulation), the sounding of archaic language, and the guttural sounds that give this language significance, are all indicative of the theatrical "otherness" of the world as reconstituted in topeng.

In this splendidly realized theatrical domain, the music that Kakul held in his mind while fashioning his "script" is sounded—imperfect, but shimmering and vitally present. The masks are animated. The costumes are adjusted and displayed. The dances acquire specific life as Kakul's bare feet move along the consecrated earth and his hands and body unite with the masks he wears to create a highly theatricalized illusion of characters. Words are now chanted, or sung, or spoken, in a manner appropriate to the linguistic context and the eccentricities of a mask. At times, as in the introductory dances, or *pengelembar*, these theatrical elements dominate, and the "scripting" all but disappears in the display of character and the synesthesia of music and motion. At other times, as in the narration of the two Penasars, the scripting becomes the predominant element of the performance, directing attention back onto the dramatic center. Sometimes, as in the moments in which the principal figures of the drama appear, or in the reflexive jokes and parodies offered by Si Mata Mata, scripting and theatricalization exist in a mutual exchange; first one and then the other are held at the center of the audience's attention.

From Theatre to Performance

The theatrical display of topeng is nested within the larger domain of "performance" in such a way as to encourage precisely this sort of inter-play. Contextualized by the occasion which its appearance helps to celebrate—a wedding, an *odalan*⁷—this theatrical display is both a generator and a recipient of the festive excitement and weight of significance attending the larger occasion.

As the space that will hold the theatrical life is being consecrated, the audience gathers to form a truncated oval, providing a space which is set apart by soft and flexible boundaries. The musicians, whose efforts will herald and support the events within this theatrical world, sit among this audience, facing the curtain which is at the sacred [*kaja*] end. The performer enters from the direction of the sacred mountains and the realm of the ancestors and gods, into the performance oval demarcated by the audience's imperfect ring. Beyond the audience is the sea, the direction of the secular and the profane [*kelod*]. As the curtain shakes, and the performer tantalizingly or triumphantly makes his entrance to the sound of cymbals and drums, he is entering into a space specifically set off as somewhere between the divine and the demonic, and defined by the audience's presence.⁸

Compare this convention with the use of the curtain, common until very recently in Western proscenium theatre. On the proscenium stage, the curtain is raised or drawn to reveal a world apart—often one representing a different historical time or geographical place—and the audience is invited to vicariously identify with the characters portrayed as living in that world. In the Balinese convention, the curtain is at the rear of the playing space. There is nothing to

reveal but the architecture and scenery that have always been there--and the actor's changing table, which has been in view during his preparations and can frequently be glimpsed during entrances. No matter where or when the story takes place, the action is thrust into the present moment of performance to realize its theatrical form.

Thus, although the Dutch colonists brought illusionistic scene painting to Indonesia and Balinese artists, internationally acclaimed for their technical skills, have seen such painting used in Java and elsewhere, the only scenery that I have ever seen painted for a Balinese theatrical presentation is a replica of the gateway to a Balinese temple--the "natural" site for a performance. Representations of past times or distant lands would be inappropriate, even though the actions depicted in the dramas take place putatively in India, Majapahit, or ancient Bali. By moving out of the dual world of ancestral space and theatrical preparation, through the curtain and into the immediate space defined by the audience, the actor--as character--can directly address the audience in their own time, in their own space, no matter where or when the "drama" is taking place. Such "anachronistic" play abounds in topeng--both as a strategy for humor and as an integral part of its "meaning."

What a chase those noblemen in the orchestra gave me! Now I'm worn out! Already too tired to give you a show! Mind you, I don't mean to criticize. Not just yet. It's my first time here. My first time dancing with these musicians. Their first time playing with me. And I'm old fashioned. Just like an old dog!...Beh! Moving on! (Kakul 1979:38).

Thus, also as the over-annuated coquette, Desak Made Rai, he teases a priest in the audience:

Oh, those brahmans over there are laughing at me. And that one tried to pinch me! I wonder if he'll do that when we're alone (1979:45).


And thus, he jests about his right to speak as he wishes after mistakenly addressing Jelantik as though he were divine:

"But my holy Lord...I mean my noble Lord! I got mixed up. Well, anyways I'm out here alone, so I can say whatever I want! Ha, Ha, Ha!" (1979:44).

These are all instances of "metacommentary" (see Bateson 1972, Geertz 1980)--throwing the emphasis onto the act of performing by recognizing the presence of the audience and his fellow performers. An even more significant instance of the potential primacy of the "domain" of performance is the Sidha Karya ritual that ends the performance; but in this instance the play is no longer essentially between the "domains" of theatre and performance (though both of these domains are involved), but between the "domains" of performance and of life itself--in its secular and sacred aspects: "Now the Holy Presence arrives. Now Sidha Karya appears. Coming now, into this world" (1979:46).

Beyond Performance

As Schechner notes, beyond the domains of performance, across an indistinct boundary, is the domain of everyday life—what Victor Turner refers to as *societas*—the activities of which surround, occasion, inform and, in turn, may be informed and affected by those events set within "liminal" or "liminoid" circles of performance (Turner 1969, 1982). Further, beyond this domain of everyday life, at least for the Balinese audience, lies the domain of the macrocosmos—the realm of the ancestors, the deities, and of enduring values. One adds these outer realms to Schechner's circles within circles at the risk of calling to mind the childhood joke of listing one's address by giving name, street and number, state, country, the world, the universe. In the child's joke, though, the last two designations are true enough, but superfluous to delivering the mail and, therefore, are listed either out of naivete or silliness. In Balinese performance, these outer domains are operative addresses; characters, audience members, and performers, may be understood to move imaginatively, metaphorically, or actually into or out of these domains.⁹ Thus, for the discussion that follows, Schechner's diagram might be redrawn as follows, adding the outer circles and showing his "boundaries" to be less hermetic and formidable than they first appear:



Held outdoors, on ground which is only temporarily set apart for theatrical use, the circumstances that surround Balinese performances encourage an active interplay between the domains of performance and everyday life. Audience members come and go on the physical periphery of the performance, joining

friends, buying food, flirting, or chatting. In another essay, Schechner has characterized this behavior, typical of traditional theatre throughout much of the world, as "selective inattention" (1988 [1977]:196-206). The performer, too, may tend to matters of the "real world" while performing: matter-of-factly adjusting a costume piece or chasing away a stray dog. Events and concerns from the "domain" of everyday life allusively play into the content of the "script" and clash with the splendidly set apart world of theatrical conventions. Thus, the Penasar Cenikan, or junior storyteller, interrupts highblown rhetoric about the demands of *dharma* in order to render a scene in everyday images:

"Beh! It's a leech as big as a roofing mat! Aduh! There's the leech all curled up. And hairy, too! Beh! Mun, mun, mun! That big!" (Kakul 1979:42).

Cukul's talk of prosaic concerns—after Jelantik's martyrdom and before Sidha Karya's divine intervention—is even more startling:

"Aduh! Such a crowd of people gathered in the palace courtyard. All of them so happy! And here I am, so sad and miserable... My wife has gone and left me!" (1979:45),

while Si Mata Mata's parody of Indonesian nationalism takes this form of play still further.

The play between the "domain" of performance and the events of everyday life that surround and occasion performance can be complex in topeng, and often results in humor. Ron Jenkins reports acting in a performance held in his teacher's family temple in which his teacher's extramarital affairs were broadly satirized in front of his wife, family, and friends, with the teacher himself as the leading performer (1979:54). Such allusions add spice to a Balinese performance and may serve a therapeutic function. Elizabeth Young makes a case for this humor being socially corrective; by ridiculing inappropriate behavior, the argument goes, proper social behavior is taught and reinforced (1980:196-239, see Goodlad, 1971). Young presents the argument well, and I am willing to believe that there are instances of humor in topeng that function along these lines. There is little doubt that Balinese performances can be given a conservative turn. Hildred Geertz has recently recounted a chilling tale of a topeng performance commissioned by princely patrons in league with the Dutch in 1947, during the Indonesian war for independence, in order to whip up a crowd to beat rebellious brahmans (1988); Fredrik deBoer has shown how jokes in Balinese shadow plays (*wayang kulit*) can be used to buttress the traditional social order (1987). Still, the humor involved in Si Mata Mata's parody of Indonesian nationalism or Cucul's devaluing of history strikes me as having a somewhat different, more mischievous, and perhaps more profound function.

James Boon, in his recent article, "Folly, Bali, and Anthropology, or Satire Across Cultures" (1984:160), is similarly distrusting of moral exegesis. Citing Northrop Frye and using the translation and description of Kakul's performance as an example, Boon makes a case for topeng (along with all of anthropological literature) being a species of Menippean satire: "A literary and performative genre based on multiple voices and viewpoints, plural languages, obsessive quotation, pastiche, etymology, blather, and always imbued with a flavor of

fragmented parody," where "culture, histories, and languages theatrically, parodically, and apocalyptically converge" (159).

Boon sees this process of setting world against world in an "exegesis-resistant" display of folly as fundamentally subversive (161). In the end, though, the inclusiveness of topeng, indicated by its range of humor as well as its penchant for having peasants and courtiers mingle with demonic and celestial beings, may be more important than its subversive or conservative turns. The performances function to create a vision of the world rendered whole—with all of its seemingly mismatched pieces in place.¹⁰ Perhaps the virtual sanctity accorded the topeng pajegan performer by references to his *taksu* and by delegating to him the duty of performing the future-oriented ritual that ends a performance is earned through this capacity.


Kakul's performance as Sidha Karya, "the priest of dharma" who intercedes for the villagers in their relations with divine forces and receives the offering on behalf of the gods, is the most striking instance of this playing between the "domain" of performance and life outside of that "domain." The offering he receives has been blessed by a brahman priest during Kakul's performance, and his acceptance of it and sharing of its coins with screaming and laughing children culminates the playing with boundaries by theatrically joining the "domain" of everyday life with the Balinese macrocosmos of spiritual force and presence. Kakul becomes identified with his role, and, though trance is not directly involved, the tradition of visitation that also embraces the ritual use of the *rangda* and *barong ket* masks once more provides a context in which sacred play can occur (Emigh 1979:32-35).

The ritual awakening and blessing of the masks that precede and follow the topeng pajegan performance, the consecration of the ground, the placement of the curtain at the sacred end of the performing space, the "dramatic" depiction of heroic ancestors, the use of languages associated with the gods and ancestors, the interpolation of religious maxims and texts into the "script," the public ritual that ends the topeng pajegan performance, and the use of the spiritual term "taksu" to refer to a performer's presence together indicate the accessibility of the macrocosmic world of spiritual force and energy to the topeng performer and his audience. Taken all in all, the domains of topeng recreate and celebrate the Balinese cosmos, giving form to force. The aim is not so much to imitate the surfaces of life as experienced—though such imitation has its place in topeng (and that place is in the *bondres* [comic characters])—but, rather, to render and restore a vision of life that is essentially whole, blending experience with cultural knowledge, and what has been seen and reported with all that might well be imagined. The movement is inclusive and all-encompassing; the neo-classical unities of place, time, tone, and action can have no place in this more ambitious effort to recreate, celebrate, and contain a vision of life in all its dissonant and ultimately sacred variety.

The Dynamics of a Topeng Performance

Schechner's model can be applied diachronically to Kakul's performance in an experiential as well as a generative fashion. That is, it can be used to trace the audience's attention as it is focused on the procedures and concerns appropriate


to first one and then another of one of the various "domains" involved in the entire performance process. Tracing this progress, a pattern emerges that may be indicative of a genius peculiar to topeng as a theatrical form, or, perhaps, to Kakul's own use of the topeng pajegan tradition.¹¹ The audience can be seen as carried through the entire performance model, circle by circle, as though moving through its core and emerging through the other side.



As Kakul says his mantras and asks his masks to waken that they might dance, the ground is consecrated with holy water, the gamelan music begins to play, and the audience assembles—joking, socializing, slowly taking up places around the performance oval. The movement is between the "domains" of the macrocosmos and of everyday life on the one hand, and between performance and life outside performance—both sacred and profane—on the other. The opening dances of the pengelembar harness the music to a theatrical display of virtuosity and brilliance. The play is between theatre and performance, with rudimentary scripting involved in the performer's choice of masks and choreography. The telling of the story, or *caritera*, begins with the Penasar Kelihan's virtuosic display of an unintelligible language, becomes more complex in its scripting, and eventually closes in on the dramatic center. The oscillations between narration and dance, between the rival modes of visitation and illusion, and between Kakul in his persona as performer and in his role as character, keep all four domains of performative activity in a heated interaction at the temporal center of the performance—with first one and then another of these domains being brought into focus. The appearance of Jelantik himself occurs at the exact center—framed


by the appearances of the two Penasars, and (excluding Sidha Karya), with six masks before and another six after. It should be noted that, as the drama heats up and the principal characters from the past are summoned to dance, the references to the "domain of performance" become fewer and fewer. With the bondres succession of comic characters—each with its reflexive view to add and jokes to tell—the emphasis on the dramatic center lessens, with a corresponding increase in attention lavished on the "domains" of theatre and performance. Finally, the Sidha Karya ritual, while it is certainly "scripted" and theatricalized, emphasizes once again an interchange between the "domains" of performance and of the sacred and secular life outside that performance.

The entire event begins with a private ritual that separates the actions of performance from the flow of everyday life (though reminders of that life may be seen within and round the audience's space); it ends with a public ritual that rejoins the concerns of performance with those of that life. Throughout the course of the performance, a priest on a platform removed from the performative focus, but still in view of the audience, prepares the offering for Sidha Karya. Entrances of figures from the past through the curtain at the kaja end of the performance space are marked by cymbal clashes and drum rolls that emphasize the movement between sacred and secular worlds. The performance may be charted as follows:



What this chart cannot show is that the emphasis on the divine has its counterbalance. Along the way, in each of the major sections of the performance, there is a movement toward humanization and containment. The startling, hypertense, and virtuosic figure of the red-faced *patih* yields place to the familiar, somewhat incompetent figure of the old courtier who is free to physically contact the audience. The Penasar Kelihan, with all of his boasting and vainglorious touting of the ancestral ethos, is followed by the Penasar Cenikan, with his far more common sense view of events. The outrageous Si Mata Mata gives way first to an aging coquette, and then to a simple peasant left outside the rush of history. Even Sidha Karya moves from a display and celebration of divine power to the sharing of the gods' offering with a small child and, in the process, his language moves from archipelago Sanskrit to the Indonesian of the schoolroom before the audience disperses with his blessing and the performing oval once more becomes, unequivocally, a part of "this earth." This movement toward the quotidian and human affirms an essential sanity to the Balinese cosmos, or, at least, of Kakul's inspired play with the confluence of extraordinary and familiar events contained by that cosmos, in all its variety.

The overall movement from everyday life to artistic activity to ritual and back to the concerns of the quotidian world is a familiar one in Balinese life. The task of teaching me my first sentence in Indonesian happened to fall to a tailor (and aficionado of Balinese theatre) who spoke a little English. He decided that the task was an important one, pondered many options, and then decided to teach me to say: "*Seni ini adala anak dari alam*," or "Art is the child of nature." The inter-relationships between art and life—in both its secular and sacred aspects—is a recurring theme on the island. A circular progression from nature to art to offering and back again to nature is played out in many variations.



Rice is made into cakes, then colored and stacked high, and decorated and profusely adorned with ornamentation. These works of elaborate artifice are given as offerings to the gods, who enjoy their essence, and are then returned to the people, who enjoy the cakes as food. The performer draws from his observations of the life around him, as well as from familiar historical annals and, using all of this material, he constructs intricate systems of sound and movement,

redeployed through the conventions of his art. To paraphrase an English professor who once tried to instruct us in the beauties of Spenser's epic poetry: topeng is not like life, but watching a topeng performance is a lot like living. This artistic refiguring and intertwining of the many worlds embraced by the Balinese imagination is then offered to the invited gods and ancestors for their pleasure. It is also (like the gaily decorated offering cakes) consumed by the earthly audience—an audience equally appreciative of a beautiful movement or a good joke. In the end, the needs and hopes of this audience are the focus of the performer's intercession with the gods who have shared in the enjoyment of his refashioning of nature as art, as offering, and as delicious entertainment.

Of Limins and Liminoids

In *From Ritual to Theatre* (1982) Victor Turner attempts to point out some of the differences between performances held in pre-industrial cultures and those found in post-industrial settings. Going back to his observation that ritual performances traditionally take place during liminal times—in the margins and thresholds of social experience—he makes a case for post-industrial performance being not truly liminal, but rather (apologizing for the neologism) "liminoid"—resembling without being identical to liminal phenomena. Liminal phenomena are collective and occur at times of renewal or crisis, whereas liminoid works (or plays) may be produced at any time by an individual or a group and are often sold as a commodity. Whereas in liminal activities emphasis is characteristically placed on anonymity and *communitas*, in liminoid performances stress is given to the individual innovator—"the unique person who dares and opts to create" (43). An obligation to follow set forms is characteristic of liminal rites, whereas an emphasis on choice and experimentation is central to liminoid art. The liminoid artist "is privileged to make free with his social heritage in a way impossible to members of cultures in which the liminal is to a large extent the sacrosanct" (52).

Finally, while liminal activities of pre-industrial societies invert and play with the social status quo, they rarely subvert it. "Reversal underlines to the members of a community that chaos is the alternative to cosmos, so they'd better stick to cosmos, i.e., the traditional order of culture, though they can for a brief while have a whale of a good time being chaotic" (41). Liminoid "entertainments" in industrial societies, on the other hand, are characteristically subversive: "satirizing, lampooning, burlesquing, or subtly putting down the central values of the basic, work-sphere society, or at least of selected sectors of that society." (41). Noting the differences between Turner's categories in this context should make it clear that the topeng pajegan performed by I Nyoman Kakul at Tusan has attributes of both liminal and liminoid phenomena. The performance—or at least a performance—is required by a communal need. The piece begins and ends with more or less prescribed rituals, and many elements within the piece are determined by traditional structures. But Kakul is brought to Tusan as a renowned artist and the script created and performed is his own, for which he receives full credit from an admiring audience. Indeed, now that more information is becoming available about topeng pajegan, and other transcriptions are available (Young 1982, see note 11 below), the mastery of Kakul's individual

handling of those potentialities within the form becomes more striking. Moreover, the inversions and subversions involved in the scripting are sufficiently complex that two intelligent, informed writers can have opposite opinions about whether the pieces act to subvert or reaffirm societal values. Topeng–Turner might have been delighted to learn—exists in a limin between the liminal and the liminoid! And this is precisely its appeal to theatre artists in the West, myself included. It has an immediacy of impact, range of signification, and purposiveness within social mechanisms that are missing in most of the theatre available to us; yet it is not so alien as to be outside our ken or to lack appeal as a theatrical model.

Topeng, Modern and Post-Modern Theatre

As Schechner points out, the opening up of "creases" between the domains of performance and the playing back and forth across these creases has become common practice in Western contemporary theatre. A list of practitioners involved in this tendency would be an impressive one, with Brecht and Artaud as a somewhat unlikely set of parents and with progeny ranging from Richard Foreman to Monty Python's Flying Circus and including Peter Schumann, Jean Genet, Lee Breuer, Robert Wilson, Peter Brook, Peter Weiss, Samuel Beckett, Jerzy Grotowski, Fred Curchack, the Wooster Group, and Schechner himself. The blatant theatricality and reflexivity common to these very different artists has been reinforced and sometimes prompted by the concerns and analytical methods of semiotic and "de-constructive" studies—particularly those of Roland Barthes and Jaques Derrida. This set of concerns and activities has coincided with a re-emergence of interest in Bali on the part of the theatrical practitioners and theorists. It may be useful to note some striking similarities and essential differences between Balinese topeng as performed by Kakul and recent theatrical theory and practice in the West.

Recorded interest by Western theatre practitioners in Balinese performance begins with the works of Antonin Artaud. It was the capacity of the Balinese performer to project an essentialized vision of life through theatrical means that so attracted Artaud. In his famous essay, "On the Balinese Theatre" (1958 [1938]), he praised the Balinese dancers he had observed in the Dutch Pavilion of the Paris Exposition for their "rigorous" sense of form, their "evocative power," and, most importantly, for their ability to reveal "spiritual states" by means of gesture (192). Artaud's other writings, both before and after his encounter with Balinese performance, indicate a deep affinity with central concerns of Balinese theatrical practice. "The theatre," wrote Artaud, "takes gestures and pushes them as far as they will go... It reforges the chain between what is and what is not, between the virtuality of the possible and what already exists in materialized nature" (192).

Plato's parable, in which men see shadows on the walls of a cave and must judge from those shadows what true "forms" outside of their restricted view are distorted and reflected (Jowett 1944 [1892]), looms behind much of Artaud's writing, and provides the platform from which he appreciates Balinese performance. But Artaud's vision of essential life forms was far darker, more

"cruel," than his classical predecessor's—far closer, in some ways, to a Tantric adept's worship of Hindu Shakti. Beyond his inverted neo-Platonic "forms," Artaud sensed a world of essential "force" that it was the actor's job to embody—always trying to move closer to that embodiment and always doomed to relative failure. "The actor does not make the same gesture twice, but he makes gestures, he moves; and although he brutalizes forms, nevertheless behind them and through their destruction he rejoins that which outlives forms and produces their continuation...that fragile, fluctuating center which forms never reach" (19). Artaud sought a "pure theatrical language" which does without words, a language of signs, gestures, and attitudes having an ideographic value" (192). In Balinese performance, Artaud thought he had found all of this, and an exemplary set of conventionalized gestures which, "in addition to an acute sense of physical beauty...always have as their final goal the elucidation of a spiritual state or problem" (61).

Working from this neo-Platonic frame of reference, and having available to him only a pastiche of dances and "scenes" from Balinese theatre presented to a predominantly Western audience (Pronko 1967:24-26), Artaud naturally drew many false conclusions about the specifics of Balinese theatre. In rebellion against the primacy of the playwright in Western theatre as he knew it, and only being able to view samples of Balinese theatre that emphasized dance, he assumed that all theatre in Bali was essentially non-verbal. Looking for "animated hieroglyphs", he over-estimated the abstract qualities of Balinese theatre and saw "mysterious signs which correspond to some unknown, fabulous, and obscure reality" (1958 [1938]:111) where a Balinese audience would see, for example, a warrior looking about him or a king commanding his ministers by means of the familiar conventions of a popular theatre witnessed, *mutatis mutandis*, since childhood. Not having any way of knowing the signals that can pass between dancer and drummer, he believed Balinese theatre to be devoid of improvisation or individual initiative—even more immersed in ritualistic tradition than it is. Not realizing the strengths and paradoxical freedoms that can be the legacy of traditional form, Artaud assumed that theatre in Bali was a director's medium.

In spite of all the understandable errors in interpreting Balinese performance, Artaud's articulation of the principles of Balinese theatre remains an eloquent testimony to its beauty and inspirational appeal. He was essentially correct in his perception that the Balinese dancer aimed at the "elucidation" of a "spiritual state." The impulse toward archetype and the intensity of signification that Artaud grasped is surely part of the Balinese aesthetic; but it is a part that is counterbalanced by the inclusion of more mundane frames of reference, frequently resulting in humor as these epistemologies clash. It is a shame that Artaud—who loved the Marx Brothers, but whose own theatrical works and projects tended to suffer from an overbearing portentousness—never had the opportunity to observe a topeng pajegan performance. The dancing principals do, indeed, seem immense and universally significant in their depiction of essentialized states sanctioned by the Balinese cosmos; but that sense of size and significance is rendered accessible and meaningful to the Balinese by the presence of the immediate, specific, parlous, and humorous story-tellers and antic clowns that contextualize their appearances. As a tormented alien within his own culture as well as a stranger to Balinese performance, Artaud was doomed to

miss the dynamic interplay between the mundane and the metaphysical which characterizes Balinese life in general and Balinese topeng in particular. It is precisely this interplay in topeng that facilitates in Bali what Artaud was to describe as "the true purpose of theatre; i.e., to create myths, to express life in its immense, universal aspect, and from that life to extract images in which we find pleasure in discovering ourselves" (192).

Artaud's view of Balinese theatre was a Romantic one. Though he admired the cosmic reach of Balinese performance—its seeming access to absolute values, absolutely stated—he felt his own audience to be cut off from all that was serious and enduring in human experience. His theatrical inclinations were to shock and startle his audience out of feelings of complacency. Hence, he sought a theatre of "cruelty." He envisioned theatre as an instrument for the radical restructuring of perception and action: "the sky can still fall on our heads and it is the first job of the theatre to teach us that (79)." Artaud exemplifies (though certainly he did not originate) the tendency of the modern avant-garde to take the familiar and to aggressively estrange or "alienate" it in order to force a reconsideration of what, perhaps, has been assumed or gone unnoticed:

The identifying signature of avant-garde art, all the way back to Bakunin and the anarchist journal L'Avant Garde in 1878, has been an unrelenting hostility to contemporary civilization. And its most obvious aspect has been negative: the rejection of social organization and artistic conventions, aesthetic values and materialistic ideals, the bourgeoisie, syntactical structure, and logic (Innes 1981:9).

Artaud sought to shatter the metaphysical smugness of positivism and distrusted political mechanisms. For other avant-garde artists, though—particularly those of the political left—the focus of rebellion has been the system of power and prestige enshrined by capitalism. Brecht stated the strategy succinctly: "If we play works dealing with our own time as though they were historical, then perhaps the circumstances under which [the spectator] himself acts will strike him as equally odd; and this is where the critical attitude begins" (1964:44). In Peter Weiss's *Marat/Sade*—a play influenced by both Artaud and Brecht—the character Marat sums up the avant-garde enterprise in its most positive terms with a statement that director Peter Brook had repeated several times at the end of his production: "The important thing is to pull ourselves up by our own hair, to turn yourself inside out and see the whole world with fresh eyes" (Weiss, 1966: 27).

When employed by a daring performer, the conventions of topeng may also function to encourage a "critical attitude." The significance of the quasi-historical events depicted may be turned about, inverted, and refracted prismatically by the succession of masked characters, each with a different vantage point, a different relationship to "history," and his or her own limited epistemology. This is the sense in which Boon can call topeng "subversive," and this capacity to refocus vision and thought is a substantial indicator of topeng's aesthetic and social vitality. To perform their many functions, considerable license is granted to masked performers; but this charge carries its dangers as well. Stories are told of performers executed by the Dutch and Japanese for their satiric remarks, and of Balinese performers killed during the bloody civil war of 1965 in retribution for

comments made while performing (Young 1980). Despite this subversive potential, though, the strategies of topeng are essentially the inverse of those of the modernist avant-garde. As Boon notes in reference to Kakul's performance, "all the worlds of topeng are made outside to each other. ...The tone is less interestedly satiric than disinterestedly parodic" (1984: 164).

There is a great deal at stake in this "disinterested" play. Kakul takes elements of knowledge and experience that are initially "strange" to each other and weaves them into the woof and warp of "normal" experience. Within each unit of the performance text that emerges, the movement is toward the quotidian and human, toward balance, and toward the containment of disparate forces. Each new unit begins with a new challenge to this capacity to balance and contain—be it within the domain of the drama or at the more important interfacing of everyday life with the enduring spiritual forces of the Balinese macrocosmos. In each new unit of action, and within each of the domains as they become appropriate "homes" for aesthetic and social action, the capacity to embrace disparate elements within the expanding circle of performance is triumphantly demonstrated. The Balinese seem to delight in a kind of spiritual athleticism; the more dangerous the force and the more otherworldly the form, the more satisfying, therefore, the momentary containment, and the more exhilarating the performance. This attitude is significantly different from the impetus for social revolution or for psychological (or metaphysical) revelation that is characteristically a part of the enterprise of modernism, in which the work of art is posited as romantically antagonistic to life as it is usually lived and perceived in the "real" world.

Richard Wallis has traced a Balinese *arja* performance through its oscillations between the abstract and the familiar—the "traditional" and the "rationalized" in Geertz's religious and social terms (Wallis 1979, Geertz 1973:170-189). Many of the same strategies evident in Kakul's solo performance may be recognized in his description of an *arja* performance of a Mahabharata story involving several actors, singers, and dancers:

Text-based feudal vignettes alternate with the details of ordinary, contemporary existence to produce a kind of telescoping effect. In one scene, epic characters may sing in literary languages and posture in highly stylized monumental poses, while at the same time their surrounding attendants busily create down-to-earth Balinese experiences among themselves. The audience can look from one group of characters to the other, adjusting the lens through which it views the respective time and geographic frames (Wallis 1979:42).

Wallis stresses the capacity of traditional Balinese theatrical forms to incorporate, play with, and effectively neutralize threatening aspects of modernization through this theatrical juggling of traditional and emergent world views. He further surmises that, just as family planning projects, schemes for national development, a war of suspect morality, and the tastes of tourists may be fastened upon today as the subject of a joke or a lecture by a 14th century king's irreverent attendant, the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch traders a few hundred years ago and, long before that, the coming of priests, traders, and ideas from South Asia may have similarly provided fodder for Balinese performances—cross-

referencing and re-contextualizing the old and the new. Such performances help Balinese audiences to clarify and manage their frequently conflicting and constantly shifting spheres of social and religious action—each with its own demands and—sometimes literally—its own language. The theatrical strategy is similar to religious Tantrism in its inclusiveness, and, like the ritual use of Rangda and the Barong Ket associated with Tantric traditions (and the final appearance of Sidha Karya in a topeng pajegan performance), this strategy aims at the containment and inclusion of threatening elements (Emigh 1983).

By playing with emergent world-views in the context of traditional forms, the strategy allows for change as well as conservation. Kathy Foley has discussed the conservative potential of this process as exemplified in the *wayang cepak* puppet theatre of Cirebon, Java: "As the historical past pulls backward toward the mythical so the *dalang* [puppeteer] composes his story to pull his audience members back into the vortex of history so the present can become a reflection of the past" (1986:43). While this capacity to manifest, contain, and celebrate a storied past in a liminal present is certainly not unique to Bali, the prominence of this conservative strain within Balinese theatre and rhetoric has led some observers to postulate that the Balinese conceive of themselves as living in a "steady state" (Bateson 1970:384-402, Geertz 1973:334,391). Yet, as Foley's own work with the clowns of Sudanese rod puppet theatre (1984) implies, the relationship of Indonesian traditional performance to the historical and mythical events at the dramatic core can be far more complex. Far from demonstrating a "steady state," Kakul's topeng pajegan performance expends much of its energy measuring and remeasuring the distance between the past and present, looked at from different vantage points. If I read it correctly, his performance redeploys and inverts conservative strategies evident, for example, in New Guinean rituals and in traditional performances elsewhere in Indonesia and in Bali itself (Emigh 1981). His topeng affirms the appeal and validity of opposing world views drawn from the past and the present, while demonstrating the performer's exemplary capacity to negotiate among them by means of his inspired play.

The utopia suggested by Kakul's performance is one of a complex set of balanced oppositions rather than the denial of new impulses or the supplanting of an old order by a newer one (or the showing up of all orders as false) that is typically advocated by modernist works. Of course, this utopian attempt at maintaining balance can fail—just as revolutions may break down or create hierarchies more debilitating than those displaced. Such a failure happened, tragically, in 1965, when tens of thousands of Balinese were killed in civil warfare following an unsuccessful revolutionary coup from the left (and the unexpected eruption of Bali's sacred volcano after an attempt to hurry the ritual calendar for political ends). Competing modernist and traditional visions of utopia became irreconcilable, and both were doomed to failure.

The metaphoric concern with balance is paralleled and exemplified by the prominent role assigned to the act of balancing within topeng dance itself. Time and again in those dances that celebrate the enduring presence of the past in the context of the present, a performer will swirl full around, abruptly come to a stop with one knee raised, and then hold this balanced posture for two beats (or ten, or eighteen). The gamelan players stop the melody momentarily as the dancer comes into this arrested pose, contributing to the sense of synesthesia, and

accentuating the dancer's balancing feat. It is common in Balinese discourse to express a dislike for being *paling*—of losing one's balance, or becoming dizzy, or losing track of direction. It is also common to express fear of experiencing *lek*—or, as Geertz interprets the term, acquiring "stage fright" within social gatherings (1973:401-403). The sudden turns and balances of the accomplished topeng performer (like the movements into and out of trance of the accomplished Rangda performer) may be seen as virtuosic displays of superiority over forces that act to knock one off balance, create a bewildering loss of direction or make one dizzy—paling. The performer's virtuosic mastery of masks that essentialize a vast array of social roles and his spirited play with the linguistic conventions appropriate to these roles similarly evoke a triumph over the forces that act to make one lek. In the microcosm of dance, as in the macrocosms of entire performances, and the larger macrocosms that surround performances, the aim is balance and containment.

Balinese topeng, then, is radically different in its essential aims and strategies from the avant-garde movements of modernism. In its non-linear, de-centered approach to narrative and dramatic structure, however, it at least appears to have more in common with post-modern theory and practice in Western theatre. I have already noted the similarity of Kakul's inchoate "script" to Roland Barthes' post-modern concept of Text. Barthes also set down a rallying cry for post-modernism: "Let difference surreptitiously replace conflict" (1975: 15). The conflict between Patih Jelantik and Dalem Blambangan is not of paramount importance to Kakul's performance (though it provides a logical sequence for the masks and its conclusion must be told, however briefly). What *is* of paramount importance is the richness of play as the various masks enter into the contexts created by this conflict and/or demanded by the conventions of topeng. It is precisely the "difference" of the various masks and the various moments of performance that matters. What is so particularly appealing about topeng, and what seems so strikingly post-modern about it, is the dynamic movement into and out of the theatrical world reconstituted in each performance, and the playing back and forth between past and present, ancestral language and Balinese vernacular, visitation and illusion, character and performer, high caste and low caste, female and male, epiphany and parody, the metaphysical and the social, the fantastic and the mundane.

Elinor Fuchs has summarized the advent of a post-modern aesthetic in the West: "A radical relativizing has occurred that permits theatre artists and their audiences to regard all reality as a bottomless series of illusions in which a central point of view—whether of character, actor, or author—has proved to be the chief illusion. In this 'dizzying regress' the stage is emptied of what we used to think of as reality" (1984a:12). Many post-modernist works take as their "central premise" "that the shifting illusions of performance constitute the only reality, and that 'character' and the human nature it depicts are mere constellations of performance attitudes (Fuchs 1984b, unpublished ms). As Boon points out in a recent essay, Balinese culture itself has something of this feel:

Like a thousand 'Popish' parodies, Balinese institutions, rituals, dramatic arts, and scribal traditions allude to each other in a perpetual reflexivity... Everywhere in Balinese ideals and practice we

must look beyond any allegorical Machinery to the dialectical field...from which it emerges... Moreover, in its institutions and performances, Balinese culture...produces the means of exposing all of its allegorical Machineries, not as disguises (for there is nothing True underneath) but as masks. Indeed, everything is masks all the way down, and their symbolics never run out (1986:244,258).¹²

One of the problems of post-modern theory has been a paucity of positive historical examples of deliberately "de-centered" works. The Derridean "deconstruction of works intended to be formed around a center of reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of play" (1978:284) has proved useful in showing up the often illusory status of the center itself; but modern works that deliberately mirror a de-centered world tend to do so with the sense of loss and nostalgia evident in the opening lines of Yeats's "Second Coming," written in 1921:

*Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world...*

(1956:184-185).

Even Lacan, who revealed the subjective "I" to be a constructed persona based on the love of a reflected image, found this theory to be problematical in psychiatric practice. It left no whole intact to contain the deconstructed parts. Psychiatrist J.D. Reynaud discusses the fragmentation of "personal functions" in modern (or post-modern society): "The industrialized society is a society of multiple memberships and belongings and, consequently, one in which personal functions differentiate themselves. Each individual occupies various positions, belong to different hierarchies or different contexts, and playing as many roles...in other words, the unity of the persona becomes a problem" (1983:213-224, unpublished trans. by Mark Siegel). When Derrida calls for positive examples of a de-centered world he must read Artaud's call for "a kind of organized anarchy" out of context (neglecting Artaud's inverted neo-platonism) or lapse into Nietzschean rhetoric, calling for "the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation" (1978:292).

This dilemma is not unique to the West. Claude Levi Strauss recently summarized the findings of a seminar on identity: "In spite of their distance in space and their profoundly heterogeneous cultural contents, none of the societies constituting a fortuitous sample seem to take for granted a substantial identity: they break it up into a multitude of elements for which, though in different terms for each culture, the synthesis is a problem" (1983:10-11, unpublished trans. by Mark Siegel). Forging a path and an identity among competing functions, hierarchies and contexts—finding a synthesis—can be a problem for the Balinese as well; it certainly is for Jelantik, and for many of the other masks in Kakul's performance. Still, the Balinese seem to view the issues in less tragic terms. Putu Wijaya, a Balinese himself and a noted Indonesian novelist and playwright, has, in discussing his own characters, described their need to be "acrobats of the every

day" in order to survive (quoted in Zarrilli 1987:155). Kakul's topeng performance provides a modest example of a de-centered text existing joyously, playfully, and boisterously within a larger cultural field that itself delights in the reciprocal counterbalancing of its many "machineries." Unlike Derrida's envisioned "world of signs," though, the masks of topeng are not "without fault, truth, or origin." They essentialize faults and truths (some of these truths in direct opposition to each other, and some of these "faults" divinely empowered). They allude to a multiplicity of "origins" through the rituals and rhetoric of visitation, through layering of historical references, and through the use of highly conventional traditional codes. The multiplicity of the "origins" deployed and alluded to in the gestural and spoken language of a topeng performance may itself be a de-centering device, yet the frequent allusions to a "macrocosmic" world dominated by divinities and ancestors protects topeng from the infinite regress into the self that marks so many post-modern works and which has led some critics with modernist tastes to dismiss the entire movement as refried solipcism (e.g. Shattuck 1985).

In Kakul's performance, he asserts that both the macrocosmos [*buwana agung*] and the microcosmos [*buwana alit*] made in its image "find expression in the body of every man." Thus, the hero Jelantik proclaims—twice—"I shall become the defender of the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, the spiritual order and the physical order, an order that finds expression in my own body" (42,39). Within the dramatic domain, Jelantik successfully defends the order of his quasi-historical world from the demonic King of Blambangan; but his ordered world is more successfully challenged by the existence of Si Mata Mata and other masks that bear witness to alternate epistemologies and force a widening of perspectives on both macrocosmos and microcosmos. In performance, all these views of macrocosmos and microcosmos must find their "expression" in the topeng dancer himself. The end result of all of the ritual preparations, kinesthetic training, familiarization with masks and types, virtuosic displays of dance, sounding of archaic and vernacular languages, reflexive play among characters, meta-commentary about the performance, jokes about the audience, and offerings for the village's health and happiness that make up a topeng pajegan performance is an exemplary human act. The dancer shows himself able to embody a range of attributes representative of the entire knowable world and to negotiate its possibilities with strength, grace, and humor.

The techniques that the topeng performer uses to represent his various characters—to wear his various masks—are essentially those of the character actor and, as such, are not unique to Balinese acting. Long before Lacan or Kohut questioned the integrity of the constructed self, the actor's uncanny play with identity was seen in the West as a profoundly disturbing indication of the instability of character—an ontologically subversive activity—as well as a testament to human creativity (Worthen 1984). As Bruce Wilshire has pointed out in *Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor*, the actor "thematizes" the struggles to find a self, "project[ing] his mimetic skill and susceptibility into possible modes of being human conjured up through his kinesthetic imagination" (1982:232-234). Freud described the process of this "conjuring" of possible selves in a letter written in 1931 to an actress bewildered by her inability to keep a safe psychological distance between "her own person" and the "sleazy characters" she

represented on stage: "[It is] not that the actor's own person is eliminated [in acting] but, rather, that elements of it—for instance, undeveloped dispositions and suppressed wishes—are used for the representations of intended characters and these are allowed exposure" (quoted in Shattuck 1985:147). Sam Shepard, discussing his methods as a playwright, in effect amends and amplifies Freud's statement: "It isn't a question of having to write about ourselves, but of contacting in ourselves the elements—forces and tendencies—that are characters. The voices of a lot of external-world characters are inside you" (quoted in Shewey 1985:122).

The Balinese actor both uses and transcends this amplitude of "the actor's own person" in order to give "representations of intended characters" their life in the theatrical moment. Working within the flexible limits of tradition, hoping for inspiration from his "taksu," the performer must still tap within himself the "undeveloped dispositions" that will allow him to embody the potential life of each mask. In wearing his many masks, turn and turn about, the topeng pajegan performer becomes a living lexicon of a typology of characters that represent the range of epistemologies within Balinese society and its encompassing cosmos; the effect is to celebrate the variety, difference, and wholeness of a complex and ultimately sacred world as it finds expression within his own body. The artist's integrity resides in the fullness and clarity of his "exposure" of these different "dispositions," these "possible modes of being"—humorous and heroic, demonic and godlike, fantastic and mundane. His virtue is in his living proof that these differing potentialities exist within each individual human being—that man or woman is not only "created in the image of god," but contains within him or her all that is divine. In doing this, he embodies the Sanskrit maxim, *tat tvam astu*—"Thou art That."

For most post-modern artists, "That" is suspect. Without a larger field of reference, the isolated artist, not the cosmos, becomes the dominant paradigm and the reflexive techniques shared with Balinese topeng lead instead to a narcissistic fascination with a dubious self. This is not without interest, either as a model of human behavior or as activity which we might observe and with which we may empathize—as Beckett has reminded us, "It's human; a lobster couldn't do it."—but it does create a far different affective field for the domains of performance. Caught between mourning a great breaking apart and fooling around with all the leftover pieces, the play of post-modern theatre often turns agonized-conflicted-infected with the (modernist) self-torture of Artaud's noble, but ineffectual, "victims burnt at the stake." Worse, it (sometimes too often) becomes frivolous—play without significance or joy.

Notes

1. I am grateful to the University of Hawai'i for asking me to speak, and, especially, to Robert Van Niel, Flo Lamoureux, Judy Ann Van Zile, Truong Buu Lam, Roger Long, John and Lauren Marks, James Brandon, Elizabeth Wichmann and David Harnish for their hospitality there. Many people have contributed to the thinking in this version of my remarks; besides the debts noted these pages, I would like to especially thank I Nyoman Wenten, Kathy

Foley, Herbert Blau, Hildred Geertz, Mark Siegel, Mick Diener, and Steven Lewis for their comments and Ulrike Emigh for her editorial suggestions.

2. Schechner himself takes this approach in giving a history of his own production of *The Tooth of Crime*, beginning with an account of the interactions between himself and the playwright, Sam Shepard (1988 [1977,1973]:973-84). It should also be noted that in his most recent revision (1988) Schechner has drawn his circles with far less sense of regularity and clear definition of territory.
3. Claude Levi-Strauss has commented at length on the multiplicity, malleability, and ambiguity of mythological "meaning": "There is no real end to methodological analysis, no hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking down process has been completed. Themes can be split up *ad infinitum*. Just when you think you have disentangled and separated them, you realize they are knitting together again in response to the operation of unexpected affinities. ...The unity of the myth is...a phenomenon of the imagination" (1969:5-6).
4. See Emigh (1979:22-24). For more on the various literary languages used in Balinese performance, see Wallis (1980) and Zurbuchen (1987).
5. The term "pseudo-work" is intended to be consistent with Barthes's distinctions between work and Text. Of course, the "texts" that Barthes has in mind are themselves written, and the transcribed and translated words of Kakul's performance remain "text-like"; but publishing this "performance text" at least threatens to convert it into something that might be treated as a "work"—separating it from its "field," holding it apart from its "production," and threatening to rob it of "jouissance."
6. The notion of "transparency" is suggested by Susanne Langer (1953:60).
7. An *odalan* is a temple festival held every 210 days, at which the gods and ancestors are invited down to be honored and entertained. Each temple has its own 210 day cycle. Since there are several thousand temples on the island, this created the need for a very active performance schedule. (See Dibia 1986, Belo 1966 [1953].)
8. Bandem and DeBoer (1983) use the terms *kaja* and *kelo* to provide a system of categorizing Balinese dance forms, according to their literal and metaphorical place along this sacred/secular axis.
9. The use of a cosmological domain in constituting a dramatic and theatrical world has also been noted in Greek and Elizabethan practice (Kitto 1960 [1956]:231-245, Tillyard 1943).
10. Hildred Geertz offers her example as an anomaly; it is anomalous precisely because the world is not rendered whole and the audience's angry intervention is solicited instead of the celebration of a blessing upon the assembled villagers. The more typical movement toward completion by an incorporation of the comic is not unique to Balinese theatre, of course. Shakespeare's subplots (and the presence of Falstaff) fulfilled the same

function, and so did Greek *satyr* plays appended to tragic trilogies and Japanese *kyogen* comedies interspersed among *noh* dramas.

11. Elizabeth Young (1982) has transcribed and translated another topeng pajegan, *The Tale of Erlangga*, as performed by an unnamed artist in Sukawati. The script she offers is far more exigetical, and the anonymous artist uses the potentialities within topeng pajegan structure in a far less complex and imaginative way than Kakul has. Too often, in studying non-Western performance forms, we act as though the culture generates the script and overlook the contributions of individual genius. The culture may provide the banks of the river; the individual artist is accountable for the force and flow of the current.
12. Boon's metaphor is reminiscent of (and probably based upon) an account given by Geertz of an explanation of the Hindu cosmology: "There is an Indian story...about an Englishman who, having been told that the world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in turn on the back of a turtle, asked...what did the turtle rest on? Another turtle. And that turtle? 'Ah Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down'" (1973:28-29).

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**The Annex of the Raj:
The Anglo-Indian Interlude in Burmese History
c. 1826-1941**

Michael Adas

One of the most striking features of the history of Burma in the post-World War II era has been the extent to which its leaders have sought to isolate the new nation from the rest of the world. While nationalist leaders in most of Britain's Asian empire buffered the transition from colonial to independent status through membership in the British Commonwealth, the Burmese brusquely rejected the British offer to join the Commonwealth, despite the considerable economic, military and political advantages that membership provided. The leaders of the AFPFL, who struggled to assert the new state's control over rebellious minorities and political factions in the decade after independence were, relative to the military regime that followed, open to international exchanges and aid and continuing foreign investment, including that by Indian businessmen who continued to play a major role in the economy.¹ But under the Ne Win regime, which, following a stint as a "caretaker" government, seized power from U Nu and the civilian politicians in 1962, Burma steadily reduced its outside contacts and commitments and closed in on itself.

From non-alignment and neutrality, then fashionable among Third World leaders, the Burmese moved to outright isolation. A once-booming export economy was reduced to a shadow of its former self. As state planners intended, foreign investment dried up in the harsh climate generated by military dictatorship and the Burmese determination to forge their own path to socialism.² Cultural exchanges with other nations dwindled. Scholarly research by foreigners was confined to a handful of specialists who maintained personal contacts with the military leaders or whose work was in fields like archaeology and the early periods of Burmese history that were regarded remote enough from current realities to be innocuous. Few places in Burma were accessible even to the most stalwart of tourists. Cities like Rangoon, where visitors were allowed, served as the pretext for numerous journalists to launch into rather predictable accounts of the lack of even the most minimal "modern" facilities in isolated Burma and to chronicle the steady deterioration of the famous haunts and imperial monuments of the late-lamented Raj.

Though many Third World nations in the post-colonial era have displayed an understandable wariness with regard to contacts with the superpowers as well as their former colonial rulers, none has surpassed Burma in its determined retreat into isolation. Explanations for this response have varied, but two basic suppositions inform much of the speculation on this point. Burma's retreat from the world, it is argued, is quite consistent with its longstanding tradition of xenophobia and mirrors attempts by earlier rulers to shut their kingdom off from the world. The pronounced expansionist tendencies of Burmese dynasties, their extensive contacts with both neighboring rulers and those more distant like China, as well as Burma's receptivity to outside cultural influences and its active participation since early times in the Indian Ocean trading network, all render the

xenophobic interpretation highly questionable. This is especially true when Burma is compared to China or Japan, which were much more cut off from outside influences for longer periods of time than Burma and yet have been major forces in the international struggles of the postwar world. As Victor Lieberman has shown, from the sixteenth century the contacts of various burmese peoples with the merchants and adventurers of the expansive European powers were extensive and influential in shaping the history of the region as a whole.³

In addition to xenophobia, Burma's determined retreat into isolation is blamed on the "traumatic" effects of colonization on the Burmese people. Thus, the hostility of the Burmese to outsiders and foreign influences is linked to political and social turmoil brought on by the collapse of the Burmese export-oriented economy in the Great Depression and the gradual but perhaps more unsettling decline of Burmese culture as exemplified by decay within the Buddhist Sangha.⁴ Once again, however, if Burma's colonial experience is viewed in a comparative context, the explanation offered for its retreat from the world is problematic. British colonial rule in Burma was a good deal milder and less exploitative than French colonization in Algeria or Vietnam, the early decades of Belgian control in the Congo, or British conquest and settlement in areas like Kenya and Rhodesia. Yet none of the nations that emerged from these other colonial contexts has closed in on itself to the extent that Burma has. In fact, Algeria, Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which suffered the shocks of both imperial domination and occupation by European settlers, have been among the most engaged of post-colonial societies in international and regional affairs and exchanges.

Despite the fact that colonialism was considerably more benign in Burma than in many other areas, an examination of the experience of the Burmese peoples under British rule reveals an added dimension of colonization that goes a long way to explaining their determination to close themselves off from the world in the post-colonial era. Like Kenya and Rhodesia, Burma was twice colonized. But unlike them, the second wave was not tens of thousands of European farmers but rather well over a million Indians from officials and policemen, to merchants and factory and farm laborers. This second colonization was in many ways the more traumatic and threatening. The Indians not only migrated, and in many cases settled, in unprecedented numbers, but they came to dominate many sectors of the colonial economy and administration. Burma's formal annexation to Britain's Indian empire across the Bay of Bengal initiated an era of foreign domination in which the interests of the Province were consistently subordinated to those of the larger empire. Even Burma's nationalist movement developed in the shadow of its earlier and much larger counterpart in India, and Burmese nationalist leaders soon concluded that their struggle involved the expulsion not only of the British but, even more critically, the colonizers' Indian allies and camp followers. At the peak of the Indian influx in the early 1920s, there were over a million Indians resident in the Province as a whole and these made up over ten percent of the population in some areas. It is not surprising then that many Burmese leaders feared that their small and historically under-populated land would be overwhelmed by migrants from their giant and over-populated neighbor to the west. Though the xenophobia of certain Burmese leaders and parties can not entirely be dismissed as a factor, Burma's double colonization and the very

formidable threat to the Burmese people and culture posed by decades of virtually unrestricted migration and Indian sub-imperialism can be seen as one of the prime causes of Burma's postwar retreat into isolation.

Though angry British merchants, clamoring for free access to the markets and resources of Burma and myopic, even arrogant, Burmese monarchs did much to bring on the conflicts that led to the piecemeal conquest of Burma between 1826 and 1888,⁵ all prompted British officials in India to view the region as yet another turbulent frontier that must be pacified, if necessary at the cost of annexation. The threat of attack or the spread of social unrest from regions ruled by Indian princes that bordered on areas to which British control had brought "peace and good government" had been a key justification for British expansion within the Indian subcontinent from the middle decades of the eighteenth century. By the first decades of the nineteenth century, Burma had become, in the mind of English East India Company officials, one of these turbulent frontiers. Its step-by-step reduction was seen as essential to peace and security in the eastern portions of the empire. Thus, Burma fell victim to imperialist aggression not so much because of calls for international free trade by British merchants, though these did much to bring on specific crises, but because it had the misfortune to border on Britain's Indian domains and appeared to fit the logic of expansion into the turbulent frontier.

Even the techniques that the British had employed since the mid-eighteenth century with regard to truculent Indian princes were applied, with very little success, to Burma. Methods of informal control from flattery to gunboat diplomacy, which had long been preferred to costly annexations, were first attempted. The British sought, again with very little success, to reduce successive Burman monarchs to what was in effect the status of subordinate allies akin to those they had earlier created through varying forms of "alliances" with the princes of India.⁶ As had been the case in the expansion of the empire within the subcontinent, when the Kon-baung rulers understandably spurned British attempts to dominate them informally, the British concluded that they had no choice but to make war and to annex Burma outright to the Indian empire.

But the fatal Indian connection that led to Burma's colonization went much deeper than the imperatives of the turbulent frontier. The merchants and sea captains, who became embroiled in disputes with Kon-baung officials, sailed from Calcutta and other Indian ports and many served the East India Company. The timber and other raw materials they sought were very often intended for the India market or for the use of the Company. Long before the first Anglo-Burman war in 1824-1826, British travellers and officials had viewed Burma's potential as a colonial possession in terms of India's needs. In 1811, for example, William Francklin wrote of the great potential of Burma as a source of raw materials and foodstuffs for India *and* a market outlet for both European and Indian manufacturers. He noted the great fertility of the Irrawaddy delta region of lower Burma and found that its presence offered "great consolation" in the face of the ever-present threat of famine in the heavily populated provinces of Bengal. To enhance the insurance against calamity that Burma might provide, Francklin urged the British to do all they could to promote the advance of agriculture in the region.⁷ Decades later, Henry Bell argued that if the fertile provinces of southern Burma were annexed to the Indian empire they would serve as a formidable

buffer to the famines that periodically ravaged the subcontinent.⁸ Shortly after the region was annexed in 1852, East India Company officials at Calcutta set to work on schemes to promote migration to the new territories from heavily populated districts in eastern and southern India.⁹

The armies that conquered Burma in the three Anglo-Burman wars that were fought between 1824 and 1886 were made up mainly of Indian troops. Their commanding officers were in the pay of the East India Company in the first two conflicts and of the Government of India in the final clash. The Kon-baung domains were transformed piecemeal into an annex of the British Raj, one of many Provinces of the vast Indian empire. Though British administrators occupied the top posts in the colonial administration and the military and police forces, many upper level and most of the intermediate positions were staffed by civil servants and officers drawn from various parts of the Indian empire. By the 1930s, nearly thirty percent of those engaged in public administration were Indian, and over forty-five percent of the security forces were made up of Indian recruits.¹⁰ Throughout the colonial era, internal security in Burma, particularly in times of crisis, as well as external defense were dependent on the Indian army.¹¹ For the great majority of the Burmese, the Indian presence was magnified by the fact that Indian or Anglo-Indian assessors, surveyors, policemen and census takers were much more likely to be in daily contact with the peasants and urban laborers than higher ranking British officials. Thus, the second or Indian wave of colonization was much more apparent to the Burmese than British overlordship in the Province.

The influx of Indian administrative and military personnel foreshadowed the reliance of the colonizers on Indian precedents in the governance of the new territories. The administrative organization itself was patterned after those which had evolved over nearly a century in India. Though the architects of the Boat and Gymkhana clubs indulged in decorative flourishes that were decidedly Burmese, the great government buildings of Rangoon—the Secretariat, Government House and the High Court—were patterned after the "great utilitarian pile[s] of Victorian brick"¹² that in a motley blend of imagined gothic, Italianate and "Moorish" styles dominated nineteenth-century Indian urban centers from Bombay to Calcutta. The physical reordering of the Burmese political landscape was based on Indian prototypes. Like India, Burma was divided into districts with British District Officers at their heads. Cadastral surveys were undertaken by British and Indian engineers trained in Indian engineering colleges. Successive Burma censuses were conducted in conjunction with and on the same pattern as those in India, complete with detailed breakdowns of caste and religious configurations.

Perhaps most critically for the majority of the Burmese people, from the 1880s, indigenous residential patterns in the rural areas—which for most of southern Burma, at any rate, were based on circles of small hamlets—were fundamentally reorganized on the model of the (often imagined) prototypical Indian village.¹³ Central to this transformation was the reduction in the colonial period of local Burman notables, who had often been staunch defenders of "village" interests in the pre-colonial era, to the status of government functionaries or "headmen" on the Indian model. This shift not only rendered local administrative arrangements alien and artificial, it turned key intermediaries

between the former Burman rulers and the peasant population into enemies of the people and prime targets in times of rural unrest.¹⁴

The application of Indian precedents was particularly intense in the relatively underpopulated southern districts of Burma. There East India Company officials, who were well schooled in the abstract principles of Bentham and the Utilitarian philosophers, saw an opportunity to create a political economy that was genuinely based on peasant smallholder production. For decades their attempts to create such a system had been frustrated in one region of India after another by the resistance of entrenched landholding elites and the Indian caste hierarchy. In the 1850s, British revenue officials viewed lower Burma as a *tabula rasa*, free from the deep-seated traditions and complexities that had frustrated their designs in India. They applied, with virtually no consideration for Burmese givens, the land tenure and revenue system that was then in favor in India, the *ryotwari*.¹⁵ Though the architects of Burma's agrarian economy clearly had the interests of the ordinary cultivators in mind, the social and economic system they promoted ignored or rode roughshod over indigenous social structures and cultural arrangements, including Buddhist religious and educational institutions. In the decades of rapid expansion and general prosperity of the late-nineteenth century, few noticed the toll the alien system was taking on Burmese social and cultural life. When the economy turned sour, this deterioration became a major rallying call for Burmese leaders who wished to stir up indigenous resistance to the British and Indian domination.

At the same time that the *ryotwari* was being introduced, the British opened Burma to foreign trade and immigration as part of their overall scheme to remake Burma as a model of *laissez-faire*, market-oriented colonialism. Their aims meshed nicely with the earlier version of Burma as a key supplier of food for India and as an outlet for its surplus population. Much of the spectacular increase in export trade from Burma was directed toward India though, in the first decades after 1852, a high percentage of the leading export product—rice—went to Great Britain and Europe. By the early twentieth century, however, India and Ceylon had become the main market for Burma rice, and by the 1930s their share of Burma's exported rice crop had reached nearly sixty percent.¹⁶ The great post-conquest expansion of the market economy in Burma also attracted Indian investors, mill owners, merchants and moneylenders. It set into motion a massive movement of capital that Lenin never dreamed of in his analysis of the workings of the capitalist-imperialist world order. Indian entrepreneurs and financiers were perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of the annexation of Burma to the Indian Raj. Though Europeans controlled the largest banking houses, shipping firms and processing plants throughout the colonial era, Indians again dominated at the intermediate levels. Very often Indian moneylenders, particularly the Chettiars, served as the major source of capital for local traders and moneylenders who were predominately Burmese. This meant that Indian, not European, capital financed the great expansion of cultivation and rice export that occurred from the last decades of the nineteenth century. Burmese who sought to operate large rice or timber mills or export firms inevitably came into competition with Indian owners, not European mercantile establishments. Burmese rice merchants competed with Indians and, to a much lesser extent, Chinese. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, Indian moneylenders and speculators had also

established themselves as substantial landholders through much of lower Burma.¹⁷

The movement of Indian entrepreneurs and capital to Burma was paralleled by a massive influx of Indian migrant laborers into both the urban centers and rural districts of Burma. In keeping with the vision held by British administrators in India of Burma as an ideal safety valve for overcrowded and famine-prone Indian districts, no restrictions were placed on Indian immigration during virtually the whole period of colonial rule. In fact, though earlier officials had expressed misgivings, none until James Baxter issued his 1941 *Report on Indian Immigration*, strongly urged meaningful restrictions on Indian entry into Burma. By the early decades of the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of seasonal and permanent migrants crossed back and forth over the Bay of Bengal each year. Tens of thousands took up permanent residence in Burma. In the peak year of 1914, the influx of Indians into Burma surpassed those leaving by 143,000; as late as 1928, the *net* migration of Indians into the Province reached 94,000.¹⁸ By the late 1920s, there were over a million Indians in all of Burma, over 600,000 concentrated in the market-oriented districts of lower Burma alone.

Just as they did in administration, marketing and processing, Indians competed with indigenous ethnic groups for positions as dock hands and street sweepers, tenants and landless laborers. In some areas in the Irrawaddy delta, they also claimed their own smallholdings and established communities that were exclusively or preponderantly Indian.¹⁹ This meant that at all social levels from the upper realms of the civil service to the lowliest coolie, Indians were in competition and intense contact with the Burmese. As long as the economy was buoyant and steadily expanding, migrants and indigenous peoples managed to coexist with surprisingly little friction despite (or perhaps because of) minimal social and cultural interchange. When the economic pie began to shrink, especially after World War I, Burmese awareness of and hostility toward the Indian immigrant community rose sharply.

In the early 1900s, the closing of the land frontier in most districts of Lower Burma and growing external competition for a slowing international demand for Burma exports, particularly rice, set the stage for the economic dislocations and social tensions that dominated the final decades of British rule. Intensifying competition between Indians and Burmese at virtually all occupational levels and social strata both fed Burmese nationalism and was exacerbated by it. In the early stages of agrarian slowdown, the importance of the India connection was again dramatically and perniciously demonstrated. The handful of British officials who sought to introduce measures for debt relief, the restriction of land alienation and tenancy control in the 1890s and early 1900s were vehemently opposed by both powerful Indian landholding and financial groups within Burma and their allies in India proper. Though Burmese landlords and moneylenders often also opposed agrarian legislation, the financial clout of Indian merchants and moneylenders again and again proved decisive in frustrating reform efforts.²⁰ The decision that in effect brought an end to the salvage efforts was made by the Governor General of India, Lord Minto, not the Governor of Burma, Sir Herbert T. White. And in killing what was to be the last land alienation act introduced before the Great Depression, Minto acted out of concern for the situation in India not in the

interests of the colonized people of Burma. In instructing White to put an end to the struggle to enact agrarian reform legislation, Minto emphasized that:

*Even if the Alienation Act is required in Burma, its introduction would cause a certain amount of uneasiness in other provinces [he specifically referred to the Punjab and Bihar] where similar legislation has been threatened, and it is advisable to avoid anything of this sort at present.*²¹

As it turned out, the agrarian legislation campaign was the last chance for the British to shore up a crumbling peasant proprietor economy. From the late 1890s, smallholder indebtedness, land alienation, rent-racked tenants and rapacious landlords became ever more prevalent features of the colonial economy and social order in Burma. Relative prosperity and communal coexistence gave way to cutthroat competition, increasing communal tensions and, by the late 1920s, communal violence. Because Burma had been twice colonized, Burmese nationalists had to organize the drive for independence at two levels: the first and more studied against the British, the second against the large and powerful Indian immigrant community. The mounting importance of the latter struggle goes far toward explaining first Burmese ambivalence and later their outright hostility toward linking the fate of the Province to an alliance between Burmese parties and the much larger and more highly developed Indian Congress Party. The Indian "problem" was also at the root of incessant factional squabbles about the extent to which Burma should also enjoy the concessions that Gandhi and the Congress politicians were wresting from the British overlords—whether Burma should march in step with India to independence or forge a separate path.²²

By the late 1920s, the popular struggle for independence among the Burman majority had become as much or more anti-Indian than anti-British. This trend is manifested not only in the horrific communal riots that erupted in both urban and rural Burma in 1931 and again in 1938, but also in the widespread anti-Indian assaults that were associated with the series of agrarian uprisings that broke out in the early 1930s. By the last years of British rule, assaults on the Indian community at all social levels had reached epidemic proportions. It is fitting that economic grievances and ethnic hostility are often hard to separate, as in the case of attacks on Indian moneylenders, in determining motives for communal conflict. From the viewpoint of the Burmese peasant or urban worker, the two were inseparable.²³ The fact that Indian policemen and troops were brought in to put down the peasant uprisings and quell the communal riots only served to heighten the Burmese awareness of their double colonization and the growing threat of Indian dominance. From the early 1930s, the restriction of Indian immigration and limitation of Indian economic activities became major rallying points for Burmese nationalist leaders at virtually all points of the political spectrum. As it became increasingly clear that the days of the British colonizers in both India and Burma were numbered, the struggle to reverse the process of Indianization in Burma loomed as large, particularly in the popular mind, as the drive for independence. Abruptly and brutally, the issue was decided by the Japanese invasion of Burma, which brought the death of tens of thousands and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Indians, who followed the British in their

retreat from Burma, and the severing of economic and migratory links between the Province and the subcontinent.

Burma was, of course, not the only British colony to receive large numbers of Indian migrants. But the speed and harshness with which the Indian populations of former colonies like Kenya and Uganda were expelled after independence suggests just how great a threat India posed in the minds of nationalist leaders in areas where the Indian connection had been significant. Because Burma, with a pre-colonial population not much greater than either of these areas, absorbed a far greater number of Indian migrants and was far more dominated by Indian administrators and financiers, the dangers of demographic inundation and cultural extinction were all the more pronounced. Until government records and personal memoirs from the post-colonial era become available, it will be difficult to judge with any precision how much influence these fears had on the Burmese retreat from the world. But in weighing the lingering legacy of the second and infinitely more pervasive wave of colonization, one can do well to remember a cartoon that was included in Thein Maung's highly emotional assessment of *The Indian Immigration Problem in Burma*, which was published in the late 1930s. The caption reads, "Crowded out by the guests, such is the lot of the Burmese." The illustration shows a smallish Burmese in traditional garb perched precariously on the edge of a long bench. The rest of the bench is occupied by six husky foreigners. One is British, one Chinese. The remaining four are clearly Indian.

Notes

1. Robert H. Taylor, *The State In Burma*, Honolulu, 1987, pp. 244-72
2. In fact, Michael Aung Thwin has argued that the main purpose of the retreat into isolation was to allow the Burmese to develop their unique blend of Buddhism and Socialism. See the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (1984).
3. "Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620," *Oriens Extremus* 27:2, pp. 203-26 (1980)
4. These themes were emphasized by anthropologists like David Pfanner and John Brohm who conducted field work in Burma in the "open" 1950s, and by Donald Smith who wrote an early and influential postwar account of religion and politics in Burma.
5. These factors are covered in depth by Oliver B. Pollack, *Empires in Collision*, Westport, Connecticut, 1979, and Charles Keeton, *King Thebaw and the Ecological Rape of Burma*, Delhi, 1974. For a view of the process of conquest and annexation from the perspective of the Burmese court, Maung Htin Aung's *History of Burma*, New York, 1967 remains useful.
6. On the workings of the British alliance systems, see H.H. Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, London, 1920; P.E. Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, London, 1929.
7. *Tracts, Political, Geographical and Commercial: on the Dominions of Ava, and the North Western Parts of Hindustan*, London, 1911, pp. 31, 34

8. *An Account of the Burman Empire*, Calcutta, 1852, p. 57
9. *Government of Burma, Report on the Administration of the Province of Pegu*, 1855-56, Rangoon, 1856, paragraph 237
10. Taylor, *State in Burma*, pp. 111-112, 127
11. *Ibid.*, p. 122
12. *Ibid.*, p. 71
13. Daw Mya Sein, *Administration of Burma: Sir Charles Crosthwaite and the Consolidation of Burma*, Rangoon, 1938, pp. 81-115, 161-75; and Albert Moscotti, *British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma*, Honolulu, 1974, pp. 6-8
14. Albert Moscotti, *British Policy in Burma*, pp. 42-6; and *Government of Burma, The Origins and Causes of the Burma Rebellion (1930-32)*, Rangoon, 1934, pp. 3-6, 15
15. Michael Adas, "The Ryotwari in Lower Burma: The Establishment and Decline of a Peasant Proprietor System," in R.E. Frykenberg, ed., *Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 100-110
16. Cheng Siok-Hwa, *The Rice Industry of Burma 1852-1940*, (Singapore, 1968), p. 201
17. On these developments see Cheng Siok-Hwa, *Rice Economy*, chapters four and seven; and Michael Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852-1941*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1974, chapters four and five.
18. Adas, *Burma Delta* p. 163 and chapter seven
19. *Ibid.*, chapters six and seven
20. The struggle for agrarian reform legislation can be traced in great detail in the special reports and enclosures in the Government of Burma, *Revenue and Agriculture Proceedings*, 1890-1911.
21. India Office Archives, MSS European 254, The Herbert Thirkell White Collection, File 190, my emphasis
22. The intricacies of the final stages of the independence struggle are ably unravelled in Taylor, *State in Burma*, chapter three.
23. On the anti-Indian assaults, see Taylor, *ibid.*; and Adas, *Burma Delta*, chapter eight.

The United States and the Philippines: "Sentimental" Imperialism or Standard Imperialism?

Stephen Rosskamm Shalom

Ever since the late 1960s it has been rare to find any serious observer—and by that I mean anyone who doesn't hold a high position in Washington—who thinks that United States foreign policy has been idyllic. Commentators from a wide range of political perspectives have not been bashful in criticizing U.S. foreign policy. But they have by and large shied away from characterizing U.S. policy as "imperialist." One of these critics has termed the United States "imperial" but not imperialist,¹ another says we are "almost imperialist,"² and a recent book on "the American Experience in Asia" refers to U.S. policy-makers as "sentimental imperialists."³ I will argue here that United States foreign policy, particularly with respect to the Philippines, has been imperialism of the standard sort and that to refer to it as "sentimental" is to misconstrue the history of U.S.-Philippine interactions in particular and to misunderstand the nature of imperialism in general.

The argument for "sentimental imperialism" does not appear in any one place. It consists of a variety of themes that can be summarized roughly as follows. The United States came reluctantly to colonialism; it was not like other colonial powers; the annexation of the Philippine Islands was a "great aberration" in its anti-colonial tradition. It is true that the U.S. behaved paternalistically toward Filipinos, thinking that it knew better than Filipinos themselves what was good for them but, unlike other colonial powers, the U.S. did not exploit its colonial subjects, and indeed it may have brought them some benefits. In any event, however, in 1946 the Philippines was granted its independence and allowed to take its rightful place in the great family of nations. The more astute proponents of the "sentimental imperialism" view concede that aspects of colonial rule continued even after formal independence: the U.S. still treated the Filipinos paternalistically, and it intervened in Philippine internal affairs. But the intervention was not with the aim of exploitation; Washington tried, albeit with little success, to promote uncorrupt and unvenal leaders. Unlike traditional imperialists, the U.S. did not seek its own aggrandizement—after all, its economic stake in the Philippines has been relatively small and Washington has allowed U.S. economic interests in the islands to be threatened and impaired without U.S. intervention. U.S. military bases did infringe in some ways on Philippine sovereignty, but U.S. officials have accepted renegotiation of these rights on the basis of equality. So, yes, there were and continue to be feelings of superiority on the part of Americans toward the Philippines and this might properly be labeled "imperialism." But it has been an imperialism of good intentions not of greed; it has not been the standard kind of imperialism—like that of Britain, France, or the Netherlands—but a "sentimental imperialism."

This, in admittedly oversimplified form, is the "sentimental imperialism" view. There are, of course, refinements and elaborations in this argument, but I think I have accurately conveyed its essential thrust. The problem with this point of view is that it is utterly incorrect. Most histories begin their account of U.S. colonialism with the year 1898. But Henry Cabot Lodge was quite accurate when he declared

three years earlier that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion...unequaled by any people in the nineteenth century."⁴ This was not primarily an overseas expansion, but it was expansion nonetheless. And Lodge was more right than he knew when he replied to critics of annexing the Philippines that if consent of the inhabitants be necessary "then our whole past record of expansion is a crime."⁵ Moreover, concurrent with this great continental expansion, the United States deployed its armed forces overseas some ninety-six times before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.⁶ So 1898 is hardly the "great divide" it is sometimes made out to be.

Turning to 1898, everyone has heard, I am sure, the story of how President William McKinley decided to annex the Philippines only after praying to God on his knees on the White House floor, an event probably not repeated again in American political life until Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger prayed on their knees in the White House after Watergate. Now I do not presume to judge McKinley's relationship with God, nor do I want to comment on the question of whether McKinley really believed God told him to take the Philippines in order to "Christianize" a people, the majority of whom were already Christian. But consider the fact that the purported heavenly advice included the admonition that the United States could not turn the islands over to France or Germany—"our commercial rivals in the Orient"—for "that would be bad business and discreditable."⁷ So McKinley may have been following what he regarded as the will of God, but if so his God, conveniently, was not blind to commercial considerations.

McKinley told Jacob Schurman, head of the first Philippine Commission, that he hadn't wanted to take the Philippines, but that "in the end there was no alternative."⁸ Again, it is not necessary for us to get inside the president's head to ascertain whether his reluctance was genuine. If we take McKinley's many public comments at face value, we see that he had no doubts at all as to the importance of obtaining markets for the exports of U.S. industry nor was he in the least ambivalent toward the immense opportunity for such exports provided by China.⁹ McKinley was determined to secure a foothold in the Western Pacific as a gateway to the China trade; he sought a naval base and coaling station from which the United States could compete in the China market with the other Great Powers, who were themselves at this time seizing strategic points along the Chinese coast. In McKinley's initial view, the port of Manila alone could have served as this naval base, but his advisers warned that Manila could not be held without holding all of the island of Luzon, and Luzon itself would be vulnerable without United States control over the adjacent islands.¹⁰ So if, for McKinley, there was at first some uncertainty as to whether it was necessary to annex the entire archipelago in order to advance U.S. economic interests in China, there was never any question that the furtherance of these economic interests was the crucial determinant of policy.

It has been argued, of course, that the China market was a myth; it never amounted to anything approaching the ecstatic hopes of the business community. This is true, but that does not mean that the expectation of future gain did not motivate United States policy at the turn of the century. No one doubts, for example, that the Ford Motor Company sought profits when it built the Edsel, and the ultimate failure of that automobile is irrelevant in analyzing the motives

for its initial production. Likewise, the ultimate failure of the China market to develop as anticipated in no way invalidates the claim that it was this anticipation that drove much of United States policy in Asia in the early years of the twentieth century. Imperialism does not become "sentimental" because anticipated future benefit was not realized.

My remarks thus far should not be taken to mean that I view United States foreign policy, or imperialism for that matter, as functions strictly of economic factors; rather, I find economic considerations to be the major determinants of U.S. policy.¹¹ In this I take strong issue with the prevailing view, expressed for example by the prominent diplomat and one-time U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, Charles Bohlen, who has written that "our policy is not rooted in any national material interest of the United States, as most foreign policies of other countries in the past have been."¹²

Moreover, in maintaining as I do that economic interests are the major determinants of policy, but not the only ones, I do not hold that the other factors are always as independent of economic concerns as is sometimes suggested. One writer, for example, considers that he has refuted economic explanations of European expansionism because, among the other instances he cites, Upper Burma was seized by Britain not for investment purposes but in order to protect India's frontiers.¹³ Given the indisputable British economic stake in India, however, this is rather like saying that bankers are not motivated by profits because they spend some of their money on vaults instead of lending it out at interest.

The Philippines has, since its initial annexation, played a strategic role for United States policy-makers, whether as the gateway to the China trade or as the military base from which U.S. interests in the entire Southeast Asian area—and, lately, the Persian Gulf as well—could be protected.¹⁴ But, insofar as Washington has perceived a U.S. economic stake in these regions, the bases, and therefore the Philippines, protect an economic interest. So to argue that United States policy in the Philippines has been driven by strategic rather than economic concerns is to miss the point.

Nor does the fact that in 1907 Theodore Roosevelt referred to the Philippines as our "Achilles' heel" affect the argument.¹⁵ That the economic or strategic worth of a territory might later undergo reevaluation does not alter our analysis of the motives for the original acquisition of the territory. For example, in the third quarter of the eighteenth century Britain and Spain judged the Falkland Islands to be a strategic asset and they nearly went to war over them; a few years later, both nations decided that the islands were more liability than asset and quietly withdrew their forces.¹⁶ Did these powers suddenly become sentimental? Or was it simply the fact that calculations of benefit will vary in different circumstances and different times? The doubts regarding the advantages of holding the Philippines in 1907 and later in the 1930s help explain the United States' decision to grant the islands independence; there is no need to attribute this decision to sentimentality. And just as the cool calculation of American interest can explain the steps toward independence, so too does naked interest explain the U.S. acquisition of the islands in 1900 and Washington's attitude toward Philippine bases in the years since 1946. Sentimentality, like divine

intervention, loses its plausibility as an explanatory variable when other, more worldly variables are so clearly operative.

Now some may object that this accounting of economic and strategic interests overlooks the U.S. accomplishments in the fields of public health and education during the period of its colonial rule in the Philippines. But the significance of these accomplishments is rather less than is often supposed.

To begin with, wherever colonial powers have wanted their traders to trade it was necessary to assure that the health environment was adequate for these traders. Thus, when the United States recognized Cuban independence it insisted, through the Platt Amendment, not only on a military base, the right to intervene, and restrictions on Cuba's ability to conclude treaties or incur debts, but also that the sanitation of the cities be maintained.¹⁷ This was not sentimentality.

When the United States acquired the Philippines, the islands already had the most extensive system of education in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ (Note that few have used this fact as evidence of *Spanish* benevolence.) The Philippines also had the most developed nationalist movement in the region, a movement that was demanding, in addition to independence, the establishment of free, public, and secular primary education.¹⁹ And Philippine nationalists did not just demand these things—they fought a war over it. U.S. policy, like the policies of most colonial powers in subjugating their colonies, called for a combination of massive repression and pacification. Education was the key element of the latter; nothing less could serve as the carrot for pacification given the program of the Philippine Republic, as even the U.S. military realized; General Douglas MacArthur, for example, urged a large expenditure on education "primarily and exclusively" as an adjunct to military operations calculated to pacify the people....²⁰ Needless to say, when scholars discussed the possibility of the Soviet Union's using education as part of its pacification program in Afghanistan, "sentimental" was not the first word that came to mind.²¹

Numerous scholars have shown that in qualitative terms U.S. educational policy in the Philippines was unsuccessful.²² Even the quantitative record, however, was not unprecedented for a colonial power in Southeast Asia; Japanese-ruled Formosa (which started the century well behind the Philippines) had about the same fraction of the population in school in 1938 (11.36%) as did the Philippines (11.54%); the figure in independent Thailand was not much lower (10.65%).²³ The other colonies in the region lagged far behind, but there are few who use this as evidence of *Japanese* benevolence or sentimentality.

It would actually have been quite astounding if concern for Filipinos had been the primary motive of the same U.S. officials who in the United States were so conservative, so racist, and so committed to the interests of business; recall that when Taft heard reports that thirty Pullman strikers had been killed in 1894 he hoped it was true; that Root was the lawyer for the Sugar Trust, the Lead Trust, the Whiskey Trust, and the Standard Oil Company, among other worthy clients; and that Theodore Roosevelt argued that the "most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman," not that this should bother anyone because it was "idle to apply to savages the rules of international morality which obtain between stable and cultured communities...."²⁴ Lewis H. Douglass' advice to black Americans seems

of wider relevance here: only the self-deluded, he wrote, could believe that the U.S. government would act more justly ten thousand miles away than it did at home.²⁵

Now some might argue that, although these U.S. officials had rather backward social views, *within the context of these views*, they tried to do what they thought was best for the Filipino. This argument, however, comes very close to being tautological; by the same reasoning, for example, it could be said that Hitler did what he thought was best for Jews, within the context of his view that Jews were subhuman. But in any event, I think a good test of whether actions are sentimentally driven is consistency: lying will often be used to hide self-interest, only rarely to disguise an excess of sentimentality.

The biggest lie of the whole U.S. colonial period in the Philippines was that the United States tutored the Filipinos in self-government, that Filipinos, in the words of a general testifying before the U.S. Senate, had so little notion of what independence meant that they probably thought it was something to eat. "They have no more idea of what it means than a shepherd dog," he explained. But shortly afterward in his testimony, the general stated that the Filipinos "want to get rid of the Americans." "They do?" asked a senator. "Yes, sir," replied the general. "They want us driven out, so that they can have this independence, but they do not know what it is."²⁶ Now I don't quote this interchange merely to ask who seems to have the intelligence of a shepherd dog here. The point is that many have said that U.S. officials, perhaps because of faulty information, truly believed the Filipinos incapable of self-government. But testimony like that I have quoted was available for any who cared to learn what Filipinos thought. Those with the gleam of Chinese markets in their eyes did not care to learn very much.

Nor was this simply a turn-of-the-century myopia. Consider the following scene from the 1945 motion picture *Back to Bataan*. In a 1941 Philippine schoolhouse, the American teacher asks the students what the United States gave to the Philippines. "Soda pop!" "Hot dogs!" "Movies!" "Radio!" "Baseball!" scream the pupils. You might think these were rather sophisticated students, but the teacher and the principal correct the erring youngsters by explaining that the real American contribution was teaching the Filipinos freedom. At first, however, says the teacher with a straight face, the Filipinos did not appreciate freedom for they "resisted the American occupation."²⁷ No, it wasn't the Filipinos who failed to understand freedom; you don't fight a war at a cost of many thousands of lives²⁸ for something that you think you can eat. The notion of freedom was not exported from the United States.²⁹

Of course, the main piece of evidence for the claim that Washington's colonialism was different from that of other nations is the fact that the United States gave the Philippines independence. Whatever U.S. motives may have been in 1898, in 1946 the U.S. flag was pulled down voluntarily.

First of all, however, as I have already noted, deciding that an investment is no longer worthwhile does not thereby make the investor sentimental. Texas Instruments was not sentimental when it decided to stop making home computers and the United States was not sentimental when it decided to end its colonial relation to the Philippines. Texas Instruments found it wasn't making money; Washington found that possession of the Philippines conflicted with the profits

from domestic and Cuban sugar and with the jobs of a heavily-unemployed work force.

The second thing to note about the decision to end colonial rule in the Philippines is that, contrary to the standard mythology, the Philippines was not the first instance of a colony being voluntarily granted its independence. Britain conquered Iraq in World War I and Iraqis assumed—as Filipinos in 1898 had assumed—that they were to be granted independence. Britain waffled on the question, but the outbreak of a major rebellion in 1920 settled the issue from London's point of view; independence was promised for the near future and in 1932 Iraq joined the League of Nations as an independent country. The same pattern was followed in the case of Egypt, which became a League member in 1937. France seemed to be moving along the same path with regard to Syria and Lebanon when World War II took matters out of French hands. And, actually, the United States itself had earlier given independence to an occupied territory: namely, Cuba—conquered in the Spanish-American War and set free in 1902.

Now in each one of these instances, there were serious limitations on independence; these countries were given "independence with strings." As Benjamin Disraeli had put it in 1863, "a colony does not cease to be a colony merely because it becomes independent."³⁰ Iraq, by virtue of a 1930 treaty with Britain that was to last a quarter century, had to give the British access to two military bases, have its armed forces trained by the British, consult with London on foreign policy, and promise mutual aid in time of war. Egypt, by the terms of a 1936 treaty, had to permit British troops to occupy the Suez Canal zone and, in the event of war, had to allow Britain "all facilities and assistance in her power."³¹ And Cuba was made to incorporate into its constitution the Platt amendment giving the United States a military base and the right to intervene and limiting Havana's authority to conclude treaties or incur debts.³²

But this was precisely the kind of independence the Philippines was given in 1946: independence with strings. The United States got military bases and investment privileges, U.S. military advisers were to be detailed to the Philippine armed forces, and the Philippines was limited in the control it had over its currency or in accepting military aid or advice from third parties. Now it might be claimed that these strings were voluntarily accepted by Filipinos and thus not strings at all. But the circumstances were quite typical of imperialism. Economic aid, so desperately needed by a Philippines ravaged by war, was partially tied to Manila's acceptance of a privileged position for U.S. investors. And even then it took parliamentary shenanigans by the Philippine elite, installed in power by the United States at war's end, to clinch passage of the appropriate legislation.³³

Rudolph von Albertini, one of the leading historians of comparative colonialism, has written that, ironically, the United States "did not bring decolonization to an end" in the Philippines "until 1955, several years after the British, Dutch, and French withdrawal from the vast area of South-East Asia!"³⁴ It was only at this point, he suggests, that economic and military relations were settled on a more or less bilateral basis. This is, in fact, a common view among critics of U.S. policy: that while there were vestiges of colonial rule that continued after 1946, these were eliminated in the mid-1950s with the signing of the Laurel-Langley agreement and the re-negotiation of the military bases agreement. But although these agreements removed some of the more blatantly colonial features

of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, these were much more changes of form than substance.

U.S. investment privileges in the Philippines were actually extended under Laurel-Langley, though, for the sake of appearances, Filipinos were given reciprocal rights to invest in the United States, an even-handedness reminiscent of the famous French law that prohibited rich and poor alike from sleeping beneath bridges. With regard to the military bases, in 1956 the United States announced that it recognized Philippine sovereignty over the facilities. The essential function of the bases, however, never changed; these bases were, in the words of one Defense Department official in 1962, the "cornerstones of any U.S. staging of military operations to the west or southwest;" these bases provided the main logistical support for the massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In 1972, after sixteen years of amendments and adjustments to the bases agreement, United States authorities could still note that "nowhere in the world are we able to use our military bases with less restrictions than we do in the Philippines."³⁵

It has been argued that overseas investment and trade are too small an economic stake to have any considerable influence on United States foreign policy, so while there may be some unfortunate behavior by the United States in the Philippines and elsewhere, this behavior cannot have been motivated by economic concerns. According to this view, whatever its absolute magnitude, foreign business activity constitutes a relatively minor fraction of the U.S. economy as a whole. This is even more strikingly the case, it is argued, if one compares profits from U.S. investments in the Third World to total corporate profits—both domestic and foreign. This argument, however, is deeply misleading in a number of different ways. Those who adhere to this argument have many differences among themselves, but they all are critical of the radical view of U.S. imperialism, so for convenience, I shall refer to them as "the critics."

To show the flaws in the argument of the critics, I propose to do the following. First, I will demonstrate that the overseas operations of U.S. corporations are of considerable importance to the dominant economic institutions of the United States. Second, I will propose that the high overlap in personnel, motivation, and ideology between government and economy leads government policy-makers to share the corporate concern for the well-being of foreign investment and trade. And, third, I will examine some of the counter-arguments typically raised by the critics.

To begin with, there is the question of how one is to evaluate the importance of the, say, 5 percent of economic activity that originates overseas. According to the critics, one must simply conclude that the U.S. economy does not depend upon assuring itself access to foreign markets for investment or trade; a 5 percent reduction in the Gross National Product would not cause the demise of the United States. But, it is one thing to say that foreign markets are not necessary for the survival of U.S. capitalism and another thing entirely to assert that, therefore, foreign markets are unimportant or of little concern to the corporations that are the backbone of the economy. Corporations are profit-maximizers, and they try to maximize 100 percent of their profits, not just 95 percent of them. Any corporate manager who was unconcerned about 5 percent of potential profits

would be ousted by the stockholders immediately, for the latter are considerably less sanguine about 5 percent cuts in earnings than are the critics.

One of the critics has written that the economic stake in the Third World "is not a matter of life and death for the American economy but only a cruel convenience."³⁶ Observe the dichotomy: either a "matter of life and death" or a "convenience." The word "convenience" suggests that corporations have a "take it or leave it" attitude toward their foreign operations. But if so, then this is a 5 percent unlike any other 5 percent of corporate activity. To get some feel for how important 5 percent is to corporations, one need only consider how likely they would be to do any of the following, even under considerable public pressure: (1) lower prices 5 percent without lowering production costs; (2) raise wages 5 percent without raising prices; (3) slow down the speed of an assembly line by 5 percent; or (4) rehire during a period of high unemployment the 5 percent of the work force that had been laid off. Merely to mention these possibilities points up their absurdity. Profits are not pursued casually. As foreign bribes—in the Philippines, Japan, and most everywhere else—pollution, industrial accidents, deceptive advertising, price fixing, and countless other practices attest, profits are sought after with a vengeance. And this means the full 100 percent of profits, for notice that rarely have any of the listed practices been a "matter of life and death" for the firms involved. So although "only" 5 percent of sales or investment may take place overseas, one can expect corporations to pursue this 5 percent with the same vigor with which they try to maximize the profits from any another 5 percent of their operations.

In calculating the actual magnitude of foreign economic activity, some fundamental errors have been made by those who minimize the overseas economic stake. Let me briefly consider some of these errors here.

One critic has stated that U.S. exports in 1968 were only 4 percent of the Gross National Product.³⁷ But, if one is interested in determining the value of foreign markets to the U.S. economy, the relevant figure is not exports, but the sum of exports and the sales of U.S. overseas subsidiaries (subtracting, to avoid double counting, exports of U.S. corporations to their foreign affiliates, and excluding subsidiaries' sales to the U.S.). When such a calculation is performed, one finds that total foreign sales in 1968 accounted for 13 percent of GNP—a rather substantial fraction. And the percentage has increased since 1968.³⁸ Moreover, the proper comparison for merchandise exports is not GNP, which sums the production of goods and services, but total goods produced. Even ignoring the sales of foreign affiliates, exports accounted for 8 percent of all U.S. goods produced in 1968, and have grown to one seventh of goods produced in recent years.³⁹

According to one of the critics, income on foreign investment in 1968 was only 5.6 percent of total corporate profits for 1968 and the income from developing nations was only 3.2 percent of total profits.⁴⁰ These statistics, however, suffer from a number of faulty comparisons. First the foreign income figures are just for repatriated interest, dividends, and branch earnings. This omits reinvested earnings, which are, however, included in total corporate income. To this should be added the royalties and fees resulting from direct investment. These are considered by the Commerce Department to be part of the benefits of direct

investment ownership, and for many firms they provide a disguised means of transferring earnings, since they are subject to different tax and remittance laws.⁴¹

The second error is considering foreign income and total corporate income to be measuring the same kind of thing because both are before U.S. taxes. But overseas earnings are not taxed at the full U.S. tax rate because of credit given for foreign taxes already paid. The effective (or actual) U.S. tax rate on profits earned abroad is between 3 and 10 percent⁴² compared to 40-45 percent on total corporate earnings. When all these corrections are made, we find that after U.S.-tax foreign earnings in 1968 were, conservatively speaking, 15 percent of total after-tax corporate profits. For developing countries, after-tax profits were 6 percent of total after-tax profits. And both figures have generally been higher since 1968.⁴³

Finally, it should be noted that the foreign income figures that I have been discussing here are all income from "direct investment:" that is, investments in which U.S. firms have a controlling interest or an important management voice. In 1960 other private investment income amounted to about one-sixth of direct investment income; in 1970 it was about a third, in 1980 about 90 percent, and by 1986 it *exceeded* direct investment income by almost a quarter.⁴⁴

A number of critics have made the point that income from foreign investment amounts to only one-third of 1 percent of the Gross National Product.⁴⁵ This, however, is a meaningless comparison for it compares profits with sales. By the same logic one could conclude that profits as a whole are irrelevant to the capitalist system since total after-tax corporate profits are typically only about 5 percent of GNP.

Thus far I have assumed that official Commerce Department figures were accurate. Let me indicate, however, at least one way in which these figures are likely to be inaccurate. By means of the accounting technique known as "transfer-pricing," corporations are able to shift their *reported* assets and profits from country to country in order to maximize worldwide profits. In one particularly dramatic instance, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in Colombia was able to report profits that were one twenty-fourth its actual profits, but there is other, less extreme, evidence from many other countries.⁴⁶ Most analysts have concluded that reported profit rates on foreign investment bear little relation to the actual rates.⁴⁷

Consider now the objection that the United States has a much more substantial economic stake in the developed countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan than in the Third World. It is certainly true that U.S. overseas investment is concentrated in the industrialized nations and that the major U.S. trading partners are developed countries. Thus, no one would dispute the fact that were the United States faced, for example, with the choice between safeguarding its investments in Canada or Columbia it would choose the former. But this formulation is exactly the opposite of the problem as perceived by U.S. policy-makers. That is to say, from Washington's point of view it is not a question of *either* the developed countries or the less developed countries, but rather of *both* or *neither*. As former ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer put it, "no clear line exists between our very immediate interests in the security and stability of the advanced nations (such as those of Europe, Japan, and Australia) and conditions in the less developed world."⁴⁸ The best illustration of this view is the

attitude of U.S. officials to the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia in the 1950s.

In a very literal sense, Japan's economic survival has required foreign trade. Geography and complementarity made China the natural trading partner for Japan; United States officials feared, however, that any Japanese dependence upon trade with China might lead to political accommodation between the two nations and Japan would be lost to the "Free World." Accordingly, Washington had to assure Japan access to other markets, and Southeast Asia was considered to be the natural choice. This meant that the United States had to prevent Southeast Asia from becoming dominated by China or even from choosing to develop along autarkic lines which might deny a major role to trade with Japan.

By the mid-1960s, of course, the situation had changed. Washington found that by assuring the economic viability of Japan it had permitted Tokyo to escape its subordination to the United States and to become a major economic competitor. "What did we really win" in World War II? complained a member of Congress regarding Japanese textile imports.⁴⁹ But during the 1950s, United States policy-makers held the view that it was crucial to secure markets for Japan in Southeast Asia and the evidence showing that this was so is overwhelming.⁵⁰ So the argument that the U.S. has no serious economic interests in the Third World nations of Southeast Asia because Japan is many times more important is simply beside the point.⁵¹ It was precisely in order to preserve Japan within the "Free World" orbit that it was felt necessary to keep Southeast Asia fully integrated into the world capitalist economic system.

So far I have been considering the United States economy as a whole. But as William Appleman Williams has observed, the importance to the economy of overseas activities "depends less upon gross percentages than upon the role in the American economy of the industries which do depend in significant ways (including raw materials as well as markets) on foreign operations."⁵² When one examines this aspect of the question, one finds that foreign activities are concentrated among the largest U.S. firms,⁵³ and that to the largest firms their foreign activities are extremely significant.⁵⁴

If this is to have any implications for U.S. foreign policy, of course, it is necessary to show that government policy-makers share the view of corporate leaders. There has been extensive documentation of the fact that key foreign policy positions in Washington are, to a considerable degree, filled by corporate executives or by lawyers who serve the large corporations.⁵⁵ There are, to be sure, differences between the Democrats and the Republicans in this regard. Where the Republicans had as Secretary of Defense, for example, Charles Wilson, the head of General Motors, the Democrats had Robert McNamara, the president of Ford.

There has also been ample documentation of the fact that elected officials depend heavily on the campaign contributions of the corporate sector in order to secure office,⁵⁶ giving us, in Will Rogers' phrase, the best government that money can buy.

But the central issue is not where the policy-makers or their money comes from, but what the views of the policy-makers are. And on this point as well there is abundant evidence to show that the desire to preserve and extend

opportunities for private enterprise abroad has been a constant and important component of the official worldview.⁵⁷

In fact, it is so fundamental an attitude for U.S. officials that it is taken as a self-evident virtue, with any who doubt its automatic character thought to be either deranged or totalitarian. Thus, a Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee explained that "political questions don't really enter into the discussion inasmuch as the goal we all seek is a better climate for investment generally, to reduce the money we have got to budget for foreign aid."⁵⁸ In 1953, a high level report to the National Security Council explaining why U.S. oil companies should not be prosecuted for anti-trust violations abroad stated that U.S. officials "seek to make the point that freedom of competitive enterprise is the economic counterpart of the concept of freedom of the individual in the political and social spheres. We have sought to lead the way toward a wider acceptance of the American way of life...."⁵⁹ Or consider the words of an academic who has served as an adviser to the U.S. government in a book on U.S.-Philippine relations sponsored by the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations:

*The United States has always emphasized the primary role of private enterprise in economic affairs. During the Commonwealth period and immediately after World War II, this had meant, in practice, continuous efforts to protect the economic interests of American residents in the Philippines and the investments that American individuals and corporations had made there. Such a policy requires no justification insofar as it is an expression of the fundamental assumptions of a free society.*⁶⁰

Some of the critics have themselves essentially made the same point I have. No doubt they do not think they have conceded anything, but they have in fact accepted the central argument of those who describe U.S. foreign policy as imperialist--not sentimental imperialism, but standard imperialism. Thus, according to one of the critics, "The national interest is not to protect individual American firms but to preserve a system of business. ...The American empire expresses its presence and exercises its influence through the capitalist mode of operation for which it keeps as much of the world 'open' as possible."⁶¹ One critic has approvingly quoted the words of another that what was threatened in Vietnam was not the physical security of the United States, but

*the security of an economic and social system dependent upon the fruits conferred by America's hegemonic position. A world in which others controlled the course of their own development, and America's hegemonic position was broken, would be a world in which the American system itself would be seriously endangered.*⁶²

The critics have been quick to add that the belief in democracy has been as much a part of the official U.S. worldview as the belief in capitalism.⁶³ Now, while it might be true that, all other things being equal, U.S. policy-makers prefer U.S. client states with free elections to U.S. client states without free elections, it is certainly not the case that the U.S. commitment to democracy has run very deep. Guatemala in 1954, Vietnam in 1956, and Chile in 1973 are just a few examples of

the less than compelling hold that the belief in free elections has had on U.S. officials. And when a vice-president of the United States can tell Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines in 1981 that "We love your adherence to democratic principle,"⁶⁴ the true meaning of the U.S. belief in democracy stands exposed.

The critics have tried to refute the claim that the United States is imperialist by pointing to what they consider to be decisive counter-examples: instances where a foreign government has nationalized some U.S.-owned assets but yet where Washington did not intervene against, and may even have tolerated, the government in question. This line of argument, however, confuses the contention that the United States is imperialist with the very different view that the United States is both imperialist and omnipotent.⁶⁵ If the latter were claimed, then U.S. acceptance of any diminution of its global hegemony would indeed constitute decisive counter-evidence. But, in the real world where there are obvious limits to U.S. power and to the U.S. ability to control events, such examples may be either consistent or inconsistent with the imperialism thesis—consistent if the U.S. course of action was the one out of the available and possible courses of action most likely to maximize the opportunities for investment and trade; and inconsistent if there was a feasible alternative that was likely to do more for investment and trade. Thus, the imperialism thesis does not require that Washington accomplish the impossible, only that government officials choose that course of action from among the feasible actions best calculated to promote economic interests.

The critics have rarely bothered to examine any of their alleged counter-examples in this regard, evidently content to note the U.S. non-intervention. The critics have pointed to a number of instances in which both U.S. government policy-makers and corporate officials have concluded that economic interests would not be best served by Washington's involvement in corporate disputes with indigenous governments.⁶⁶ Such instances certainly disprove that the United States was all-powerful, but they do not disprove the economic motivation of U.S. foreign policy; on the contrary, they show only a different appreciation of how economic interests might best be served.

Consider one case in the Philippines. Harry Stonehill was an American soldier who stayed in the islands after World War II and amassed a large fortune. In 1962, he was deported from the Philippines without any public outcry from the U.S. embassy, proof—according to one scholar—that the United States was not following an imperialist or neocolonial foreign policy.⁶⁷ But no one has suggested that the U.S. government will seek to protect every individual American. Rather, Washington tries to defend U.S. investors in general and it clearly would have been contrary to the interests of these investors as a whole for the U.S. embassy to openly intervene on behalf of someone universally known to have engaged in widespread illegal activity.⁶⁸ Consider the following analogy: did it disprove the thesis that big business had disproportionate influence in U.S. politics when Al Capone was arrested by government agents?

It is, incidentally, not at all unprecedented for the U.S. government and U.S. businesses to oppose the flagrant abuses of power by a single U.S. enterprise that worsens the business climate for U.S. corporations in general. In Peru, for example, the majority of U.S. business interests opposed calls for imposing sanctions on Peruvian sugar in retaliation for the expropriation of the U.S.-owned

International Petroleum Company; the oil company's behavior was viewed as excessive by most U.S. firms and the Peruvian government remained generally supportive of foreign investment.⁶⁹

Another critic has charged that the imperialism thesis explains both U.S. intervention and U.S. non-intervention, and by explaining everything in fact explains nothing at all.⁷⁰ This claim, however, suffers from a serious confusion. It is obviously improper to consider a theory to be *confirmed* by a crucial piece of evidence regardless of whether the evidence shows A or not-A to be true. Thus, the fact of U.S. non-intervention cannot be taken as proof of U.S. imperialism—but then no one has ever made this argument. It is another thing entirely for a theory to be able to *account* for both A and not-A; this all theories do. Thus, Newtonian mechanics can explain why some objects are moving and why others are at rest. Likewise, there is no inconsistency in a theory of imperialism that explains why the United States intervenes in some cases and not in others. Indeed, any sensible theory of U.S. foreign policy would have to do this. One scholar has done a study that shows there to be a rather small relationship between the amount of U.S. foreign investment in a country and whether the United States has intervened in that country.⁷¹ But this is like looking for a correlation between a bank's assets and whether the police were sent to the bank. Surely the police are not dispatched to banks whose assets are highest but to those whose assets are threatened. Likewise it would be a foolish imperialism indeed that in 1965 sent the U.S. Marines to Mexico rather than to the Dominican Republic merely because the investment stake was greater in Mexico.

Another critic has argued that the imperialism thesis "overpredicts" in that it would have predicted U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1953-54, Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, Laos in 1961-62, Iraq in 1958, and Chile in 1970-71.⁷² But the imperialism thesis does not predict that the United States will intervene whenever its interests are threatened—any more than Newtonian mechanics predicts that an object will invariably move in the direction of an applied force. Before predicting in the latter case, one would have to know whether there were countervailing forces and so on. Likewise, one has to know the costs and benefits of intervention in any particular instance; only then can one evaluate the actual imperialism thesis: namely, that the U.S. will intervene whenever so doing appears to U.S. policy-makers the best course for furthering economic interests.⁷³

In the Vietnam case referred to, Washington considered direct intervention, rejected it as impractical,⁷⁴ and settled for military aid and covert assistance to the French. In the Laos case, the U.S. undertook small-scale intervention and threatened large-scale intervention unless the Pathet Lao offensive was halted—which it was.⁷⁵ U.S. covert operations were conducted against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs⁷⁶ and, as is now well known, in Chile throughout the Allende years.⁷⁷

As for Iraq in 1958, the United States and Britain sent troops to adjoining Lebanon and Jordan, but judged that there was no one in Iraq who could lead counter-action, and that, in light of the Iraqi government's assurances of friendliness to the West and to Western oil interests, the best that could be done was to attempt to work with the new regime.⁷⁸ Significantly, following these assurances—which were not necessarily unrelated to the presence of the U.S. troops in Lebanon—shares of the oil companies with Iraqi investments rose

briskly on the London stock market. And the major foreign oil firm in Iraq soon announced its intention to expand its operations there.⁷⁹

Certainly in none of these instances was the U.S. failure to intervene due to an excess of sentimentality. Washington has overthrown governments, dispatched large numbers of troops overseas, conducted military operations against civilian populations, and plotted the assassination of foreign leaders: none of these actions is symptomatic of hyper-sentimentality. To take a single example among many that could be cited, in 1954 in Manila, the CIA station chief and the U.S. ambassador discussed the possibility of killing Philippine nationalist politician Claro Recto. The plans proceeded far enough that a vial of poison was prepared for the job, but ultimately the idea was dropped, not for sentimental or moral reasons, but on "pragmatic grounds."⁸⁰

One of the critics has remarked that those who see economic factors behind United States foreign policy might have a "psychic need to believe that American grownups are inherently evil."⁸¹ One can only wonder what motivates those who view U.S. policy-makers as sentimental.

Notes

1. Jerome Slater, "Is United States Foreign Policy 'Imperialist' or 'Imperial'?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 91:1, Spring 1976
2. Michael Harrington, "The Almost-Imperialism," In: *Toward a Democratic Left*, Penguin, Baltimore, 1969; but cf Harrington's *The Vast Majority*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1977, pp. 102-128, esp. p. 125
3. James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*, Harper & Row, New York, 1981. Likewise, see Henry Pachter, "The Problem of Imperialism," In: *Dissent*, Sept.-Oct. 1970, p. 462, who uses the term "imperialism" but is careful to specify that he is referring to an imperialism that results from folly or from "the willful extravaganza of idealistic dreamers" rather than from the inherent structures of U.S. capitalism.
4. Quoted in Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Schenkman, 1972, p. 32
5. Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Philippine Islands," In: *American Imperialism in 1898*, Theodore Greene, ed., D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1955, p. 72. This was a common theme among those who favored annexation of the Philippines; thus Beveridge: "The Declaration of Independence applies to all men? How dare we, then, deny its application to the American Indians?" (quoted in Claude G. Bowes, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, Houghton Mifflin, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1932, p. 131).
6. See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, *Situation in Cuba*, Hearings, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 Sept. 1962, pp. 80-87, for a list of "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad." For discussion of pre-1898 U.S. expansionism, see Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1960.

7. Charles S. Olcott, *Life of William McKinley*, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1916, vol. 2, pp. 109-11, citing *Christian Advocate*, Jan. 22, 1903
8. Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1959, p. 344. McKinley alleged that he hadn't even known where the Philippines was before Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet there; in fact, however, both Theodore Roosevelt and Orville Platt had earlier discussed with the president the significance of Manila. See Thomas J. McCormick, *The China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901*, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1967, p. 107.
9. See Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963; McCormick, *China Market*. Thomson, Stanley, and Perry (*Sentimental Imperialists*, p. 102) state that the argument that overseas markets were needed to solve the problems of the U.S. economy, both "as an analysis of the economy and as a prescription for its future" was "wrong," and "was widely understood, or at least suspected, to be wrong at the time." LaFeber and McCormick provide a great deal of evidence that government and business leaders thought the argument to be correct; Thomson, Stanley, and Perry give none to support their contrary view.
10. LaFeber, *New Empire*, p. 411; Leech, *Days of McKinley*, pp. 326-27, 331-32, 339-41.
11. Racism has surely been another important factor in U.S. foreign policy. While many were attracted by the economic potential of the Philippines and Asia, others saw the islands as a place to send the United States' unwanted black population. See Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898-1903*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1975, pp. 301-08.
12. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, *At War with Asia*, Pantheon, New York, 1969, p. 111. Thomson, Stanley, and Perry (*Sentimental Imperialists*, pp. 103-04) claim that to understand U.S. imperialism we have to look beyond economics to social psychology. Projecting U.S. power abroad would secure not just markets "but social discipline and a restoration of national purpose." They then cite the views of Captain Alfred Mahan who felt that unless the masses accepted the great challenge of expansionism they would move toward rebellion and socialism. But opposition to socialism is hardly a non-economic explanation of imperialism; it was in fact precisely one of the motivations for imperialism advanced by Lenin, specifically with respect to British imperialism and the views of Cecil Rhodes. (V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, International Publishers, New York, 1939, p. 79)
13. D.K. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism': An Historical Revision," In: *Economic Imperialism: A Book of Readings*, Kenneth E. Boulding and Tapan Mukerjee, eds., University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1972, p. 106. A later work by Fieldhouse is, in my view, no more convincing on this matter. He writes "Thus...I suggest that the desire of French merchants to establish a direct trade with China via the Red River was a genuinely 'economic'

phenomenon; but that the military and administrative obstacles put in the way by China and Annam were 'political' factors and that French use of an army to remove these obstacles constituted 'political' action. It may be argued that if military action of this sort were intended to produce an economic benefit it is misleading to describe it as a 'political' act. Yet in my view it remains desirable to distinguish between the inherent character of the means and ends. Contemporaries certainly did so." (*Economics and Empire, 1830-1914*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1973, p.491n1) Likewise, the debate occasioned by Ronald Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny's *Africa and the Victorians* (Macmillan, London, 1961)—while important for an understanding of British colonial policy in Africa—is actually irrelevant to the question of economic factors in British foreign policy. If the critics of the book are correct, African colonies were seized for direct economic benefit. If, on the other hand, the authors are correct, "the decisive motive behind late-Victorian strategy in Africa was to protect the all-important stakes in India and the East" (p. 464). Either way, then, British policy was motivated by economic concerns.

14. On the purpose of the bases, see Walden Bello, "Springboards for Intervention, Instruments for Nuclear War," *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no. 89, Apr. 1983.
15. This may not have been Roosevelt's last word on the subject, however. W. Cameron Forbes has stated that Roosevelt indicated that he would "unquestionably advocate the retention" of the Philippines if the U.S. gave no promise of independence and built up sufficient armaments. (*The Philippine Islands*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1928, vol. 2, pp. 344-45)
16. See J.H. Parry, *Trade and Dominion: The European Overseas Empires in the Eighteenth Century*, Praeger, New York, 1971, pp. 131-32.
17. Of course, epidemics were more likely to spread to the United States from Cuba than from the Philippines. See on the Platt Amendment, David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963, pp. 150-78.
18. J.S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia*, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1943, p. 44. In the words of Leonard Wood, "We have come here with the work largely done.... I believe that we have the easiest Eastern colonial problem which has ever been presented to any Christian people." (letter to Roosevelt, 18 Nov. 1906, quoted in Oscar M. Alfonso, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines, 1897-1909*, University of the Philippines Press, Quezon City, 1970, pp. 16-17n35)
19. See article 23 of the Malolos Constitution in Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, Quezon University of the Philippines, City, 1960, p. 767.
20. Quoted by Prescott F. Jernegan in *Census of the Philippine Islands*, taken under the direction of the Philippine Commission in the year 1903, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1905, vol. 3, p. 640

21. See, for example, Thomas T. Hammond, "Will the Soviets Pull Out of Afghanistan?" *Survey*, vol. 27(118/119), Autumn/Winter 1983, p. 244.
22. See, e.g., Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut, 1980.
23. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia*, pp. 106-07. In the Philippines, Formosa, and Thailand, the fraction of students who were female was about the same p. 108); the Philippines was the clear leader only in terms of higher education (p. 109). The per capita expenditure on education was 50 percent higher in Formosa in 1938 than in the Philippines (calculated from p. 112).
24. Taft quoted in William J. Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia*, International Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 139; Root background given in Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p.178; Roosevelt quoted in Alfonso, *Roosevelt and the Philippines*, p. 20. It has been argued that Roosevelt's views were not true "racism" because he "attributed differences of 'race' to acquired characteristics and to the effect of geographic environment" and "he did not regard the 'backward people' as permanently or inherently inferior" (Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1956, pp. 30-31) and thus he was "anything but racist in the anthropological sense." (James A. Field Jr., "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book," *American Historical Review*, vol. 83:3, 649, 1978) That Roosevelt was willing to rationalize genocide seems to me to make the question of whether he was racist "in the anthropological sense" quite beside the point.
25. Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War 1899-1902*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1979, p. 111. Lewis was the son of Frederick Douglass.
26. U.S. Senate Committee on the Philippines, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, Hearings, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902, pp. 581-82
27. *Back to Bataan*, 1945, screenplay by Ben Barzman and Richard H. Landau, original story by Aneas MacKenzie and William Gordon, directed by Edward Dmytryk, RKO Radio Pictures. Script is in the film library of the Library of Congress.
28. In a letter to the *New York Review of Books*, 4 March 1982, p. 44, I carelessly suggested that 10 percent of Filipinos had died during the Philippine-American War. There are no reliable figures on the matter, but the toll is more likely to have been 3-4 percent of the population, still enough to make it one of the bloodiest wars on record.
29. The notion that freedom is a "western" concept imported into the Third World from the colonial countries is one of the most insidious elements of neocolonial consciousness. For an early refutation of this view with respect to Africa, see Thomas L. Hodgkin, "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States," In: *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations*, J. Roland

- Pennock, ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1964; and a recent study of the non-Western origins of democracy is Raul S. Manglapus, *Will of the People*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1987.
30. Speech in the House of Commons, 5 Feb. 1863
31. On Iraq, see Henry A. Foster, *The Making of Modern Iraq*, Russell & Russell, New York, 1935 (reissued 1972). For the text of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, see Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, pp. 253-67.
32. As Leonard Wood confided to Roosevelt, "There is, of course, little or no independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment." (Healy, *United States in Cuba*, p. 178)
33. For details, see Stephen R. Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism*, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1981, chapter 2.
34. Rudolph von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960*, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, NY, 1971, p. 487
35. See Shalom, *United States and the Philippines*, pp. 93-101, for details and citations.
36. Harrington, "Almost-Imperialism," p. 188. See also Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism*, Basic Books, New York, 1973, p. 141.
37. S.M. Miller, Roy Bennett, and Cyril Alapatt, "Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism?" *Social Policy*, Sept.-Oct. 1970, pp. 14-15. Also Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1974, p. 37; Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1971, p. 134
38. See Table 1.
39. This calculation is suggested by Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, pp. 177-78; and Edwin L. Dale, Jr., *New York Times*, 16 Nov. 1975, Sec. 3, p. 17. See Table 2.
40. Miller, Bennett, and Alapatt, "Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism?" pp. 14-15. Slater, "Imperialist or Imperial," p. 68, gets his figures from this source.
41. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (hereafter SCB), Oct. 1971, p. 36; Michael Z. Brooke and H. Lee Remmers, *The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise: Organization and Finance*, Elsevier Publishing Co., New York, 1970, p. 161
42. For estimates within this range, see the testimony of former Treasury official Stanford G. Ross in U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Involvement of U.S. Private Enterprise in Developing Countries*, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 26; a 1962 Internal Revenue Service study cited in Thomas E. Weisskopf, "United States Foreign Private Investment: An Empirical Study," In: *The Capitalist System*, Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich and

- Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972, p. 428n3; and the government studies cited in the testimony of AFL-CIO officials in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy*, Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, part 13, pp. 83, 111.
43. See Tables 3 and 4.
 44. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83* (hereafter *SA*), p. 820; *SA*, 1988, p. 756. Adding royalties and fees to the direct investment income does not change the result.
 45. Miller, Bennett, and Alapatt, "Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism?" pp. 14-15; Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, p. 37
 46. See Sanjaya Lall, "Transfer-Pricing by Multinational Manufacturing Firms," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 35:3, Aug. 1973; Clyde Farnsworth, "Tax Loophole for Multinationals," *New York Times*, 21 Aug. 1977, Sec. 3, pp. 1, 9; U.S. Comptroller General, *IRS Could Better Protect U.S. Tax Interests in Determining the Income of Multinational Corporations*, General Accounting Office, GGD-81-81, Sept. 30, 1981.
 47. Brooke and Remmers, *Strategy of Multinational Enterprise*, p. 119; Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1974, pp. 18-19; Raymond Vernon, *Restrictive Business Practices: The Operations of Multinational United States Enterprises in Developing Countries, Their Role in Trade and Development*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 1972, pp. 18-19. Commerce Dept. data on assets, too, are inadequate due to transfer-pricing and the fact that the data report historic book value rather than market or replacement value.
 48. In *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy*, Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., Harper Colophon, New York, 1968, p. 269. I omit here consideration of one respect in which developing nations are more important than the developed nations: namely, as a source of raw materials.
 49. U.S. House Appropriations Committee, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1972*, Hearings, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 1971, part 2, p. 338
 50. **Prestigious study groups:** Staff of the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution, *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1952-53*, Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 289; *Staff Papers Presented to the U.S. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy*, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1954, pp. 251-54; Study Group Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association, *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1955, p. 135. **Official public statements:** *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 382-83; U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Mutual Security Program*, Hearings, 82nd Congress, 1st

Session, 1951, p. 916; *Mutual Security Act of 1956*, Hearings, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, p. 243; *Mutual Security Act of 1958*, Hearings, 85th Congress 2nd Session, 1958, p. 1198; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific*, Hearings, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952, pp. 11-12, 28; *Mutual Security Act of 1954*, Hearings, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 219. **Private statements:** U.S. Dept. of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers*, Sen. Gavel Edition, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971, vol. 1, pp. 375, 386, 436, 450; Council on Foreign Relations, Study Group Reports, Japanese Peace Treaty Problems, digest of discussion, 23 Oct. 1950, in John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University: "Opening Statement by Secretary Dulles before the First Closed Session of the Bangkok Conference, February 23, 1955," in Dulles Papers; Dean Acheson to all Diplomatic and ECA Far East Missions (including South Asia), 21 Dec. 1951, Subject: Relationship with Japan and Production of Essential Materials, in Myron M. Cowen Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; Dept. of State, "Urgency of Tariff Negotiations to Increase Japan's Trade," 18 June 1954, p. 3, in Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Official File, OF 149-B-2, Apr. 1955). For many additional citations and further discussion, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, pp. 99-100, 105; John W. Dower, "The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan In and Out of the Pentagon Papers," In: Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, eds., *The Pentagon Papers*, Sen. Gavel Edition, Vol. 5, Critical Essays, Beacon Press, Boston, 1972; Noam Chomsky, *For Reasons of State*, Vintage, New York, 1973, pp. 39-42; Frederick S. Dunn et al., *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963, pp. 145, 149; Jerome B. Cohen, *Economic Problems of Free Japan*, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, Memorandum No. 2, 1952, p. 84; Carl Oglesby in Carl Oglesby and Richard Schaul, *Containment and Change*, Macmillan, New York, 1967, pp. 123-29; Chomsky, *At War with Asia*, pp. 33-36; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p. 795n22; Hernando J. Abaya, *The Untold Philippine Story*, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1967, pp. 54-55; Robert Pringle, *Indonesia and the Philippines: American Interests in Island Southeast Asia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980, pp. 134-38.

51. The critics have been singularly unconvincing in dealing with this argument. One says merely that the argument is not very persuasive and provides no evidence or counter-argument (Cohen, *Question of Imperialism*, pp. 126-7). Another states that citation of the views of policy-makers "provides no more than conviction, and a mistaken conviction at that" (Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 116, 117n). But, just as with the matter of the China market, conviction is the very heart of the question.
52. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Delta, New York, rev. ed., 1962, p. 45. Pachter ("The Problem of Imperialism," p. 477) states that foreign operations benefit only a few firms or industries, and then reports that "nearly half of the hundred biggest corporations in the United States depend for a sizeable part of their dividends on foreign

- sources." This hardly makes the corporate stake in overseas business seem marginal.
53. See United Nations, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, *Multinational Corporations in World Development*, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 5; House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Involvement of U.S. Private Enterprise...*, 57; Vernon, *Restrictive Business Practices*, p. 2; AFL-CIO, "Trade Union's View of International Trade and Investment," In: U.S. Senate Finance Committee, *Multinational Corporations: A Compendium of Papers*, Committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, p. 69.
 54. See U.S. Senate Finance Committee, *Multinational Corporations*, Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, p. 410; and the various industry submissions in *Multinational Corporations: A Compendium of Papers*.
 55. See, e.g., Kolko, *Roots of American Foreign Policy*, chap. 1; G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles*, Vintage, New York, 1970, chap. 5; Thomas Graham Paterson, "The Economic Cold War: American Business and Economic Foreign Policy, 1945-1950," Ph.D., Berkeley, 1968, pp. 1-55; John C. Donovan, *The Cold Warriors: A Policy Making Elite*, Lexington, D.C. Heath, Massachusetts, 1974, esp. pp. 284-85; David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W. Doig, *Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1967; Dean E. Mann with James W. Doig, *The Assistant Secretaries: Problems and Processes of Appointment*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1965; G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America Now?*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983, pp. 136-43. Bloomfield (*In Search of American Foreign Policy*, p. 55) criticizes Kolko's data because it stops in 1960, thereby omitting "the very period when the consensus began springing leaks, the time when members of the inner group themselves often became the critics." Leaky consensus, of course, is irrelevant to the matter of the background of policy-makers. But, in any case, the internal disagreement was tactical; the consensus regarding the U.S. right to intervene whenever it chose remained intact. For example, prominent dove George Ball opposed escalation in Vietnam not for any principled reasons but because the U.S. could not win and because there was a significant possibility of war with the Soviet Union or China. (Dept. of Defense, *Pentagon Papers*, Vol. 4, pp. 51, 615-16)
 56. G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America Now?*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967, pp. 84-96, 122-26; G. William Domhoff, *Fat Cats and Democrats*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972, chaps 1-2; George Thayer, *Who Shakes the Money Tree?*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1973; David Nichols, *Financing Elections*, New Viewpoints, New York, 1974; Alexander Heard, *The Costs of Democracy*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1960; Delmar D. Dunn, *Financing Presidential Campaigns*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972
 57. See the extensive evidence collected in Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*; Richard J. Barnet, *The Roots of War*, Penguin, Baltimore, 1972, pp. 137-205; Kolko and Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, chap. 1. Tucker (*The*

Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, pp. 64-65) asks why one should take statements acknowledging selfish economic motivation at face value and yet discount statements asserting humanitarian motivation. First of all, it is quite logical to weigh statements against a speaker's own interests more heavily than those in accord with them. Second, in many cases the alleged humanitarian motive is patently false. Consider Tucker's own example of the Truman Doctrine. Here is a statement of policy, says Tucker, which speaks of the liberty of free peoples and makes no reference to the needs of capitalism. Tucker neglects to mention, however, that it is known that the theme of defending freedom was consciously chosen by U.S. policy-makers as the "only way" to "sell the public" on the Truman Doctrine. (See Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, Viking Press, New York, 1955, p. 151.) But, in any case, given the character of the Greek regime that Washington was backing (see Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982), the assertion that the United States was promoting freedom is somewhat less than compelling.

58. House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Involvement of U.S. Private Enterprise*. p. 32
59. "Report to the National Security Council by the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice on National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies," Washington, D.C., Jan. 6, 1953, printed in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy*, Hearings 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, part 8, p. 7
60. George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership*, Praeger, New York, 1964, pp. 210-11
61. Pachter, "Problem of Imperialism," p. 475. No one has any difficulty understanding why the cost of capturing a bank robber may sometimes exceed the value of the money stolen: obviously, the rules of the game have to be enforced if the profit system is to be maintained.
62. Cohen, *Question of Imperialism*, p. 251, citing Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, p. 52. Whether Tucker is giving his view here or simply stating the radical position is unclear; but Cohen accepts it.
63. e.g., Pachter, "Problem of Imperialism," p. 475; Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, p. 52 (but cf p. 58)
64. *New York Times*, 1 July 1981, p. 13. Note that in both the Guatemala and Chile cases Washington helped replace democratic governments that were hostile to U.S. investment with brutal dictatorships that welcomed U.S. investment. For further examples and analysis, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, South End Press, Boston, 1979.
65. For example, Charles P. Kindleberger writes "Nor is neo-imperialism proof against confiscation of foreign properties in the host countries, witness Mexico, Iran, Ceylon, Indonesia, Peru and so on." (*Power and Money*, Basic

- Books, New York, 1970, p. 81) This shows no more, however, than that U.S. power is not unlimited (leaving aside the fact that, at least in the case of Iran, the United States did help topple a government that nationalized foreign assets).
66. Slater, "Imperialist or Imperial," p. 70. If in every instance policy-makers decided that the best way to further economic interests was by non-intervention, then of course the imperialism thesis would not be very interesting, regardless of whether it was true. But given that the U.S. has intervened in foreign countries on many occasions, the truth of the imperialism thesis is of considerable consequence.
 67. Chester L. Hunt, "The Philippine and American Relationship: Neo-Colonialism or Reluctant Partnership?" paper presented at the Western Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, Tempe, AZ, Nov. 11-13, 1983
 68. On the Stonehill affair, see George Farwell, *Mask of Asia: The Philippines Today*, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 208-09.
 69. Charles T. Goodsell, *American Corporations and Peruvian Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974, pp. 46-47, 55, 85, 130-131, 134-37. Raymond Vernon criticizes a study by C.H. Lipson that "concludes that the multinational enterprises do dominate U.S. policy-making after all, since the decision of the U.S. government not to act reflected the dominant preference of such enterprises." (*Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, p. 249n25) But given that, as Vernon himself points out (pp. 183-84), the United States, unlike, say, the Netherlands, has to take account of the impact of actions in defense of a U.S. enterprise on other U.S. firms, it is hard to see what his criticism is all about. The radical view seems well supported if, when most U.S. firms oppose intervention, Washington doesn't intervene and when most favor intervention (see note 77 below on Chile) Washington does intervene.
 70. Slater, "Imperialist or Imperial," pp. 71-72
 71. Frederick S. Pearson, "American Military Intervention Abroad: A Test of Economic and Noneconomic Explanations," In: *The Politics of Aid, Trade and Investment*, Satish Raichur and Craig Liske, eds., Halsted, New York, 1976, pp. 37-62
 72. James R. Kurth, "Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism," In: *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1974, p. 13
 73. Herbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment*, Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, 1973, quite sensibly argues that one must look at the constraints that are operative before predicting intervention. In many of the 147 cases he studies where the U.S. did not intervene, he finds restraints such as that lesser acts than overt intervention were successful, that U.S. local allies were strong enough to win on their own, or that war with nuclear weapons or against the Soviet Union would be necessary. In quite a few of the instances, however, he does not find these

sorts of restraints operating and he asserts that moral considerations restrained the intervention. But in Guatemala in 1954 and Iran in 1954 lesser acts clearly were successful, in Indonesia in 1965-66 and Jordan in 1970 Washington's local allies were able to handle the situation on their own (pp. 204-17). In any event, that the U.S. rejected overt in favor of covert intervention in, for example, Cuba in 1961 is not strong evidence of morality (p. 191) but of concern for appearances.

74. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, Signet, New York, 1963, p. 413
75. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, Fawcett Crest, New York, 1965, pp. 314-17
76. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Against Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Nov. 1975, pp. 139-48
77. It is sometimes suggested that U.S. intervention in Chile was supported only by that rogue elephant of the corporate world, ITT (e.g. Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen*, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1975, p. 43). But in 1970, the chairperson of the board of Anaconda and the Council for Latin America—whose "member companies control 85 percent of United States private investments in Latin America and have wide influence in Washington"—urged the U.S. Government to actively intervene to prevent Allende's election. Anaconda and other concerns offered to funnel money to a right-wing candidate, but Washington declined the offer, preferring to use taxpayers' money. (Seymour Hersh, *New York Times*, 24 Dec. 1976, p. A3)
78. Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p. 522; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, NY, 1965, pp. 271, 278, 286
79. George W. Stocking, *Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy*, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1970, pp. 215-16
80. See Shalom, *United States and the Philippines*, pp. 103-04.
81. Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, p. 31

Table 1

Merchandise Exports and Sales of Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates 1967-1976, 1982 (all figures in \$ billion except column 7)							
Year	(1) Merch. Exports	(2) Merch. Exports to non- Affiliates	(3) Merch. Sales of MOFAs	(4) MOFA Merch. Sales Not to U.S. or Affiliates	(5) (2+4)	(6) GNP	(7) (5/6)
1967	30.7	23.0	98.6	77.9	100.9	793.9	.127
1968	33.6	25.2	109.8	86.2	111.4	864.2	.129
1969	36.4	27.3	122.1	94.6	121.9	930.3	.131
1970	42.5	31.9	141.7	109.9	141.8	982.4	.144
1971	42.8	32.1	167.7	130.0	162.1	1055.5	.154
1972	49.4	37.1	192.7	149.4	186.5	1171.1	.159
1973	71.4	53.6	264.9	202.9	256.5	1306.6	.196
1974	98.3	73.7	397.9	291.8	365.5	1413.2	.259
1975	107.1	80.3	421.0	314.7	395.0	1516.3	.261
1976	114.7	86.0	468.0	347.5	433.5	1691.6	.256
1982	209.2	157.9	663.9	479.9	637.8	3069.3	.208

Note: MOFA = Majority-owned foreign affiliates. This overstates by counting 100% of sales when the U.S. share may actually be a smaller fraction, and understates by omitting minority-owned affiliates.

Sources

- (1) 1967: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971*, p. 753 (hereafter *SA*); 1968-69, 1971: *SA, 1974*, p. 778; 1970, 1972-76: *SA, 1982*, p. 820; 1982: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, July 1983, p. 58 (hereafter *SCB*)
- (2) Column 1 x .75 as estimate of exports to non-affiliated companies. See *SCB*, Dec. 1965, p. 12; AFL-CIO, "An American Trade Union's View of International Trade and Investment," in U.S. Senate, Finance Committee, *Multinational Corporations: A Compendium of Papers*, Committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Feb. 1973, p. 60
- (3) 1966-73: *SCB*, May 1976, p. 27; 1974-76: *SA*, 1980, p. 570; 1982: *SCB*, Dec. 1985, p. 49. MOFA sales before 1982 were not disaggregated into goods and services, so the ratio from 1982 (.909) was applied to total sales figures for 1967-76.
- (4) Total sales reduced by sales to U.S. (given in *SCB*, Aug. 1974, pp. 28-29; May 1976, p. 28; Feb. 1977, p. 31; Mar. 1978, p. 33); local sales reduced by 6% as estimate of affiliate sales and foreign sales reduced by 53% (see *SCB*, Aug. 1974, part II, pp. 26-27)
- (6) 1967: *SA*, 1971, p. 305; 1968-69, 1971: *SA*, 1974, p. 373; 1970, 1972-76: *SA*, 1982, p. 418; 1982: *SCB*, Dec. 1984, p. 12

Table 2

Merchandise Exports as a Percent of All Goods Produced 1965, 1968, 1970, 1972-1987 (all figures in \$ billion except column 3)			
Year	(1) Merchandise Exports	(2) Goods Produced	(3) (1/2)
1965	26.5	338.4	.078
1968	33.6	429.5	.078
1970	42.5	459.9	.092
1972	49.4	529.6	.093
1973	71.4	604.1	.118
1974	98.3	646.7	.152
1975	107.1	694.0	.154
1976	114.7	771.1	.149
1977	120.8	855.0	.141
1978	142.1	958.6	.148
1979	179.2	1065.6	.168
1980	220.1	1140.6	.193
1981	232.6	1291.8	.180
1982	209.2	1280.9	.163
1983	206.1	1396.1	.148
1984	224.1	1581.4	.142
1985	220.8	1641.2	.135
1986	225.0	1697.9	.133
1987	254.8	1792.5	.142

Sources

1965, 1970, 1972-78, *SA*, 1982-83, pp. 820, 418; 1968: *SA*, 1974, pp. 778, 373; 1979-82, *SCB*, July 1983, pp. 58, 23; 1983: *SCB*, July 1987, pp. 49, 41; 1984-87: *SCB*, July 1988, pp. 69, 41

Table 3

Profits from Direct Investments Worldwide 1968, 1970, 1973-87 (all figures in \$ billion except column 4)				
Year	(1) Earnings	(2) Royalties & Fees	(3) After-tax Corporate Profits	(4) 90%(1+2)/3
1968	6.5	1.5	48.2	14.9
1970	8.0	1.9	41.3	21.6
1973	16.5	2.5	76.6	22.3
1974	19.1	3.1	85.1	23.5
1975	16.4	3.5	81.5	22.0
1976	19.0	3.5	102.5	19.8
1977	19.7	3.9	122.0	17.4
1978	25.5	4.7	145.9	18.6
1979	38.2	5.0	165.1	23.6
1980	37.1	5.8	149.8	25.8
1981	32.4	5.8	144.1	23.9
1982	22.9	5.6	115.1	22.3
1983	20.5	6.3	130.4	18.5
1984	21.2	6.5	146.1	17.1
1985	33.2	6.7	127.8	28.1
1986	38.4	8.4	129.8	32.4
1987	52.3	9.3	142.9	38.8

Note: 90% in column 4 represents a 10% effective tax rate on foreign income (see text). The 1968 corporate profits figure is from unrevised series. Corporate profits do not include the capital consumption allowance, the capital consumption adjustment, or the inventory valuation adjustment.

Sources

- (1) 1966-75: *SCB*, Aug. 1977, p. 43; 1976: *SCB*, Aug. 1978, p. 35; 1977-82: *SCB*, Aug. 1983, p. 22; 1983-87: *SCB*, Aug. 1988, p. 65
- (2) *SCB*, Oct. 1971, p. 27; Aug. 1974, p. 22; Oct. 1975, p. 49; Aug. 1976, p. 45; Aug. 1977, p. 41; Aug. 1978, p. 23; Aug. 1983, p. 22; Aug. 1985, p. 33; Aug. 1987, p. 62; Aug. 1988, p. 46
- (3) 1968; *SA*, 1971, p. 472; 1973; *SA*, 1981, p. 522; 1970, 1974-78; *SA*, 1982-83, p. 545; 1979-82: *SCB*, July 1983, p. 27; 1983: *SCB*, July 1987, p. 25; 1984-87: *SCB*, July 1988, p. 45

Table 4

Profits from U.S. Direct Investments Developing Countries Only--1968, 1970, 1973-87 (all figures in \$ billion except column 4)				
Year	(1) Earnings	(2) Royalties & Fees	(3) After-tax Corporate Profits	(4) $90\%(1+2)/3$
1968	2.9	.4	48.2	6.2
1970	2.9	.5	41.3	7.4
1973	5.9	.5	76.6	7.5
1974	8.0	.6	85.1	9.1
1975	6.6	.7	81.5	8.1
1976	7.0	.7	102.5	6.8
1977	7.7	.7	122.0	6.2
1978	9.1	.9	145.9	6.2
1979	13.0	1.0	165.1	7.6
1980	11.9	1.2	149.8	7.9
1981	12.6	1.3	144.1	8.7
1982	8.6	1.2	115.1	7.7
1983	5.7	1.3	130.4	5.4
1984	7.2	1.2	146.1	5.7
1985	6.8	1.0	127.8	6.1
1986	6.7	1.1	129.8	6.0
1987	9.0	1.0	142.9	7.0

Note: Royalties and fees for 1968 taken as 25% of worldwide total, based on 1969-70 ratios. See notes to Table 3 above.

Sources

Same as Table 3 above